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| Forest Peoples Programme Bank Information Center REPORT ON A WORKSHOP ON INDIGENOUS PEOPLES, FORESTS AND THE WORLD BANK: POLICIES AND PRACTICE Washington D.C., 9-10 May 2000
Forest Peoples Programme Contents Executive
Summary Table 1 Case studies undertaken as part of the reviewTable 2 Official response to Inspection Panel claims BOX 1 OD4.20 and the World Banks View on Indigenous Land and Resource Rights BOX 2 The Challenge of Compliance: A Bank-wide problem BOX 3 Ecuador Indigenous Peoples And Afro-Ecuadorian Development Project (Prodepine) BOX 4 Bolivia-Brazil Gas Pipeline BOX 5 Guyana: National Protected Area System Project BOX 6 Eastern Lowlands Project (PTBE), Santa Cruz, Bolivia BOX 7 Madhya Pradesh Forestry Project, India BOX 8 Ecodevelopment Project: Nagarhole National Park, India BOX 9 Conservation of Priority Protected Areas System Project (CPPAP), Bataan, Philippines BOX 10 First and Second Integrated Forestry Projects, Rwanda BOX 11 Chad-Cameroon Petroleum Development and Pipeline Project BOX 12 Conservation of Bwindi and Mgahinga National Parks, Uganda BOX 13 Forfeiting accountability or creating flexibility? Annex 1 Workshop analysis of compliance with OD4.20 in seven World Bank funded projects Executive Summary Concern about the impacts of World Bank projects on indigenous peoples has been widespread for many years. Forced removals of tribal peoples to make way for large dams and mines, the invasion of indigenous reserves by landless colonists and loggers, the denial of land rights in the extension of large-scale plantations and agricultural schemes, pollution and the desecration of lands by oil exploration, all have been widely reported and decried. In response to criticisms and expressions of concern, the World Bank has adopted special policies designed to mitigate these impacts and ensure indigenous participation in development. However, partial reviews of the Banks compliance with these policies, carried out by World Bank staff, have revealed serious shortfalls in performance. In the 1980s, a Bank review of a small sample of 33 projects affecting indigenous peoples showed that less than half sought to observe the policy and only two complied with all its key elements. A recent desk review of projects in Latin America suggests that a third of projects affecting indigenous peoples are still failing to implement one of the central policy obligations, the preparation of Indigenous Peoples Development Plans. Currently, the World Bank is again revising both its Indigenous Peoples policy and its Forest Policy. The Forest Policy has been submitted to an intensive implementation review. Indigenous peoples and Non-Governmental organisations have urged that a similar review be made of the existing Indigenous Peoples policy before it, too, is revised. As in the case of the Forest Policy Implementation Review, a detailed review is needed to ensure that any future policy not only accommodates indigenous peoples views, but also takes into account the real difficulties the Bank has had in implementing the policy on the ground. The reluctance of the World Bank to carry out such a review prompted this study. We invited indigenous peoples to document their own experiences with World Bank projects in forests and then organised a workshop in Washington DC in May 2000 at which indigenous peoples and World Bank staff could discuss these case studies. The aim was to contribute to the World Banks policy revisions and strengthen indigenous peoples inputs to these policy-making processes. The willingness of World Bank staff to participate in this workshop contributed substantially to the usefulness of the outcome. Case studies, selected and prepared by indigenous peoples, came from Panama, Guyana, Bolivia, Cameroon, Uganda, Rwanda, India and the Philippines and included projects affecting forests financed by all the main parts of the World Bank Group including the International Finance Corporation and the Global Environment Facility. The case studies examined indigenous peoples experiences with a wide range of projects, including agricultural development schemes, community forestry projects, eco-development, protected areas, oil and gas pipelines and community development. This paper summarises the case studies and the workshop discussions. It finds that the existence of the policy has been important in promoting positive change in some countries and mitigating the worst impacts of World Bank funded projects in others. However, it also finds that very often the policy is not adhered to closely, sometimes with serious consequences for the peoples concerned. Obstacles to effective compliance are found both within the Bank and in borrower countries. Common failures include:
