For many years, local peoples and environmentalists have been opposing large dams due to the severe social and environmental impacts they entail. Since its creation, the WRM has been an active participant in the fight against dams, and included them as a major cause of forest loss already in its 1989 "Penang Declaration." During the past years, we have been trying to assist local peoples' struggles against dams and reflecting them in almost every issue of our bulletin 
(all available at http://www.wrm.org.uy/deforestation/dams.html ). We have now decided to dedicate an entire bulletin to this problem, with the aim of sharing information to enhance opposition to this destructive activity at a moment when, on the one hand, the World Commission on Dams has produced an extensive report detailing the damaging effect of large dams, and, on the other hand, when organizations worldwide are preparing an "International Day of Action against Dams and for Rivers, Water and Life", to take place on March 14. We hope the bulletin will contribute to increase awareness and solidarity with the struggle.

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OUR VIEWPOINT 

- Dams, forests and people

When asked to name different causes of deforestation, few people will mention hydroelectric dams as being one of them. Even fewer will include them as a cause of human rights violations. However, dams constitute a major direct and indirect cause of forest loss and most of them have resulted in widespread human rights abuses.

This lack of awareness can be explained by the fact that for many years large hydroelectric dams have been portrayed as synonymous with development. Another reason can be that most users of hydro-electricity live far away from the impacted areas and that the sites selected for dam building have been often those inhabited by indigenous peoples, ethnic minorities and poor communities having little capacity of being heard by the wider national community.

The fact is that more than 40,000 large dams --those that measure more than 15 metres in height-- are currently obstructing the world's rivers, whose reservoirs cover more than 400,000 square kilometres of land --an area larger than the combined surfaces of the United Kingdom, Belgium, The Netherlands and Austria.

These reservoirs have inundated millions of hectares of forests –particularly in the tropics-- many of which were not even logged and trees were left to slowly rot. They have also resulted in deforestation elsewhere, as farmers displaced by the dams have had to clear forests in other areas in order to grow their crops and build their homes. Additionally, dams imply road building, thus allowing access to previously remote areas by loggers and "developers", resulting in further deforestation processes.

However, the dams' effects have included much more than forest loss and the major environmental changes have impacted on local people, at both the dam site and in the entire river basin. Not only are the best agricultural soils flooded by the reservoir, but major changes occur in the environment, where the river’s flora and fauna begins to disappear, with strong impacts on people dependent on those resources. At the same time, dams imply a number of health hazards, starting with diseases introduced by the thousands of workers that are brought in to build the dam (including AIDS, syphilis, tuberculosis, measles and others) and ending with diseases related to the reservoir itself (malaria, schistosomiasis, river blindness, etc.).

In far too many cases, dam-building has resulted in widespread human rights violations. As most of us would, local peoples have persistently resisted the destruction of their homelands and their forced "resettlement." As a result, they have had to face different types of repression, ranging from physical and legal threats to mass murders, such as in the case of the Chixoy dam in Guatemala (see article in this bulletin).

But resistance, consciousness and solidarity have grown. Local people have increasingly been able to organize themselves and to establish local, national and international alliances with other concerned organizations. Major examples are the Narmada Bachao Andolan movement in India, the Bio Bio Action Group in Chile, the Coalition of Concerned NGOs on Bakun in Malaysia, the People Affected by Dams movement in Brazil among many others. It has now become possible to stop large hydro dams. They are definitely not a symbol of development but one of economic and political power resulting in social and environmental degradation.

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LOCAL STRUGGLES AND NEWS

AFRICA

- Kenya: Resistance to the Sondu Miriu Dam project

The Sondu Miriu River is one of the six major rivers in the Lake Victoria basin, which drains 3,470 square kilometres in the western part of Kenya. The company responsible for managing all public power generation facilities in Kenya --KenGen-- is planning a dam project to be located about 400 kilometres from Nairobi. Water from the river will be diverted through a 7.2 kilometre long tunnel into a one million cubic meter reservoir and a 60 megawatt hydro power station.

