OUR VIEWPOINT
-
Plantation certification review process:
The
future of the FSC at stake
With
regards to plantation certification, FSC has reached a crossroads
where no less than its credibility is at stake. The internal process
for the review of plantation certification is fairly advanced
and in September this year the Working Group set up for this purpose
will submit its recommendations.
In
this respect, it is of interest to note that there are various
worrying aspects in this process. On the one hand, since its initiation,
FSC has continued to certify vast tracts of plantations. In 2002,
when the Assembly decided to initiate the process, 3.3 million
hectares had been certified. In 2004 when the review process
was finally implemented, the figure had increased to 4.9 million
hectares and today, it reaches 7.4 million hectares. Although
WRM and other organizations formally requested a moratorium to
the certification of plantations until the review process was
finalized (see http://www.wrm.org.uy/actors/FSC/lettermoratorium.html),
the request was rejected.
Of
even greater concern is the fact that there is talk of totally
eliminating Principle 10 (that expressly refers to plantations).
For years now we have pointed out the serious weaknesses of this
principle – that enables practically any plantation to be certified
– with the aim of substantially improving it (see
http://www.wrm.org.uy/actors/FSC/comments.html).
To consider that its elimination would be a solution – as is the
intention now – is, to say the least, astonishing. Furthermore,
this would lead to an even greater conceptual confusion, because
in this way FSC would definitively be considering that forests
and plantations are synonymous.
It
should also be noted that the present review process does not
address a very important issue: that of the certification firms’
vested interests, whose profits depend more on the quantity of
hectares certified than
on the quality of the certification they are carrying out (see
article
"The
rot at the core of the FSC apple: Vested interest and so-called
‘independent certification’").
As
evidence of the above, it is illustrative to note FSC and the
certification firms’ reaction to the publication of an investigation
by WRM on four plantations certified in Uruguay (see
http://www.wrm.org.uy/countries/Uruguay/book.html).
Smartwood’s reply in addition to adulterating the truth, does
not respond to the criticism made in the report (see
http://www.wrm.org.uy/actors/FSC/fymnsa_clarifications.pdf).
The other firm involved (SGS) prepared a reply which it submitted
to FSC but did not make public. Based on the reply of the parties
involved in the complaint and without contacting WRM or the author
of the study, or launching an internal investigation, the Director
of FSC International, Heiko Liedeker, publicly dismissed
the report in a statement
-issued on
July 14, 2006-
under the title of “FSC guarantees
peace of mind to consumers” (available
at: http://www.wrm.org.uy/actors/FSC/Peace_mind.pdf).
As authors of this report, we can guarantee that none of these
plantations should have been certified.
The
attempt at reinterpreting existing criteria - that in fact are
not complied with - is also a matter of concern, seeking
to adapt the criteria to the plantations and not the other way
round (see
the comment on criteria 6.3 in article
"FSC
Plantations Review: Raising the Bar or Lowering Standards?").
In fact, if strict compliance with all FSC principles and criteria
were to be a requisite for plantation certification, no large-scale
monoculture tree plantation could receive the FSC seal. However,
thanks to the “flexibility” of the certifiers, they manage to
obtain it in most cases.
Moreover,
neither the FSC nor the Working Group seem to take seriously into
account the documented evidence on the negative impact of plantations
in general and of certified plantations in particular. However,
the evidence showing the accumulated impact of the plantations,
particularly on flora, fauna, water and society are abundant and
show the need to consider the joint impact of all the plantations
in a region and not just one in isolation.
Of
course it is not up to us to tell the Working Group what it should
do. But we can demand that the result of its work serves to ensure
fulfilment of FSC’s express mandate that all certified operations
(be these forests or plantations) are “environmentally
responsible, socially beneficial and economically viable.” Given
that many of the plantations presently certified do not comply
with one, two or all of these three elements, it would be appropriate
for their recommendations to include:
- the
immediate de-certification of the most questioned plantations,
whose social and environmental impacts have been
sufficiently documented.
- the
immediate launching of an independent investigation on all the
other questioned plantations
- the
implementation of a moratorium on further certification of major
plantations until a serious study has been made of whether these
large-scale monoculture tree plantations can or cannot comply
with the three elements of the FSC mandate.
WRM’s
position is well known regarding plantation certification by FSC
as well as our opposition to the expansion of monoculture tree
plantations in general. However, what is important to us in the
present review process is that radical changes be introduced to
avoid that – unintentionally – FSC should continue to undermine
local struggles against companies that have an impact on the environment
and on the local communities’ livelihoods. We are not concerned
about definitions; it is people and their environment that are
a matter of concern to us.
If
this process does not lead to much stricter requirements for plantation
certification, then it will have been useless. This would be a
defeat for FSC as it would accelerate loss of support from social
and environmental organizations ensuring its credibility. The
case of Spain, where organizations are campaigning to convince
others to withdraw from FSC (see
article below) should be taken seriously
into account.
In
short, the Working Group is presently facing an enormous responsibility.
It can choose to “change something so nothing changes” or it can
introduce radical changes in the policy implemented so far. The
future credibility of the organization depends on the option it
chooses.
index
CONTRIBUTION TO THE REVISION
PROCESS
-
FSC Plantations
Review: Raising the Bar or Lowering Standards?
In
November 2002, Forest Stewardship Council's General Assembly passed
a motion requiring FSC to revise its plantation policy. At the
time, an area of 3.3 million hectares of plantations had been
certified as well managed under the FSC system.
Almost two
years later, FSC launched a Plantations Review at a meeting in
Bonn, Germany. By then, the area of FSC certified plantations
had increased to 4.9 million hectares.