The study also highlights the structural and financial disincentives within the Bank to adhere to the policy. Staff lack the time and resources to implement the policy effectively, resulting in inadequate participation and shallow studies prior to implementation. Bank staff are not rewarded by their managers for close adherence to the policy and senior management to the very highest levels encourage staff not to apply the policy literally. In those cases where the policy was implemented effectively, this has been the result of long project preparation times, intensive staff inputs, willingness to pay unusually high transaction costs, stronger borrower government commitments to reform and genuinely participatory decision-making both in project preparation and implementation. The review stresses that if the Bank is to effectively apply its Indigenous Peoples policy in the future it will have to carry out reforms to the incentive structure within the Bank, so staff are encouraged and enabled to adhere to it. The paper also summarises the detailed recommendations previously made to the Bank by indigenous peoples. The case studies and workshop reinforced these points of view and called again on the Bank to carry out a participatory implementation review of the existing Indigenous Peoples policy. Effective compliance will also require:
ANR - Assisted Natural Regeneration Introduction: This paper summarises the findings of a workshop held in Washington DC in May 2000 on the theme of Indigenous Peoples, Forests and the World Bank: Policies and Practice. The workshop focused on discussion of nine case studies, presented by indigenous representatives, of their communities' experiences with World Bank projects in forests. The workshop had five main aims:
The cases examined come from Central and South America, Central Africa, India and the Philippines. Some 15 indigenous people participated in the workshop, which was also attended by 1 government official, 15 NGO representatives and 17 members of staff and consultants of the World Bank. The cases examined come from a wide spectrum of World Bank projects affecting forests, including forestry, eco-development, protected areas, oil and gas pipelines and community development. The examples are also from nearly the full panoply of World Bank institutions including the World Bank proper- the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), the World Banks soft loan window - the International Development Association (IDA), the World Banks private sector lending operation - the International Finance Corporation (IFC) and the current funding mechanism for the Convention on Biological Diversity which is administered by the World Bank - the Global Environment Facility (GEF). The cases also span over a decade of World Bank activity - some of the projects were initiated in the late 1980s, while others are still in preparation. The cases were selected after the Forest Peoples Programme (FPP) sent out a call for case studies on the web to indigenous organisations, targeting those organisations with which the FPP has already worked. Although an effort was made to invite indigenous organisations to present case studies on a number of projects with indigenous peoples that the World Bank was especially proud of, in the event indigenous organisations who came forward to present their experiences to the conference were mainly those who had less happy stories to tell. In that sense the projects are not a random selection of World Bank projects that have affected indigenous peoples, however, they do include a good range, geographically, institutionally and sectorally. They are thus broadly illustrative of the kinds of engagement that the World Bank has had with indigenous peoples. Table 1: Case studies undertaken as part of the review
This evaluation of World Bank performance comes at a time when the Bank is being pressured both externally and internally to reform the way it does business. Indeed, some social movements are calling for the World Bank to be shut down altogether. Ever since the mid-1970s, the World Bank has come under sustained criticism for the social and environmental impact of its projects. The World Bank has tried to respond: by increasing the number of staff with environmental and social expertise; by adopting operational guidelines on issues requiring special care; by establishing a whole new department on Environmentally and Socially Sustainable Development (ESSD); and by opening itself up to more thorough review and scrutiny, both through its own Operations Evaluation Department (OED) and by establishing an independent Inspection Panel to review controversial projects. Notwithstanding these important advances, expressions of concern from affected groups have not lessened. During 2000, the World Bank is itself undertaking two different policy reviews relevant to the theme of this paper. It aims to bring to a conclusion a process already long in gestation - its redrafting of its policy on Indigenous Peoples, with the objective of making its policy more realisable and flexible. It is also engaged in a detailed review of its Forest Policy, which it adopted in 1991, and which is now considered by World Bank staff to be outdated and in need of revision. The workshop was thus timed with the explicit intention of feeding into both these processes by drawing the World Banks attention to the people on the sharp end of both these policies, the forest-dwelling