This megaproject is being financed by the Japan Bank for International Cooperation together with KenGen. Kenya is the largest recipient in Africa of Japanese official "aid": in 1999 Japan devoted more than U$S 57 million under the form of grants and loans to this aim. The civil works are being carried out by Konoike Construction JV, Viedekke Heavy Construction Company of Norway and Murray & Roberts Contractors International of South Africa.

Even though the power station is scheduled to be operational in 2003, some of the works --like the construction of camp sites, roads, a bridge, and communication facilities-- have already started, and together with them the fears over the environmental and social impacts of the project.

According to the NGO coalition Africa Water Network, the diversion of the river will cause the disruption of the whole hydrological basin, with negative consequences on wildlife. Colobus monkeys and hippopotamus, for example, which are dependent on the river will be forced to seek a source of water at the lower populous Nyakwere plains disturbing their habitat. KenGen is not taking responsibility on the issue, arguing that this is the competence of governmental agencies. The company even claims that a part of the river’s flow will keep on running on the original channel. Nevertheless, similar river diversion projects for the Turkwel Gorge and Masinga hydropower dams resulted in the permanent or seasonal drying up of the courses. The blasting needed to build the tunnel will alter the geomorphology of the area, and the entire water table may be also affected by the construction.

Social impacts are already taking place. Since health precaution measures have not been put in place to handle the effects of the great dust clouds that come off the construction project, most members of the community are already suffering from eye and respiratory problems. The diversion of the river will provoke a shortage in the supply of water, which is a vital element for domestic and agricultural use by 1,500 local households. Additionally local communities have denounced that KenGen has not kept its promise of providing them electricity and irrigation facilities, as stated in the initial project documents. Now the company says that such activities are beyond its mandate. Last but not least the project has so far displaced 1,000 households through forced resettlement. In March 2000 KenGen admitted lacking plans to relocate people who will be affected by power transmission lines from the dam.

Resistance to the project is on the rise and so is repression by Kenyan authorities. Last December Argwings Odera --an activist of the Africa Water Network who works with dam affected people-- was arrested, beaten and shot in an arm by the police. He is now facing criminal charges for holding meetings and trying to share information and raise awareness about the project.

Article based on information from: "Kenyan Dam Protester Arrested, Shot" http://ens-news.com/ens/jan2001/2001L-01-11-01.html 

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- Namibia: Uncertainty on the future of Epupa Dam

For over five years plans have been discussed by the Namibian and Angolan governments to dam the Kunene river, which runs through both countries, and construct a hydroelectric power station somewhere south of the Angolan border. The proposals have been dogged by controversy and delays from the outset and have developed into a saga, which has rumbled on and on without ever seeming to reach closer to a conclusion.

The controversy has centred on the impact of the dam on the indigenous tribal group of the Kunene region, the Ovahimba, who have successfully lived as nomad pastoralists in the area for the past five-hundred years. Of the two potential sites for the dam the most economically viable, at Epupa, is the least environmentally and socially attractive; a dam wall 163 metres high would create a reservoir covering up to 380 square kilometres. This would displace 1,100 Himba and affect 5,000 occasional users of the excellent grazing areas on the river bank. In addition, 95 archaeological sites and 160 Himba graves sites would be permanently lost.

The Namibian government has often come under criticism for excluding the interests of its many minorities, including the San Bushmen and Rehoboth Basters, and it can be of little surprise that it has always favoured the Epupa option, yet has made minimal efforts to consult the local population about the consequences for them of such a project and how they might be mitigated. In fact, a feasibility study commissioned by the respective governments carried out in 1999 concluded that "there has not been sufficient dissemination of information concerning the scheme, or local community consultation, participation and … development of an acceptable social mitigation programme." Fears that the disruption to the Himba and their grazing areas could lead to their urban migration and the demise of their way of life brought the response from the Namibian authorities that the project would bring much-needed jobs to the Kunene region --so in tune with the feelings of the local population was the government that it forgot that the Himba are nomadic farmers who neither need nor want jobs.