The Plantations
Review consists of two phases: a Policy Phase and a Technical
Phase. The Policy Phase is currently drawing to a close. At its
fourth meeting in April 2006, the Policy Working Group produced
a set of "Draft Recommendations". The area of FSC certified
plantations has now reached 7.4 million hectares.
Since November
2002 and the General Assembly motion, FSC has certified an additional
4.1 million hectares. It did so using a draft plantation policy
which is "not clear enough and needs improvement", in
the words of the motion passed by FSC's members.
At its fourth
meeting the Policy Working Group produced a vision of what it
would like FSC to achieve in the next ten years. The Working Group
describes this vision as "Raising the Bar", implying
that as a result of the Plantations Review process FSC's standards
will be improved. But the vision and the Working Group's recommendations
suggest that little will change for local people affected by industrial
tree plantations.
The Working
Group suggests that FSC should introduce a "Social Management
System" for forest and plantation managers to use "to
address social issues in forest and plantation management, which
certification bodies would then be able to audit". This proposal
overlooks the fact that local communities are sometimes in direct
opposition to plantation managers. In some cases, it can be extremely
dangerous for them to speak out against plantation companies.
To suggest that the plantation managers simply need to refer to
a Social Management System is ludicrous.
According
to the Working Group, plantation managers are to be responsible
for "consultation". FSC's Certifying Bodies are supposed
to be able "to determine if consent has been 'manufactured'"
and whether "the manager's research into the local community
has identified all affected parties". But plantation managers
have little interest in uncovering problems with their plantation
operations. Meanwhile, determining whether all affected parties
have been identified and whether consent has been manufactured
could require months and years of study - certainly longer than
the few days that FSC's Certifying Bodies spend assessing plantation
operations.
Currently
if a plantation manager has cleared
forest in order to establish plantations since November 1994,
then that operation cannot be certified
under FSC. There are problems with this, since it does not exclude
certification of plantations established
since 1994 on grasslands, for example.
Raising the bar might include, for example, prohibiting the conversion
of grasslands and other ecosystems to plantations.
The Working
Group suggests another review to look at conversion, which will
consider other ecosystems. However, the Working Group suggests
that the review should reconsider the 1994 cut-off date, partly
on the grounds that the current system "may exclude responsible
managers who had never heard of FSC in 1994 and converted from
natural forest to plantation in good faith, but who are now locked
out of the certification process."
At the 2004
meeting to launch FSC's Plantations Review, one of the people
who questioned the 1994 cut-off date was Arian Ardie, director
for sustainability at Asia Pulp and Paper. Obviously APP has an
interest in changing this cut-off date. Over the past five years,
APP has been responsible for clearing about 450,000 hectares of
forest to feed its Indah Kiat pulp mill in Riau, according to
WWF Indonesia's Nazir Foead. But in the bizarre world of FSC,
APP is a stakeholder, whose views need to be taken into account.
Back in
July 2002, Tim Synnott, then FSC's Policy Director, wrote: "FSC
P&C [Principles and Criteria] and guidelines are not always
clear or precise, leading to different
and contradictory interpretations by assessors, managers and FSC
members". Four years later the Working Group has not clarified
the situation. Instead, in the report of its fourth meeting, the
Group states that, "the lack of confidence in FSC certification
of plantations, is not because of the structure, nor the content
of the P&Cs." The Working Group suggests leaving any
changes to the Principles and Criteria to a separate review process.
FSC's Criterion
6.3 states that: "Ecological functions and values shall be
maintained intact, enhanced, or restored, including: a) Forest
regeneration and succession. b) Genetic, species, and ecosystem
diversity. c) Natural cycles that affect the productivity of the
forest ecosystem." This Criterion should exclude all industrial
tree plantations from FSC certification.
But rather
than recommending that FSC's Certifying Bodies should apply this
Criterion rigorously, as it is written, the Working Group proposes
that it should be interpreted as follows: "An FSC certified
plantation will take an active approach to optimising its conservation
strategy." This amounts to a serious weakening of the Criterion.
In its vision
for FSC, the Working Group hopes to see a "significant demand
for certified forest products" within ten years. In the context
of a Plantations Review this is an extraordinary statement. Many
industrial tree plantations provide raw material for the pulp
and paper industry. The Working Group is therefore hoping for
a "significant demand" for paper products. This undermines
both local struggles against industrial tree plantations and NGO
campaigns in the North aimed at reducing the consumption of paper.
Instead
of excluding industrial tree plantations from the FSC system,
the Working Group is making it easier for such plantations to
be certified. The Working Group is not raising the bar, it is
lowering standards. In fact it has to do so, if FSC is to stand
a chance of meeting the "significant demand for certified
products" hoped for in the Policy Working Group's vision
for FSC.
By Chris
Lang, email: http://chrislang.org
==
FSC is inviting
comments on the Policy Working Group's "Draft
Recommendations":
http://www.fsc.org/plantations/public_consultation.
index
-
The rot at the core of the FSC apple: Vested
interest and so-called ‘independent certification’
As
one of its Founder members, I am at least partly responsible for
having allowed a fatal flaw to be built into the FSC system when
it was established: quite simply put, the so-called ‘independent’
certification bodies that are accredited to the FSC are not, in
fact, independent at all. Having been a close observer of the
FSC since it was established, it now seems clear to me that this
flaw underlies much of what has subsequently gone wrong – and
why we now see so many utterly unjustified certificates being
issued to logging and plantation companies that fail to comply
with the majority of the FSC Principles and Criteria (P&C).