indigenous peoples themselves. For several years the Forest Peoples Programme has been calling on the World Bank to carry out a participatory implementation review of its Indigenous Peoples policy, in the belief that any revision of the policy should be informed above all by the actual experience of indigenous peoples themselves at whom the policy has been targeted. The workshop was not seen as substituting for such an implementation review but was aimed at demonstrating why one is necessary and what such a review should look at and how. The workshop, and its preparations, were made possible through the support of many individuals and institutions. We would like to take this opportunity to thank in particular, Charles Stewart Mott Foundation, Moriah Fund, Novib, W Alton Jones Foundation, Bank Information Center, Environmental Defense, International Work Group for Indigenous Affairs, Swedish Society for Nature Conservation and Rainforest Foundation (UK and USA). We would like to thank all the workshop participants for their comments on this paper and the case studies given during the workshop and thereafter. Background: In 1982, the World Bank adopted its first policy guidelines on Tribal Peoples in Bank-Financed Projects as an internal, and at that time confidential, document issued only to staff with the technical reference Operational Manual Statement No. 2.34 (OMS 2.34). The previous year, the World Bank had published a book titled Tribal Peoples and Economic Development: Human Ecologic Considerations, which ostensibly set out in more detail the World Banks policy towards tribal peoples. The publication was a progressive document, which committed the World Bank to respect the right of tribal peoples to their lands. It supported the principal of self-determination and affirmed that the World Bank would not support projects opposed by the peoples themselves. The internal OMS 2.34 issued to staff was, however, notably weaker being aimed at mitigating the worst impacts of World Bank projects rather than affirming the principle of self-determination. It did not offer indigenous peoples a corresponding right of veto. It did however direct World Bank operational staff to incorporate into their projects measures designed to protect the affected peoples land rights, health, cultural integrity and ensure their participation in project design and execution. The discrepancy between the two policies was not clarified until 1986 when the World Bank felt obliged to disclose the existence of the OMS and admit that the published policy statement was not considered binding on staff. Both the new internal policy and the publication were aimed at countering serious criticism of the World Bank for the severe impact of its projects on indigenous peoples. In the Philippines, the World Bank had offered to support the construction of the Chico Dams, which would have flooded some 80,000 Kalinga and Bontoc people off their lands. Tribal mobilisation against the dams triggered repression and insurgency. In Central India the World Bank had supported the establishment of huge timber plantations on tribal lands with shattering effects on the displaced Muria people. In Brazil, World Bank support for Amazonian development schemes also led to land invasions and high mortalities from introduced diseases. Despite the adoption of the 1982 policy, the severe impact of World Bank projects on indigenous peoples continued, but the World Bank denied major problems until in 1987 the then World Bank President, Barber Conable, finally admitted that many of World Bank projects had failed to take into account social and environmental issues. New staff with social science expertise were recruited and a review was undertaken to establish the degree to which staff were adhering to the tribal peoples policy (see below). During the late 1980s and early 1990s, there was a growing realisation inside the World Bank that borrower governments were failing to protect indigenous lands and therefore, where World Bank projects might impact such peoples, precautionary measures had to be taken to secure their rights and safeguard their future. The importance of such measures to secure the land rights of indigenous peoples was incorporated into the revised Indigenous Peoples policy in 1991. The fundamental role of land in indigenous welfare was further highlighted in a series of studies carried out by the World Bank in preparation for the 1992 World Development Report. The summary report of these studies noted: indigenous peoples in contrast to Western economists and development planners do not view land as a "commodity" which can be bought and sold in impersonal markets; nor, do they view the trees, plants, animals and fish which cohabit the land as "natural resources" which produce profits or rents. To the contrary, the indigenous view... is that land is a substance endowed with sacred meanings, embedded in social relations and fundamental to the definition of a peoples existence and identity. This close attachment to the land and the environment is the defining characteristic of indigenous peoples.... [Bank