The second possible site, at Baynes, some 40 km south of Epupa, would cover just 57 square kilometres of land, drowning 15 grave and 45 archaeological sites, displacing one-hundred permanent users and about 2,000 occasional ones. However, this site is far and away the least economically viable and could only work with the benefit of the war-damaged Gove dam inside Angola. The Angolan government, which would like an excuse and funding to rejunenate Gove, favours this option.

However, there are good reasons to question both sites. Apart from the serious disruption to the Himba population, creating a reservoir which would evaporate twice as much water as the country uses in a year seems to make little sense, especially in the desert and semi-desert landscapes of Namibia. In addition, in times of drought the power station could expect to see its output fall dramatically from 360 megawatts to 200 megawatts. The Himba themselves have suggested looking into solar and wind energy as alternatives, but have received short shrift from a government with an antipathy to any form of opposition and who is also "obsessed with building the dam, despite the fact that both the EU and the World bank have expressed strong reservations about its viability." (Stephen Corry, Director of Survival International, a group that campaigns for the rights of minority tribes).

Finally, will it ever happen? Sources close to the Namibian government have suggested that the plan has been shelved, partly due to adverse publicity and a resultant lack of investor interest. Certainly little progress has been made in the past few years and no decision has been made on which site, if either, would get the nod. Only last year in a July visit to Namibia, Luis da Silva, the Angolan energy and water affairs minister, declared that his government’s priority was to rehabilitate Gove dam, suggesting that bilateral agreement is as far off as ever. Given that the Gove/Baynes option is contingent on the Angolan government securing the Gove area from UNITA rebels, if the two governments do agree on this plan it could not go ahead for the foreseeable future. However, this is largely immaterial as Namibia would agree to Epupa or nothing, which makes it difficult to believe that the plan will now go ahead at all.

By: Henry Dummett, e-mail: HenryDummett@eiu.com 

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- The Bujagali Dam: A useless giant in Uganda

The Ugandan government --backed by the International Finance Corporation, the World Bank, the US agency Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC), and a number of European export credit agencies (ECAs)-- is promoting the construction of a huge dam which, if implemented, will destroy the living space of thousands of local dwellers together with the scenic beauty and historical sites at the Bujagali falls region on the Upper Nile River. Responsible for the construction of this U$S 530 million hydroelectric dam is US-based AES corporation.

The main argument of the promoters of the project is that it will be useful to alleviate poverty and reduce the use of fuelwood and charcoal in a country with one of the lowest per capita income in the world, and where about 95% of the population does not have access to electricity. This argument clearly confuses causes and consequences. As Martin Musumba of "Save Bujagali" Campaign says, "the real issue in Uganda is not electricity but poverty. Currently the majority of Ugandans have no money for electricity, for they are below the poverty line. Production of more electricity will not reduce use of fuelwood and charcoal until deliberate programs are evolved to reduce poverty and the cost of power."

The megaproject would completely alter the landscape, since it would flood the Nile all the way to the base of the Owens Falls Dam. As well as in the case of the Owens Falls Dam, located just 10 miles below the projected site of the Bujagali Dam, no independent environmental impact assessment (EIA) has been performed. According to Dr John Baliwa of the Fisheries Research Programme, the sources of the Nile, an extensive fishery resource with an estimated potential of 10,000 metric tons of fish per year, are menaced by the accumulation of water hyacinth behind the several dams existing in the region. Cumulative impacts including the desiccation of wetlands and the destruction of forests along the river are also feared.

From the socioeconomic point of view, consequences are equally negative. An EIA performed by AES itself considers that the dam would permanently displace 820 people, and affect an additional 6,000 by submerging communal lands and sacred burial sites. Replacement land for those who would lose homes or crops is not planned. In addition, the reservoir is expected to increase seRious water-borne diseases like schistosomiasis and malaria, being the latter already the most important cause of death in Uganda. Sustainable tourism activities especially by foreign visitors who like to enjoy rafting in the spectacular series of cascading rapids of the Bujagali Falls will disappear, which will mean a significative decrease in the incomes of local communities. Jobs for local people promised by the company during the works have never turned into reality.