The problem is that, at present, contracts for certification assessments
are arranged directly between logging and plantation companies
and the FSC’s accredited certifiers. Because of this – and especially
because the award of a certificate will ensure future profits
for the certifiers from monitoring visits and re-assessments –
certifiers have a strong financial incentive to award certificates
even when the logging/plantation company does not comply with
the FSC’s P&C.
Another consequence is that certifiers are effectively competing
with each other to show prospective ‘certifyees’ that they are
the most likely to award a certificate – and the way that they
do this is by lowering their assessment standards, ‘turning a
blind eye’ to any major problems that they find, or taking a very
‘sympathetic’ view towards the logging or plantation company under
scrutiny. In effect, the accredited certifiers are in a commercial
‘race to the bottom’ in terms of the rigour of their assessments.
This serves to completely undermine the integrity of the FSC system.
The evidence for this is plentiful. For example, four years ago,
the Rainforest Foundation obtained internal documentation from
one of the accredited certifiers showing that it had deliberately
ignored the demands of the entire environmental and social NGO
community in Indonesia – who were calling for a complete moratorium
on certification - in order to pursue its own “strategic economic
interests”. This involved, amongst other things, issuing lucrative
FSC certificates to at least one company that was self-evidently
in gross breach of the P&C (and which, after a protracted
campaign, subsequently had to be withdrawn).
In
other cases, certifiers’ internal assessment systems appear to
have been manipulated in order to ensure that the logging/plantation
company under inspection just achieves the ‘pass mark’ necessary
to qualify for a certificate. In other cases still, the supposedly
independent ‘certification councils’, which are meant to oversee
the decisions of each of the accredited certifiers, have blatantly
ignored the assessors’ actual findings or any adverse recommendations,
and instead recommended that a certificate be awarded nonetheless
– thereby promoting the economic interests of the certification
company that, in reality, they are working for.
Through its monitoring and accreditation procedures, the FSC should
be dealing with these problems. However, in practice, it cannot
and does not. The FSC’s legally binding contract with the certifiers
prevents it from doing anything that might ‘harm the economic
interests’ of the certifiers. Moreover, some of the ‘Big 4’ certifiers
(SGS, SCS, SmartWood and Soil Association Woodmark) have simply
threatened to leave the FSC if it is too strict in applying the
rules. No doubt aware of how this would be viewed by its competitors
and funders, the FSC has therefore been cowed into complete submission
– with the result that it continues to allow totally inappropriate
certificates to be issued around the world, including in Brazil,
Cameroon, Ecuador, Indonesia, Ireland, Slovakia, South Africa,
the USA…
A
further consequence of the present structure is that the vast
majority of the ‘income stream’ from certifications is captured
by the certifiers, whilst the FSC itself is left permanently short
of cash and dependent on donors, who themselves have their own
agendas for the organisation.
Of
course, the benefit of hindsight is a wonderful thing. But it
seems clear that this problem of conflict of interest at the heart
of the FSC has to be addressed if any meaningful progress is to
be made in making the FSC work for the objectives that most readers
of this bulletin share. For example, one has to question the value
of putting a lot of effort into the Plantations Review process
when, even if P10 is radically improved, the certifiers would
be allowed to continue to totally ignore it anyway.
The direct financial link between the certifiers and the logging/plantation
companies has to be broken. One way to do this would be for logging/plantations
companies to have to contract directly with the FSC Secretariat
for certification assessments. The sub-contracts for carrying
out the assessments (and subsequent monitoring) could be awarded
by the FSC to certifiers on the basis of competitive tenders,
with the certifier promising the highest standards of assessment,
at the best price, winning the contracts for any given assessment.
The present ‘race to the bottom’ would thus immediately be transformed
into a ‘race to the top’. Certifiers could be obliged to include,
for example, a certain percentage of community forest certifications
in their total ‘portfolio’ in order to be eligible to bid to certify
the larger, more lucrative, industrial forestry operations.
The FSC Board would be responsible for commissioning an independent
evaluation of a random sample of certifications each year to ensure
that the certifiers were fulfilling their contracts – and any
that were not would be heavily penalised or have their contractual
payments withheld. The FSC Secretariat would charge for its services,
thus ensuring a steady income stream and reducing its dependence
on external funders.
Of
course, the certifiers will fiercely resist these changes – as
it would force them to increase the rigour of their assessments.
But the choice seems to be simple: either the certifiers’ stranglehold
on the FSC is broken, or the FSC will continue to slide towards
total collapse of its credibility.
By
Simon Counsell, Rainforest Foundation,
email:
simonc@rainforestuk.com. Note: A more detailed briefing
and proposal on this matter is available on request from the author.
index
-
Brazil: Asking explanations from FSC, Imaflora/Smartwood
and Aracruz
On
June 1st, 2006, the Seminar on “The Rights
of Indigenous Peoples and the Advance of Agribusiness: issues
and challenges” took place in the town of Vitória, Espírito Santo,
Brazil. The Seminar gathered the Tupinikim and Guarani communities
and also other communities affected by large-scale monoculture
tree plantations, in addition to various sectors of civil society
in the State of Espirito Santo, for a thorough reflection on the
subject.
They
discussed the complete lack of suitability of the present development
model which follows the expansion in Brazilian rural areas of
large-scale monoculture plantations, such as eucalyptus, pine,
soya and sugarcane. The reform of this model is urgent –they claimed-
beginning with the financing of productive activities on totally
different bases, giving priority to life, to diversity and to
the people and communities affected by large-scale monoculture
tree plantations, especially women who are those who most suffer
from these impacts.
At
the meeting, the case of Aracruz Celulose, that tried to get the
FSC certificate in 1999 for its eucalyptus plantations in the
state of Bahia, was highlighted. At that time a strong and massive
mobilization of organizations, communities, movements and citizens
prevented Aracruz from succeeding in obtaining the certificate.