studies] emphasise the well-documented fact that indigenous peoples throughout the world face serious problems in gaining official recognition of their customary land and territorial rights. In most countries inhabited by indigenous peoples, there is either very limited or no legal recognition of their land and territorial rights; or, when national laws do recognize such rights, they are seldom defended in practice, especially when they conflict with wider regional and national development goals." pp.i-ii in Davis S (1991) "Indigenous Views of Land and the Environment" Background paper No. 10, World Development Report 1992, World Bank, Washington D.C. (emphasis added) As a result of this internal review and extensive consultations inside the World Bank, a new policy was adopted in 1991. Titled Indigenous Peoples and referred to as Operational Directive 4.20, the new six-page policy is a real improvement on OMS 2.34. The new policy adopts a broad approach about which categories of people should be considered as indigenous for the purpose of the World Banks operations and thus treats as indigenous peoples those "social groups with a social and cultural identity distinct from the dominant society, which makes them vulnerable to being disadvantaged in the development process". Key characteristics highlighted in OD 4.20 to help staff identify such peoples include:
The new policy makes much clearer the steps that World Bank project staff should go through to safeguard indigenous peoples in project areas. It emphasises the participation of affected peoples in project design, implementation and monitoring. Key elements that staff are expected to observe in applying the policy include the following:
The central and overriding objectives of the current safeguard policy are to: "ensure that the development process fosters full respect for [indigenous peoples] dignity, human rights and cultural uniqueness" (para. 6) and to "ensure that indigenous peoples do not suffer adverse effects during the development process...and that they receive culturally compatible social and economic benefits" (para 6). The policy therefore remains dominated by the concept of large projects requiring mitigation measures, but adds requirements for benefit sharing and indigenous participation. In sum, OD4.20 seeks to guarantee and promote:
More than its definitions, guidelines and objectives the policy is important because it makes requirements of borrowers and Bank staff in loan operations affecting indigenous peoples most of which are tied to specific stages of the project cycle (see Annex I). The Forest Peoples Programme criticised the World Bank at the time that the new policy was released for not having elaborated it through a participatory process in consultation with indigenous peoples. We also noted that the policy did not respect the right of indigenous peoples to self-determination or to veto projects, and did not make clear exactly when in the project cycle the critical elements of participation and land regularisation should take place. Indeed, indigenous organisations such as COICA had made clear recommendations to the World Bank in 1990 demanding a policy which included:
The International Alliance of Indigenous and Tribal Peoples of the Tropical Forests, which held meetings with the World Bank to discuss the new policy in 1992, also called for a much stronger recognition of indigenous peoples rights. They again demanded that:
Both the forest policy and the indigenous peoples policy are examples of what the World Bank calls its safeguard policies: policies that have been adopted by the World Bank to make sure that social groups and issues that are frequently marginalised or over-looked in economic planning are taken care of in its actual projects. World Bank staff are obliged to comply with these policies in all projects which may have an impact on these peoples or environments, including sectoral adjustment loans (SECALs), and they are also encouraged to address these issues in developing Country Assistance Strategies (CAS). Compliance with safeguard policies is, however, not currently mandatory for full structural adjustment loans though many indigenous peoples and civil society groups believe this is necessary. Current Revision Process: Since 1996, the World Bank has once again been revising its indigenous peoples policy. This is being undertaken by an ad hoc Working Group within the Bank and moved into the public domain in 1998 with the circulation of an "Approach Paper" to indigenous peoples organisations, governments and NGOs. The approach paper retains many of the objectives of OD4.20 but places more emphasis on culturally appropriate indigenous "self-development" and poverty alleviation. Much of the focus of the paper is centred on redefining categories and clarifying definitions and requirements. The underlying assumption is that development of a clearer policy will improve implementation. The proposed revision, as set out in the Approach Paper, intends to ensure that "minimum standards" are maintained by:
In late 1998, the World Bank held a series of consultations with indigenous peoples organisations and others in Brazil, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Vietnam, the Philippines, India and Russia. Each meeting produced a brief report of civil society recommendations. Since then, the World Bank has been reviewing its policy without direct consultation with indigenous peoples and advocacy groups. The World Bank was expected to make public a zero draft of its new policy on Indigenous Peoples (to be renamed Operational Policy 4.10) in July 2000, with the expressed intention of getting reactions to the draft from indigenous people and other interested parties. However, in line with current World Bank procedures, the draft first needs to be assessed and approved by the World Banks legal department and then passed to and cleared by the World Banks Operational Policy Committee before it can be released to the general public for further discussion. Owing to controversy now raging within the Bank about the status of all its safeguard policies and owing to a series of very critical findings by the World Banks Inspection Panel, which has documented persistent failures by World Bank staff to adhere to these policies, the process of revising these policies has been, at least temporarily, stalled. At the time of going to press, it is still not clear when or whether the zero draft OP 4.10 on Indigenous Peoples will be released for consultation. Non-Governmental Organisations like FPP have argued that while modifying the policies may be useful this will not necessarily improve implementation without more fundamental changes in World Bank procedures and practice. Crucially, there is a need to insitutionalise real incentives for staff to apply the policy and address the cross-sectoral impacts of World Bank lending. Indigenous and NGO recommendations for the revision of OD4.20 centred on six central themes: identification, land and natural resource management, participation and consultation, compensation, self-determination and indigenous development, and compliance. Some of the more important recommendations and observations included:
Previous Implementation Reviews: In 1987, the World Bank carried out a very partial internal review of the implementation of its 1982 policy. It found that, out of a small sample of 33 World Bank projects thought to be affecting indigenous peoples since the policy was adopted, only 15 had observed the policy at all - less than half. Moreover, of those 15 only 2 projects had observed all four key elements of the World Bank's policy. Only 6 out of the 33 projects included measures to protect the land rights of the affected peoples; only 2 included the required health measures; only 2 included measures for protecting the cultural integrity of the affected peoples and only 3 included measures for increasing the peoples participation in project design and execution. The review also found that land demarcation elements in indigenous project components were "severely delayed or out of pace with the progress of the overall project". These findings encouraged the World Bank to redraft the policy with the aim of giving clearer guidance to operational staff on how and at what stage in the project cycle, they should undertake specified actions. Since the 1988 study and since the World Bank adopted a new policy on Indigenous Peoples in 1991, no overall implementation review has been carried out. However, partial reviews have been undertaken of the application of the policy in Latin America. One early internal review suggested that in lowland South America, the new policy was promoting land regularization but noted the need for greater institution- building in borrower country governments so that national policy reforms could be put into practice. The review also advocated an alternative approach that built on the cultural and social strengths of indigenous peoples. BOX 2 - THE CHALLENGE OF COMPLIANCE: A BANK-WIDE PROBLEM The Indigenous Peoples policy is not the only one of the safeguard policies which the World Bank has problems complying with. The same is true of other policies such as those on Environment Assessment, Involuntary Resettlement and Forests. The main reason is that operational staff are under heavy pressure to move money fast with the minimum amount of hassle. Country Directors, who tend to be professional economists, have the job of overseeing World Bank lending to client countries in line with Country Assistance Strategies, which define borrower requirements principally in macro-economic terms. Annual lending targets to cushion countries balance of payment difficulties are also set by Consultative Groups comprising all the main donor agencies. Meeting these targets is a Country Directors first priority and operational staff are thus discouraged from investing too much time in socially and environmentally complicated projects. As a result, safeguard policies are seen as all pain and no gain. Staff are thus likely to invest the minimum of time in compliance with these policies, or they just avoid controversial projects altogether. The problem of abbreviated participatory procedures is