Ugandan and international concerned organizations are putting forward alternatives to this useless giant. They are promoting the use of true renewables like solar and wind, which constitute realistic and viable possibilities in order to stop the pressure on native forests for fuelwood and charcoal. "Future economic prosperity and sustainable water resource management in Uganda will not lie in huge dams. The way forward is the wise use of river-based environmental goods and services; not their extinction through the pursuit of hydropower lunacy," says the Kampala-based National Association of Professional Environmentalists, which carried out a study of the area in February 2000.

Article based on information from: http://www.uganda.co.ug/bujagali/ ; US Company Plans to Dam Uganda's Bujagali Falls" by Lori Pottinger, International Rivers Network, e-mail: lori@irn.org 

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ASIA

- Malaysia: Bakun Dam project once again relaunched

The Bakun Dam project --the largest in Southeast Asia-- was originally planned by the Malaysian authorities in the early 1980s, abandoned in 1990, revived in 1993 and reshaped in 1997. The Bakun Hydroelectric Corporation is the owner and future operator of the dam. Lahmeyer International from Germany, Harza from the US and Dohg-Ah Construction and Industrial Co. from South Korea have been involved in the supervising of the works and the construction of the tunnel for the diversion of the waters. The main construction package of this multimillion dollar initiative was first granted to the Swiss-Swedish multinational ABB and the Companhia Brasileira de Projectos e Obras (CBPO), but in late 1997 problems arose and ABB was sacked from the project. The expected and real impacts of the projected dam on the environment and local communities, and the controversy that such megaproject has brought with it, are in line with its gigantic scale.

According to the original plan of the dam, about 69,000 hectares of primary rainforest --which represents one third of Sarawak's remaining pristine forests-- were to be logged. Clearcutting could have catastrophic effects on the dam itself, increasing the chance of sediment build up, flood and slope failure. Fish stocks would be dramatically reduced following the loss of mobility and deoxygenation of river water in the flooded area, while 43 protected species of fauna and 67 protected species of flora could disappear because of flooding. The project's environmental impact assessment was never released to the public, although this is a legal requirement.

Local villagers, indigenous peoples, and human rights and environmental groups in Malaysia and abroad have repeatedly denounced the lack of transparency surrounding the project from the very beginning. The infrastructure needed for the works has facilitated the encroachment on Native Customary Rights lands. The forced resettlement of the Bakun residents --which sum about 10,000 indigenous people belonging to 15 longhouses-- is a major impact caused by the project. Indigenous communities of the Kayan, Kenyah, Lahanan, Ukit and Penan ethnic groups have definitely lost their lands and crops --including traditional rice varieties-- and were resettled in a location called Asap. The government promised to compensate them, as though the loss of their homeland and culture could be somehow repaired. But in fact they were only provided with modest houses in a new "modern" village lacking completely adequate infrastructure regarding roads, waste disposal and schools and where no job opportunities exist.

Because of the Asian economic crisis in 1997 the Malaysian government had to halt the project, as well as several other major infrastructure initiatives, in order to reduce public spending. However, Bakun's long and tortuous story is not over yet, since two years later the authorities raised the proposal of restarting the project, presenting a downsized plan according to which the original generation power of the dam of 2,300 megawatts was reduced to 500 megawatts. The Coalition of Concerned NGOs on Bakun (Gabungan), the Bakun Region People's Committee (BRPC), Sahabat Alam Malaysia (Friends of the Earth) and other representatives of Malaysian civil society and academic circles consider nonetheless that the only real solution to the conflict is to definitely shelve the project. They advocate for a more realistic, sustainable, transparent and democratic approach to the issue of energy needs and supply in Malaysia.

Article based on information from: "Malaysian megadam won't go away", BBC News, 16/11/2000, http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/world/asia-pacific/news ; http://irn.org/programs/bakun/ ; Lang, Chris et al., "Dams incorporated. The record of Twelve European Dam building Companies", A Report by the Corner House published by the Swedish Society for Nature Conservation, February 2000; WRM Bulletins 2, 9, 24 and 29. 