The company then ‘purchased’ this certificate when, in 2003, it
acquired about 40,000 hectares from the Riocell company in the
State of Rio Grande do Sul, which had its plantations certified
by the FSC in 2001. However, action by the Tupinikim and Guarani
before the International Secretariat of the FSC led the company
to announce that they had ‘demanded the canceling of the FSC-certificate’
themselves.
Aracruz,
though, went unpunished and local communities question how it
was possible that for around two years the company succeeded in
maintaining in the region where it operates a certificate that
demands respect for the rights of indigenous peoples and their
lands, while in another region where it is active it violates
these same rights.
They
now demand “a necessary explanation about what happened on the
part of the involved parties:
1.
FSC – Why did FSC allow Aracruz to bear the FSC-certificate since
2003 while it was occupying indigenous lands? Why was it that
FSC did not act after the indigenous communities self-demarcated
their lands in May 2005, and after they were violently evicted
from two villages in January 2006, when the Guest House of Aracruz
was used as Federal Police Headquarters and as a police station
where two Indians were kept prisoners for several hours? Does
FSC believe that such a company deserves this certificate for
even one day?
2.
Aracruz Celulose – if the company is publishing the news that
there had never been Indians on their lands, if it affirms, with
such conviction that it legally bought its lands in Espirito Santo,
including those which are indigenous, why did the company decided
to desist from the FSC-certificate?
3.
Imaflora/Smartwood – Why is it that Imaflora/Smartwood did not
study the Aracruz Celulose Company when it bought up the Riocell
company? Why did it allow Aracruz to hold the certificate for
about two years while occupying indigenous lands in Espirito Santo,
even though there was much public information about the issue
on the Internet?
We
expect public explanations from the three actors involved in this
issue. And we hope that in future FSC will no longer give permission
for the certification of forest management units of companies
which violate human rights and/or jeopardize local communities,
be these indigenous, quilombolas, fisherfolk or peasant communities.
The time has come for FSC to promote good diversified forest management
with benefits for all. For this purpose FSC has an excellent opportunity
at its disposal with the current international review process
on the certification of tree plantations.”
Excerpted
from the open letter “The harshness of capital against life --but
Aracruz Celulose lost the FSC-certificate!”, issued by the Alert
Against The Green Desert Movement”, on 4th July 2006 (at
http://www.wrm.org.uy/countries/Brazil/Open_Letter_Aracruz.html).
For more information on Brazilian’s FSC Review Process, see “Documento
para o Grupo Internacional de Revisão dos Princípios e Critérios
do FSC para plantações de árvores” (in Portuguese, at
http://www.wrm.org.uy/paises/Brasil/Carta_Revisao_FSC.pdf)
index
-
Certified plantations in Uruguay:
Can the FSC
really guarantee peace of mind to consumers?
In
March 2006, the WRM released the publication “Greenwash:
Critical analysis of FSC certification of industrial tree monocultures
in Uruguay” (see
at http://www.wrm.org.uy/countries/Uruguay/book.html).
The report addressed the four main certified plantation companies
and included a very detailed critique
of the certifiers’ reports, complemented
with interviews with workers and people from local communities
in the vicinity of the plantation areas. The report concluded
that none of those plantations comply with FSC’s mandate because
they are not managed in an “environmentally appropriate, socially
beneficial or economically viable” way.
The two
certification companies involved (SGS and Smartwood) reacted to
the report by sending their response to FSC. Based on that “evidence”,
the FSC disseminated a statement
titled “FSC guarantees peace of mind to consumers” (see
at http://www.wrm.org.uy/actors/FSC/Peace_mind.pdf).
Heiko Liedeker, Director of FSC International, is quoted as
saying that “Reading the certification body’s reports it is apparent
that some information in the WRM report was based on misunderstandings
or in some cases presented out of context” and ends promising
that “Consumers can count on the FSC system as a guarantee for
good forest management”.
We honestly
believe that by acting in this way, the FSC is missing a good
opportunity for change, particularly in the context of the current
plantation certification review the organization is working on.
The WRM report is in no way “based on misunderstandings” or presenting
anything “out of context”; it is based on facts.
Unfortunately,
much as we would like to, we cannot comment on SGS’s response,
for the simple reason that the document they presented to FSC
is not publicly available. We can however comment on Smartwood’s
(available
at http://www.wrm.org.uy/actors/FSC/fymnsa_clarifications.pdf),
which states that “The WRM report findings
related to stakeholder interaction do not agree with SW’s records
or information on numerous elements.” In
this respects, Smartwood provides the following information:
“The
WRM report states that the head of a local workers union (Jose
Bautista) indicated to SW his perspectives on FYMNSA certification
and SW ignored them (“lo que dije a SmartWood sobre la certificación
de FYMNSA no lo tuvieron en cuenta para nada" y que “luego
que vino SmartWood a los pocos días había un gran cartel de la
certificadora en las oficinas de la empresa"). [“everything
that I told SmartWood with regard to the certification of FYMNSA
was completely disregarded.” Meanwhile, after SmartWood came to
assess FYMNSA’s operations, “within a few days there was a big
SmartWood poster hanging in the company’s offices”].
We would clarify the following: SOIMANORPA,
which Mr. Bautista heads up, was established in 2003. He was never
interviewed during the initial assessment of FYMNSA simply because
this organization did not exist at the moment. He was interviewed
during subsequent assessment of another operation, Villa Luz,
where he met with SW auditors Jacques Boutmy and Rolyn Medina.
During that meeting he indicated that, from his perspective, WRM
was not up to date on actual social or worker realities of operations
in the field. He also indicated that FYMNSA was a leader in allowing
the workers union to interact with FYMNSA workers, that his union
maintains constant and very open communication with FYMNSA.”
