Cameroon:
Oil palm plantations fostered by new biofuel market harm local
livelihoods
In Cameroon, like
in other African countries such as Ivory Coast or Ghana, the production
of oil palm is distributed in 3 sectors: an agro-industrial sector,
a village sector controlled by agro-industries, and a small-scale
traditional sector.
Table 1. Area
and production of oil palm plantations in Cameroon in 2002.
|
|
Surface (ha) |
Raw production
of oil palm (tons) |
|
Agro-industrial
plantations |
60,000 |
105,000 |
|
“Supervised”
village plantations |
14,000 |
|
Small-scale
traditional plantations |
24,000 |
35,000 |
Source:
Monfort (2005).
Even though Indonesia
and Malaysia hold a strong leadership position in the oil palm
global market, the agro-industrial sector in Cameroon can rely
on several advantages.
In the first place,
the industrial plantation of oil palms has largely benefited from
governmental programmes and from international capital. The intensive
culture of oil palm – a plant traditionally used by local populations
– begins under the German colonization and is further developed
by the French and the British with the creation of the Cameroon
Development Corporation (CDC) and of Pamol Plantations.
In 1963, the government
starts a first large programme aimed at developing the plantation
of oil palms, notably with the creation of SOCAPALM in the Kribi
region. In 2001, the Ministry of Agriculture launched an ‘oil
palm project’ within the framework of new “voluntarist” policies
aimed at “modernizing the agriculture”, with the help of France
and the international financial institutions (IMF, World Bank).
This programme is seen as a “national priority” and promotes an
increase of production and productivity in order to cover national
needs (in deficit) and to improve international competitiveness.
The objective is to produce at least 250,000
tons by 2010. This aim relies on the privatisation of large state-owned
exploitations (CDC, Palmol and SOCAPALM) and on the increase of
the plantation area of at least 5,000
ha per year.
Secondly, the oil
palm agro-industry will benefit from the predicted boom of biofuel,
a new market in which the French group Bolloré, for a long time
present in Cameroon, is expected to play a key role.
In Cameroon, the
culture of oil palm and its industrial transformation is carried
out by 5 large societies, 3 of which are being owned by Bolloré:
SOCAPALM, SAFACAM and the Ferme suisse. The investment strategy
of this group is based on the possibility to expand the plantations
and on the productivity gains made possible at the level of production
and transformation.
Created in 1822,
the company of the Bolloré family has today a yearly turn over
of more than 5 billions of euros. The Bolloré Empire has specially
grown in Africa, where it controls more than 70 firms in 35 countries,
particularly in the transport, energy, and other highly profitable
sectors such as wood exploitation and cash crops (like oil palm
and hevea). It is well-known that the group, in order to expand
its influence, did not hesitate to work hands in hands with dubious
dictators such as Sassou Nguesso. What is more, Bolloré has largely
benefited from the large privatisation campaigns imposed by structural
adjustment programmes.
In Cameroon, Bolloré’s
nickname is “the last emperor”. The group is present in the petroleum
industry (Chad–Cameroon pipeline), in sea transport for exportation
and in the wood business. The group also controls about 40,000
ha of oil palm plantations, particularly through the Belgian company
Socfinal. The latter, which flourished thanks to the Belgian colonization
in Africa, exploits 31,000
ha of oil palms in Cameroon (SOCAPALM and the Ferme suisse), as
well as other oil palm plantations in Indonesia and elsewhere
in Africa, totalising an area of more than 140,000
ha.
SOCAPALM is the largest
oil palm plantation in Cameroon and its expansion is on the way,
at the cost of neighbouring forests traditionally used by local
populations. SOCAPALM is at the root of important land conflicts
involving Bagyeli, Bulu and Fang populations whose land has been
confiscated without compensation. Their traditional ways of life
have become impossible and at the same time they cannot benefit
from an insertion into the market economy.
In effect, SOCAPALM
hires workers from other regions of Cameroon and accommodate them
in camps located in the plantation. The neighbouring villagers,
on the other hand, only rarely get jobs. Jobs are often temporary,
without labour contracts, without health and accident insurances,
and the wages are extremely low: an unskilled worker earns a little
more than one euro a day (the workday starts at 6am and lasts
sometimes until 6pm). What is more, the arrival of non-native
workers poses several problems, for instance with respect to the
increasing pressure on local bush meat.
The agrochemicals
used by SOCAPALM and the rejections of its treatment factory massively
pollute the neighbouring streams. Cases of sicknesses within the
village population have been reported.
An important number
of guards prevent the villagers from using the resources of the
plantation. This situation led, on January 7, 2003, to a severe
clash between guards and villagers (during which arms and legs
were cut by machete). As a reprisal, the police forces came to
help the plantation guards and swept off many villagers and kept
them in jail without trials during 14 days.
Given that oil palm
plantations benefit from a large national and international support,
this type of agro-industry will keep on spreading, in parallel
with a worsening of the mentioned social and ecological impacts.
Moreover, the new market of biofuel will certainly represent a
powerful motor for the cultivation of oil palm. It is expected
that the Bolloré group will not stay inactive in the great race
for the “substitution of petroleum”. The group has already several
advantages in his hands. Bolloré is already present in the energy
and plantation sectors and can benefit from solid foundations
in Africa based on the collusion of political and economic interests.
Also, eager to green its image, the group has already invested
in projects of “alternative” energy, for instance with its “BlueCar”
electrical prototype.
By Julien-François Gerber,
e-mail: This article is
based on the author’s field observation and on the following publications:
M.A., Monfort 2005, "Filières oléagineuses africaines",
Notes et études économiques, n°23, p. 55-85; Agir ICI & Survie,
2000, "Le silence de la forêt: réseaux, mafias et filière
bois au Cameroun", Dossiers Noirs n°14, and "Bolloré:
monopoles, services compris. Tentacules africaines", Dossiers
Noirs n°15, Paris, L’Harmattan.