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- Philippines: Local people against the San Roque dam

The San Roque Dam is to be located on the lower Agno River of Pangasinan Province, in the Cordillera region of Luzon island in the Philippines. If built, San Roque would be the tallest dam --at 200 meters-- and largest private hydropower project in Asia, generating 345 megawatts of power. Electricity generated by the dam would be primarily used to power industrial activity and the burgeoning mining industry in northern Luzon. Preparation of the site began in 1998, and construction is slated for completion in 2004. San Roque is the third dam to be constructed on the Agno river: the first two, Binga and Ambuklao, were built in the 1950s.

The San Roque Power Corporation (SRPC) is owned by a Japanese trading company, Marubeni (41%); a subsidiary of US energy company Sithe Energies Inc. (51%), which is 29% owned by Marubeni; and a Japanese utility company, Kansai Electric (7.5%). In 1997, the Philippines National Power Corporation (NPC) gave the SRPC the rights to build, operate and maintain the project for a peRiod of 25 years. In return, the NPC has agreed to buy power for a price of P2.98 per kilowatt-hour. In April 1998, US-based Raytheon company won a $700 million sub-contract to design and build the facility.

The project cost is estimated at US $1.19 billion. In October 1998, JEXIM (the Export-Import Bank of Japan) approved a $302 million loan to the private sector developers, and is considering an additional $400 million loan to finance the Philippines National Power Corporation’s contribution to the project. Other financing is expected to come from a consortium of Japanese commercial banks and equity provided by the project sponsors.

Project benefits are said to include irrigation of 87,000 hectares, water quality improvements due to reduced downstream siltation, and 50 percent reduction of floods which destroy crops during the rainy season. However, the two upstream dams, Binga and Ambuklao, have been plagued by excessive sedimentation due to logging and gold mining operations in the Agno watershed, resulting in more severe floods at the upper end of the reservoirs. There is no reason to believe that the situation will be any different at San Roque.

Over 160 families at the dam site in Pangasinan were forcibly displaced in early 1998 and for almost a year were living in desperate conditions at a temporary site. They were promised land, houses, alternative livelihood sources and social services, but instead the NPC distributed P10,000 per family as supposed compensation. Only in late January 1999 were 147 houses in the new resettlement site handed over to the displaced families. Another 402 families in Pangasinan will be required to relocate before the project is completed.

The project is fiercely opposed by thousands of indigenous Ibaloi peoples upstream of the dam site. NGOs in the region estimate that if the dam is built, more than 2,000 Ibaloi families in Itogon, Benguet will be adversely affected by the project. Many of the people facing resettlement were forced to move once before to make way for the Binga and Ambuklao dams upstream. The livelihoods of tens of thousands of downstream residents will be affected due to erosion and destruction of fisheries.

It is important to underscore that JEXIM's environmental guidelines state that people resettled by projects it funds must have given their consent. Given the strident opposition of the populations slated for resettlement, it appears that JEXIM's support for this project violates its own guidelines. Affected peoples have written to JEXIM in protest, to no avail.

Approximately 4,000 residents, municipal and barangay officials including the mayor of San Nicholas, Bagong Alyansang Makabayan - Central Luzon (BAYAN-CL) and the Cordillera Peoples Alliance (CPA) trooped to the municipal plaza and held a rally calling for the stoppage of the San Roque Dam project last September 30th, 2000 in San Nicholas, Pangasinan. The rally highlighted the failure of the Marubeni Company to meet the peoples' demands and conditionalities attached to the dam construction.

Local organizations have been campaigning for the total stoppage of the dam project because of its adverse social and environmental effects on the host community. Furthermore, they believe that the project will not benefit the Filipino people. Besides being a burden to the Filipino taxpayers, the $1.2 billion dam will only serve the energy needs of the foreign mining companies who are out to exploit their natural resources. The project also violates the indigenous peoples and farmers rights over their lands.