That is
Smartwood’s version, which apparently Mr Heiko Liedeker believes
to be true. I spoke on Thursday, 20th of
July with Mr Bautista and asked him
if he agreed with the points raised above by Smartwood. His answer
was: “It’s all false” (“es todo falso”). Mr Bautista is a very
well organized person and keeps record of all he does. He was
therefore able to track the meeting quoted above with Jacques
Boutmy and Rolyn Medina, and discovered that it took place on
20 October
2004, well before WRM had even thought about carrying out this
research!
I
asked him more specifically on whether in his view “FYMNSA
was a leader in allowing the workers union to interact with FYMNSA
workers”.
Once
again he replied:
“it’s false”.
With reference to SW's
statement that “his
union maintains constant and very open communication with FYMNSA”,
Bautista explained
that even though the company receives the union, that's just a
mere formality. And added: “three days
ago I was interviewed in Rivera [the capital city of the province
where FYMNSA is based] by TV Channel 6 and by four local radios
and I said that the company was violating labour rights and that
it should have never been certified. Maybe that’s the reason why
Smartwood has reacted in this way”.
In
its report to FSC, Smartwood adds that “FYMNSA has now hired an
External Labor Auditor to ensure compliance with labor laws, regulations
and procedures for all staff and contractors. This auditor sends
monthly reports to FYMNSA on these issues, including corrective
action requests (CARs).”
I
also asked Mr. Bautista about this and he replied: “I don’t know
anything about that”. One might think that the union leader with
which apparently FYMNSA maintains such a good communication would
be the first person informed about such good news. Unfortunately,
this is not the case.
Even worse, Mr Bautista explained at length the present very conflictive
situation resulting from the company’s violation of labour regulations
and sent me in writing a summary of the main points of the conflict
(see
http://www.wrm.org.uy/actors/FSC/Letter_Batista.html).
Contrary to what Smartwood’s response seems to imply, the document
ends stating: “Dialogue with the Union
still exists but the reverting of FYMNSA’s breaches of labour
legislation and respect for trade union organization and workers
has not been achieved.”
Even without
taking into account all the other environmental and social impacts
detailed in the WRM report, the above is sufficient to emphasize
that in this case –where labour rights are being violated- the
FSC cannot seriously pretend it can “guarantee peace of mind to
consumers”.
By
Ricardo Carrere, World Rainforest Movement,
author of the report mentioned in this
article. E-mail: rcarrere@wrm.org.uy
index
- The
power of corporate groups. The case of the local Ecuadorian
FSC
Ecuador
is a country with one of the highest rates of deforestation in
the world. In this process various actors are involved, not only
the major timber companies that typically carry out both lawful
and unlawful timber extraction activities, but also companies
undertaking deforestation to install vast monoculture tree plantations,
ranging from African palms to pine and eucalyptus.
In
order to appease world opinion that has become aware of these
problems and rejects them, the market has found a solution: certification.
It is thus that today in Ecuador both projects causing major environmental
impacts as well as very destructive companies now have FSC certification,
as is the case with the PROFAFOR del Ecuador S.A.'s
large scale monoculture tree plantations for carbon
sinks
and the ENDESA and BOTROSA industrial tree plantations.
The
national group legally recognized by FSC in Ecuador is the Ecuadorian
Council for Voluntary Forest Certification (Consejo Ecuatoriano
para la Certificación Forestal Voluntaria -CEFOVE).
As is the case with FSC, it comprises environmental, economic
and social chambers. The presidency of the Board of Directors
of CEFOVE regularly rotates among each of the three chambers and
in theory power of decision is equitably spread among the three
chambers. However, no measures have been taken to ensure that
the members of the chambers really occupy their corresponding
posts and it is thus that various irregularities exist in addition
to arbitrary action undertaken by the logging companies of the
Durini Group (Setrafor, Endesa, Botrosa, Acosa) and its lobbying
organizations: Fundación Forestal Juan Manuel Durini (FFJMD),
Corporación
de Manejo Forestal Sustentable (COMAFORS) and
Asociación Ecuatoriana de Industriales de la Madera (AIMA). Furthermore,
the economic chamber is totally dominated by the Durini Group
which, through membership of four of its companies and two of
its lobbying organizations, holds the absolute majority of votes
in the chamber.
As
an example, PROFAFOR del Ecuador S.A., responsible for generating
and negotiating carbon bonds on the stock-market is involved in
the environmental chamber, when in fact its place should have
been in the economic one. The other members of the environmental
chamber have protested but PROFAFOR has refused to change. In
2006 the presidency of CEFOVE corresponds to the environmental
chamber and PROFAFOR has been appointed as its president. Last
year Juan Carlos Palacios from COMAFORS was president on behalf
of the economic chamber, which means that for two consecutive
years economic groups have predominated.
Furthermore,
the coordinator of CEFOVE works half time at CEFOVE and the other
half time in the office of the National Forestry Director in the
Ministry of the Environment. This situation leads to a serious
conflict of interests and the possibility that the Ministry of
the Environment’s public interests can influence CEFOVE policy
and vice-versa.
Mid-2005,
Acción Ecológica and WRM published the book “Sumideros de Carbono
en los Andes Ecuatorianos” (Carbon Sinks in the Ecuadorian Andes),
a thorough study on the impact of PROFAFOR plantations. However,
the study has not been addressed by the members of CEFOVE and
no comments have been formulated regarding the question revealing
that the granting of certification to these monoculture plantations
ought to be impossible. On the contrary, the election of PROFAFOR
to the presidency of CEFOVE’s Board of Directors can only be explained
as institutional endorsement for this very debatable company.