widespread as a direct result. As a 1992 report by the World Banks Portfolio Management Task Force made clear, the Banks "pervasive preoccupation with new lending" takes precedence over all other considerations. According to the Task Force, "a number of current practices with respect to career development, feedback to staff and signals from managers militate against increased attention to project performance management." In the subculture which prevailed at the Bank, staff appraisals of projects tended to be perceived "as marketing devices for securing loan approval (and achieving personal recognition)", with the result that "little is done to ascertain the actual flow of benefits or to evaluate the sustainability of projects during their operational phrase." The Banks institutional priorities and management structures thus encouraged staff to flout internal policy directives and borrower governments to ignore loan conditions. Unsurprisingly, the "credibility [of loan agreements] as binding documents has suffered" and "evidence of gross non-compliance [with Bank legal covenants] is overwhelming." When borrowers disregard loan conditions, the typical response of Bank management has been to look the other way or waive the relevant requirement, unless public pressure forces them to do otherwise. Since this report came out, the World Bank has made efforts to change staff culture. Attempts are now being made to assess projects based on actual performance rather than merely on whether staff notionally comply with policies during project preparation and appraisal. New institutions have been set up within the Bank to encourage this change (QAG and CODE). To try to encourage participation and closer engagement with client governments, the World Bank has been decentralized with greater autonomy being given to Regional Vice-Presidents and Country Directors. However, this has not led to noticeably greater engagement with civil society or indigenous peoples within borrower countries and it has lessened the influence of the Environmentally and Socially Sustainable Development department. Failures in the World Banks compliance with its policy on Involuntary Resettlement have become notorious. Successive reviews have catalogued the very severe problems of people, disproportionately indigenous, forced off their lands by large dams. World Bank review teams have been hard-pressed to find any projects at all which comply with the minimal requirement that oustees should be at least as well off after removal, as they were prior to it. Nearly all have been worse off, many disgracefully so. A recent Forest Policy Implementation Review by the Operations Evaluation Department, which reviewed over 600 projects undertaken between 1991 and 1999, has documented a similar failure in compliance. Contrary to requirements, the policy was not incorporated into macro-economic planning or lending. There was poor linkage to poverty alleviation, weak participation, land tenure issues were often neglected and gender considerations almost wholly ignored. A major problem is that the World Bank allocates inadequate funds for what it calls the transaction costs of preparing and overseeing projects. Special funds for the higher costs of spending time in careful project planning and participation are limited and hard to access. The fact remains that operational staff are given very few real incentives to pro-actively engage in controversial sectors in the way that the safeguard policies demand. Real participation is a long way off and to date the World Bank has resisted suggestions that affected peoples or independent NGOs should carry out monitoring. A more recent internal review of 72 projects affecting indigenous communities in Latin America found that the policy was slow to take effect in the period 1992-1997 but had improved thereafter. Of 48 projects already underway by 1997, only 19 had attempted to address indigenous needs with an Indigenous Peoples Development Plan (IPDP) while another 12 featured an indigenous "component". In other words, over one third of the projects had failed to include the required indigenous peoples component. Only half of the projects involved active consultation with traditional indigenous authorities regarding project design and implementation. The best examples of compliance with OD4.20 were identified in pilot projects specifically targeting indigenous beneficiaries. The apparent degree of compliance with OD4.20 was much higher in the 24 projects still in the preparation phase in 1997 where, according to the Bank, "a good number" planned to incorporate an IPDP. The improvement in the World Banks performance of adhering to its own policy in Latin America is largely due to an increase in the number of staff with social science expertise in the ESSD. The overall performance, however, is still unacceptable. Moreover, as far as we are aware, no reviews have been done of the degree of compliance with the policy in World Bank projects in Africa or Asia, where the evidence is that the policy is applied even more patchily. |
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