Article based on information from: San Roque Hydropower and Irrigation Project, International Rivers Network, March 1999; Cordillera Peoples Alliance, Press Release 11/02/00 

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- Turkey: The Ilisu Dam and export credit agencies

Over the past 30 years, activists have fought a long battle for institutions such as the World Bank to adopt social and environmental policies. However, these institutions are no longer the main source of public finance for ‘development’ projects in the South. Export Credit Agencies (ECAs) are now the largest public funders of large-scale infrastructure projects in southern countries, exceeding by far the infrastructure investments of multilateral development banks and bilateral aid agencies. Yet the majority of ECAs --with rare exceptions such as the US Export-Import Bank and the US Overseas Private Investment Corporation-- have no human rights, environmental and development standards. This allows them to support the type of projects that even multilateral developments banks find problematic, including logging, mining, nuclear plants and oil drilling, as well as dams.

The controversial Ilisu dam project, currently planned for the Tigris River in the Kurdish region of Turkey, is a case in point. The ECAs of nine countries are considering support for this dam which would enable their corporations to do business with a torturing state. The dam’s construction consortium is seeking export credits and investment insurance guarantees from the ECAs of Austria, Germany, Italy, Japan, Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland, the UK and the US. Since 1984, an armed conflict between the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) and the Turkish State has devastated the region where the Ilisu dam is to be built. Around three million people have been displaced, 3,000 villages partially or totally destroyed, and over 30,000 people killed. Despite 1999’s PKK decision to pursue a peaceful political solution to the as yet unresolved Kurdish question, many parts of the region remain a war zone to this day. Human rights abuses ranging from extra-judicial killings to torture, rape and disappearances are still common.

According to the latest estimates, the dam will affect up to 78,000 people, the majority of them Kurdish. Many local people see the project as part of a wider strategy of ethnically cleansing the area of Kurds. The resettlement plan and environmental impact assessment for the dam have yet to be published and there has been minimal consultation with those who will be moved. Conditions in the region make it extremely unlikely that resettlement could be carried out according to international standards. "We don’t want this dam … This is where I belong," one of the Kurdish people to be affected by the dam told a human rights delegation which visited the Ilisu area.

The dam will also inundate the 10,000-year-old town of Hasankeyf, home to historical treasures including cave churches, ornate mosques and Islamic tombs. Over the course of millennia, layers of civilisation have been interwoven over each other in the valley bed and surrounding caves. Destroying the Kurdish people’s most important cultural sites, such as Hasankeyf, is seen by local people as a yet another tactic to deny the Kurds their ethnic identity.

Apart from the dam’s devastating local impacts --on the environment, the people and their culture-- another ugly consequence rears its head: water wars. The Ilisu dam is to straddle the Tigris River 65 kilometres upstream of the border with Iraq and Syria and threatens to disrupt much-needed water supplies to those countries.

Plans to build the Ilisu Dam were first mooted in 1954. Although pre-feasibility studies were completed in 1971 and the final design for the dam was approved in 1982, the project remained on the drawing board until the late 1990s. One reason for the delay lay in a lack of finance. The armed conflict left the Turkish government unable to fund the project alone and led to the World Bank signalling that it would be unwilling to finance infrastructure in the region. In 1996, the Turkish government offered Ilisu to the private sector as a Build-Operate-Transfer project, but no bidder could be found. A year later, Turkey’s State Hydraulic Works (DSI) selected Swiss company Sulzer Hydro as the main contractor for the project, which retained responsibility for the electromechanical works, with ABB of Switzerland. Civil engineering works were subcontracted to a consortium led by UK construction company Balfour Beatty. Other companies in the consortium included Impregilo of Italy, Skanska of Sweden and three Turkish construction companies, Nurol, Kiska and Tekfen. The engineering consultants to the project are Binnie and Partners (now Binnie, Black and Veatch). As yet, no contracts have been signed between the DSI and any of the companies in the consortium. ABB’s involvement in the dam ceased in March 2000, when it sold out its hydropower business to Alstom of France. In September 2000, the Ilisu consortium lost another of its original members, when Skanska announced its withdrawal from the project. The financial package for Ilisu will be arranged by the Union Bank of Switzerland (UBS). With approximately half of the construction costs being made up of imports from Western Europe and the USA, the companies in the consortium sought export credit guarantees to back their contracts. In November 1998, the Swiss export credit agency, Exportrisikogarantie (ERG), approved provisional export credit support of 470 million Swiss francs for the Ilisu contracts of Sulzer Hydro and ABB. Conditional approval has also been granted by the UK’s Export Credit Guarantee Department (ECGD) for a $200 million credit for Balfour Beatty, whose US subsidiary has also obtained provisional consent to a further credit from the US Exim Bank. Italy’s export credit agency SACE has similarly given approval for a $152 million guarantee to Impregilo, although this has still to be confirmed by the Interministerial Committee on Economic Planning.