The
economic chamber now holds the power in CEFOVE, a fact that was
clearly reflected when in 2005 the Federation of the Ecuadorian
Awa Centre (Federación del Centro Awá del Ecuador - FCAE) (a member
of the environmental chamber) lodged a complaint against Setrafor,
Endesa/Botrosa (members of the economic chamber) and against Plywood
Ecuatoriana and CODESA (indirectly members of CEFOVE through membership
of COMAFORS and AIMA). The complaint involved the invasion of
their territory and their forests legally recognized as the Ancestral
Awa Settlement’s Ethnobotanical Reserve, causing serious environmental
and social damage within the Awa territory and immediately surrounding
areas considered as the buffer zone, and for removing trees without
the corresponding permits from FCAE legal representatives.
Ironically,
in this case it was FCAE that ended up by being challenged for
denouncing one of the members of CEFOVE. No measure was adopted
to halt the timber companies. On the contrary, CEFOVE resolved
that “SETRAFOR, CODESA and PLYWOOD do not have absolute control
over the procedures and attitudes of their employees and contractors
in the field.”
Worse still, Endesa/Botrosa, with the endorsement of CEFOVE received
FSC certification this year, issued by the GFA Consulting Group
for its monoculture tree plantations. This certificate wipes off
the board the record of 40 years of violation of Human Rights
of the local peoples and systematic environmental degradation
by the Durini Group companies. The vast international market is
now open to one of the companies that does the most to destroy
Ecuadorian primary forests.
However,
CEFOVE’s lack of credibility has become evident with the recent
resignation of FCAE and the Altropico Foundation, one of the founding
and promoting members of this initiative. Jaime Levy, its executive
director in his public letter sent to the members of FSC and CEVOFE
on 13 July 2006 explains that: “We consider that it is impossible
to continue sharing a space where the objectives are framed in
achieving better environmental forest management, true respect
for its owners and an equitable sharing of economic benefits from
forestry operations, with members such as COMAFORS and companies
producing plywood, who to our way of thinking are responsible
for the almost complete disappearance of the Choco forests of
Esmeraldas”. “This Heritage belonging to Ecuadorians and to the
world is now seriously threatened by the action of these companies
and in spite of their discourse on conservation and sustainable
management of the remaining forests and in spite of being members
of CEFOVE and FSC, what we have seen over the past few years in
the north of Esmeraldas is a completely
different situation. And presently exploitation with heavy machinery
in the remnant forests continues at a fast pace and with scant
control by the Ministry of the Environment.”
The
certified plantations in Ecuador are a sample of the system’s
shortfalls. It is in the hands of economic powers that dominate
the Ecuadorian FSC group – CEFOVE. Its enormous power and influence
is detrimental to the local inhabitants and to the need for forest
conservation.
By
Nathalia Bonilla, Acción Ecológica, e-mail:
foresta@accionecologica.org
and Klaus Schenck, e-mail: klaus@regenwald.org
index
RESEARCH ON CERTIFIED PLANTATIONS
Over the
past few years, WRM has coordinated research with local organizations
from several countries in Africa, Asia and Latin America to document
the impacts of large scale tree monocultures on people and nature
(see at http://www.wrm.org.uy/publications/index.html#books).
Some of those case studies included certified plantations, while
one was entirely focused on FSC-certified plantations (Uruguay).
This section of the bulletin includes short summaries of the case
studies, providing evidence of problematic certifications
- Brazil: Certification of V&M
and Plantar plantations
The
Alert against the Green Desert Movement is a broad network of
opposition to the expansion of large scale eucalyptus tree plantations
in the region which covers the
States of Minas Gerais, Espirito Santo, Bahia and Rio de Janeiro
and Rio Grande do Sul. Its existence
and struggles arose from the proven social and environmental impacts
of these plantations, some of which presently enjoy FSC certification.
A team from
this Network took part in a case study carried out at the end
of 2003 (Certifying the un-certifiable. FSC certification of tree
plantations in Thailand and Brazil” (http://www.wrm.org.uy/actors/FSC/text.pdf)
and investigated the plantations of V&M and Plantar S.A. Reflorestamentos,
certified by FSC through the certifying bodies Société Générale
de Surveillance (SGS) and Scientific Certification Systems (SCS).
V&M
owns 235,886 hectares of land in the State of Minas Gerais, distributed
among 25 properties of between 1,000 and 36,000 hectares. Plantar
is the owner of some 15 rural properties totalizing 280,000 hectares.
The study
observed that some of the certified plantations occupy lands by
encroaching on their originating inhabitants, thus undermining
the struggles of the local peoples to recover their lands.
Other disputes were also identified between small farmers and
the companies regarding the use of agrochemicals, blocking of
roads or the alteration of access to and management of water resources.
In Brazil,
FSC certification has also seriously undermined workers’ rights:
“Nothing can excuse SGS’s and SCS’s absolute silence, in their
Public Summaries and annual monitoring reports, regarding the
serious labour problems in V&M’s and Plantar’s certified forestry
management units, especially given the prominence of the issue
in local political discussion and the Minas Gerais press and on
television. Sub-human labour conditions, excessively long working
hours, child labour, illegal outsourcing, subjection of workers,
irregular transportation, unhealthy and degrading work, blacklisting
of worker leaders, lack of freedom and lack of union autonomy
– all this has been the subject of innumerable articles in the
regional mass media as well as public debates in several municipalities
and the state and federal parliaments.”
Restoring
lands planted with monoculture tree plantations back to forests
is no easy task, either politically or practically. In the case
of certified plantations, the difficulty is even greater and certification
becomes a tool which the plantation owners use to confront the
local communities.
The Brazilian
case study also documents how eucalyptus plantations – including
those of the two certified companies – have been one of the major
causes of destruction of the native cerrado vegetation. As a result,
local communities have been deprived of sustainable means of livelihood.
For the purposes of FSC certification, it may matter little that
the plantation companies burned this cerrado for the sake of charcoal
and eucalyptus plantations, since the destruction took place before
November 1994. Nevertheless, “the impact of the destruction of
the biome is felt up to today, mainly by the local people who
lost much of their flora, fauna and water and suffered the consequences
of the application of agrochemicals. Far from protecting what
native vegetation remains, the thousands of hectares planted with
eucalyptus ended up becoming a hazard.”
The study
contends that the economic and social benefits of products such
as charcoal for steel production or timber for paper pulp production
are “small compared with the negative social impacts of the associated
industrial plantations on the lives of workers and the negative
socio-economic impacts on the life of local communities.”
An issue
related with the certification process as a whole should also
be noted, namely the irregularities in the certification process
that have led to non-observance of FSC criteria and to the influence
of the certifying organizations’ vested interests. The study concludes
that V&M and Plantar’s forestry management infringes national
and international legislation, such as some of the International
Labour Organization’s treaties. Regarding environmental legislation,
V&M and Plantar have failed to observe the resolution requiring
that enterprises of their size must obtain permits through the
submission of an Environmental Impact Assessment.
The
report also documents the fact that V&M and Plantar do not
fulfil some of FSC criteria as the majority of the plantations
were established on lands covered by native “cerrado” vegetation.
They contributed to destroy this threatened biome, simultaneously
causing social, environmental, cultural and economic prejudice.
The FSC
prides itself on its attention to social issues. Consultation
with local people, communities and organizations lies at the core
of its credibility. However, in the case of Brazil, consultation
has been lacking. The Public Summary for V&M enumerates various
“interested parties” with which, according to SGS, “meetings and
discussions were held”, but does not comment on the results of
these meetings and discussions. Trade union members mentioned
in the list of “interested parties” supposedly consulted by SGS
deny that they were consulted during the certification process
in 1998.
Furthermore
the services of the certifying firms are paid by the companies
wishing to obtain certification. This gives the firms a strong
incentive to grant quick certification, without imposing too many
conditions or monitoring the fulfilment of FSC criteria in a strict
way.
Finally,
the reports by the certifying organizations regarding the plantations
owned by these companies lack a careful analysis of the socioeconomic
universe in the places where they have been established and have
not been placed in context. The reports reflect the fact that
the auditors made a subjective interpretation, ranging from the
selection of content and priority items in their study, to the
selection of less critical interlocutors. They made field visits
oriented by an extremely narrow interpretive horizon, ignoring
the territory’s temporal and spatial references.
The conclusion
of the study is that: “after having assessed the certification
of Plantar S. A. and V&M, we can state that any such consumer
certainty would be sadly misplaced."
index
-
Ecuador: Zero community benefits from FACE
PROFAFOR certified plantations
In
1999, the FACE Forestación del Ecuador S.A. programme, known as
PROFAFOR, hired the Swiss certification firm SGS-Société
Générale de Surveillance to assess the forestry management of
20,000 hectares of its monoculture tree plantations in the Ecuadorian
Andes. In 2000, SGS granted a certificate to PROFAFOR's
plantations for absorbing carbon dioxide emissions (this was the
first case in which storage and uptake of carbon dioxide were
certified in tree plantations and not in real forests), and in
December 2000 granted the Forestry Certification Seal accrediting
that PROFAFOR fulfils “FSC Principles and Criteria.”
What
is FACE-PROFAFOR? FACE (acronym meaning Forest Absorbing Carbon
dioxide Emissions) is a Dutch Foundation that was established
in 1990 by the Board of Management of the Dutch Electricity Generating
Companies, N.V. Sep, with the initial objective of establishing
150,000 hectares of tree plantations to compensate for the emissions
from a new coal fired electricity generation plant to be set up
in the Netherlands. The new project was to represent millions
of tons of carbon dioxide released into the atmosphere. Due to
the costs involved, they turned to the establishment of tree plantations
in developing countries. This is how FACE came to Ecuador where
it established the FACE Forestación del Ecuador (PROFAFOR) programme,
and funded the PROFAFOR del Ecuador company to establish monoculture
tree plantations of exotic species (pine and eucalyptus) to “store”
atmospheric CO2.
Following
the serious negative environmental and social consequences generated
by the establishment of the tree plantations, in 2005 the Ecuadorian
organization “Acción Ecológica” carried out a research, resulting
in the report “Carbon
Sink Plantations
in the Ecuadorian
Andes.
Impacts of the Dutch FACE-PROFAFOR monoculture tree plantations’
project on indigenous and peasant communities”, available at http://www.wrm.org.uy/countries/Ecuador/face.html
The
field work identified that - in addition to not guaranteeing economic,
social and environmental benefits to the communities under a certified
forestry project - in the case of the indigenous communities in
the Ecuadorian Andes, FSC Certification has led to a situation
which is precisely the contrary, insofar as the communities find
themselves obliged to absorb the costs of the project as well
as its impacts.
Additionally,
with certification FACE PROFAFOR has improved its image and managed
to make the negative impacts generated by the project invisible.
The local communities affected by certified projects must face
the force and weight of the “Green Label” which deprives their
struggles and claims of credibility.
The
report has identified what PROFAFOR obtains from the communities:
land, labour and money.
Under
the terms of the contracts signed, FACE does not pay any kind
of rent for the community-owned lands where the “Carbon Intake
and Storage” that it is negotiating on the international market,
takes place. FACE PROFAFOR keeps 100 per cent of the Rights
for Absorbing Carbon while it requires that the communities do
not use these lands for any activity other than maintenance of
the carbon sink during the 25-30 years duration of the contract.
Furthermore,
the project's offer to “generate
employment” is
fictitious. Indeed, the communities have
to absorb the negative impact of the project
as, in order to comply with the FACE
PROFAFOR contract,
on occasions they have
had to resort to hiring people from other places, either because
they do not possess the necessary skills to carry out certain
jobs in conformity with technical specifications or because the
plantations are located in places of difficult access and subject
to extreme climatic conditions.
Regarding
money, out of the figure originally offered to the community,
over the first three years PROFAFOR deducts the “cost” of the
plants and technical assistance it provides. In addition to the
communities receiving almost half of what was initially offered,
the contracts oblige them to use the resources provided by FACE
exclusively for the Plantation Contract, but these resources are
generally insufficient to cover the communities’ expenses in completing
the establishment of the plantations.
Additionally,
the contracts ban activities such as grazing. In many cases this
implies that the families owning cattle have to rent land for
their animals, an expense that previously did not exist.
Sometimes due to lack of grazing land they have to reduce their
heads of cattle.
To
improve its image, FACE alleges that its activities are carried
out on degraded lands and at altitudes where agriculture is impossible
and where grazing is not profitable.
The
true situation is very different. FACE introduces pine plantations
in primary ecosystems, not on degraded lands. The plantations
are established in a very fragile ecosystem, of great hydrological
importance: the Paramo, fundamental for the regulation of regional
hydrology and a source of water for most of the population in
the Andes. The great amount of organic matter enables these
soils to retain much water. The implantation of alien tree species
in the Paramo does NOT favour ecosystem stability. On
the contrary, it transforms and damages
the fragile soil structure, causing serious cracking due to the
changes in the water regime. It also affects the flora and the
fauna and determines that the plantations have a poor yield, which
finally leads to prejudicing the carbon sequestering it intends
to achieve.
Eight
years after launching its activities, FACE obtained FSC Certification.
It was of scant relevance that to establish its plantations primary
systems were destroyed, nor did it matter that no measures to
mitigate the impacts generated by the project were demonstrated.
Summing
up, FSC Certification in the FACE PROFAFOR plantations in Ecuador
does not guarantee that the communities “benefiting” from the
project receive economic, social or environmental benefits. Rather
it shows a considerable – and questionable – “flexibility” in
the application of FSC Principles and Criteria.
index
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South Africa: Research views FSC certified
tree plantations as a legacy of apartheid
In
South Africa, a thorough research carried out by John Blessing
Karumbidza --“A Study of the Social and Economic Impacts of Industrial
Tree Plantations in the KwaZulu-Natal Province of South Africa”,
available at
http://www.wrm.org.uy/countries/SouthAfrica/book.pdf
-- has identified a host of damaging economic, social and environmental
impacts of monoculture tree plantations affecting local communities,
water resources and ecosystems.
The introduction
of industrial tree plantations in the country witnessed in the
1980s a new wave led by timber companies Sappi and Mondi, both
with FSC certified plantations: Mondi Business Paper, with 399,068
ha, and Mondi Millennium Newsprint with 48,530 ha, both through
the FSC-accredited certification company
SGS; and SAPPI Forests Group Scheme with 76,041 ha, and SAPPI
Forests with 383,164 ha, both through the FSC-accredited certification
company Soil
Association Woodmark (SA).
The growing
of large scale monoculture tree plantations was possible thanks
to artificially low input costs, especially wages and land acquisition,
as well as generous subsidisation of and provision by the government
at that time. As a result, two processes were put in motion: the
hastening of rural capitalist relations and the intentional use
of trees as landscape modifiers. This development took place within
the framework of segregation and apartheid policies that have
been instrumental to determine the racial and spatial nature of
South Africa’s agrarian landscape. Since
the first democratic elections in South Africa in 1994, the primary
initiative of the industrial tree-growing sector has entailed
two particular strategies: the establishment of out-grower schemes
promoted as social or corporate responsibility or as employment
creation schemes, and the attempt to bring on board a BEE (Black
economic empowerment) component into the existing asset structure
of the major industrial tree-growing companies. However, it is
becoming increasingly clear that these programmes have failed
to ameliorate the ever-increasing list of negative social, economic
and environmental impacts of the industrial timber plantation
sector’s activities.
Timber industry
plantations have displaced people from their original homes disrupting
traditional livelihood mechanisms and replacing rich and diverse
grasslands with a checkerboard of plantations and fields. Soil
and water are being polluted by insecticides, herbicides and other
chemical contaminants used in timber plantations including fuel
and engine oil spilt from vehicles and chain saws. Plantation
trees also change soil pH and all plantation tree species used
by the industry invade river-courses, forests, grasslands and
wetlands, necessitating the use of more polluting chemicals and
fuels for their eradication. Plantation workers are seldom provided
with adequate safety equipment and are exposed to the fumes from
spraying pesticides and heavy plantation vehicles.
However,
and despite the problems with industrial tree plantations in South
Africa, an area of 1.665.418 Hectares is certified by the Forest
Stewardship Council as being well managed.
The case
of the SiyaQhubeka Consortium, certified by SGS, is mentioned
by the FSC as “changing the paradigm of plantation management”
(FSC no date). However, the referred study reveals that the joint
venture group called SiyaQhubeka is more a Mondi partnership with
government (sharing 90% between them) rather than a genuine empowerment
deal. There is also no definite time frame put in place for the
transfer of Mondi’s shares t