While Ilisu is an important issue on many grounds in its own right, it is also a rallying point for international campaigners, who see Ilisu as a test case for ECA reform. This is a critical year for the Ilisu dam project. The ECAs’ decision is expected within the next few months. Without export credit support, it is unlikely that the dam could be built.

By Kate Geary, Ilisu Dam Campaign, (UK), email: ilisu@gn.apc.org ; web site: http://www.ilisu.org.uk 

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- Dam in Vietnam hits Cambodians

Vietnam's US $1 billion Yali Falls 720-megawatt hydroelectric dam, under construction for the past seven years -- with funding from the governments of Russia and Ukraine-- drains into the Se San river which runs through Cambodia to the Mekong. Before the dam-building began, no study was done of its environmental effect on Cambodia. A study recently carried out by the Fisheries Office, Ratanakiri Province, in cooperation with the Non-Timber Forest Products (NTFP) Project, an NGO working in Ratanakiri Province, shows that the dam is bringing death, disease and environmental devastation to Cambodia even before it is fully working.

Earlier last year the first reports began to emerge from Ratanakkiri that problems had developed with the Se San river, and that the source of these problems was upstream at Vietnam's new Yali Falls dam.

Cambodians along the Se San river told of sudden surges of water drowning 32 people, mostly children. In the single worst case three teenage girls were drowned trying to cross the river. Villagers spoke of their fishing boats and nets being swept away, livestock being drowned and crops inundated.

In addition, locals reported 952 deaths from disease since they perceived a change in water quality over the past four years. Stock losses have been reported in the thousands as well as significant numbers of wild animals dying after drinking water from the river.

According to the study carried out by the Fisheries Office and the NTFP Project, the water quality has deteriorated greatly since 1996. Surges of water coming downstream are reddish in color, muddy and have the foul odour of stagnant water.

The report could not quantify the health effects of the water quality, but noted that people living along the river reported a rapid decline in health once the changes became apparent. Locals complain of intense itchiness, lumps and infections on their skin, and eye irritation. They have also reported other health problems that have coincided with the sudden rises in water levels. These included stomach aches, diarrhea, respiratory problems, throat and nose irritation, dizziness, vomiting and coughing. Many reported family members dying one to five days after becoming ill.

Ratanakkiri province has some of the richest areas of wildlife in Cambodia, but these animals too have been seriously affected by the hydrological changes in the Se San as well as suffering from the effects of the water quality changes.

In Virachey National Park, on the northern side of the Se San river in Ta Veng and Ven Say districts, reptiles, mammals and birds have died or become ill at a greater than usual rate. People from many communities along the Se San have reported finding dead wildlife near their villages over the past few years. Many villagers believe that the wild animals had gone down to the Se San river to drink and then died shortly afterwards.

The changing water quality is also believed to have harmed fish stocks and habitat. The number of fish has declined noticeably, with some villagers putting fish stocks down by as much as 30 percent.

Meanwhile four years of irregular flooding have caused major food shortages to people in the area. Dry season crops which are planted along the banks of the Se San have been swept away by the surges of water following discharges from the dam. Locals now rely on wild potatoes and other tubers to sustain them. In addition, about 14 types of river plants that villagers used to collect to eat have been in serious decline over the past few years.

A two-day workshop attended by representatives of ethnic minority groups living on the Tonle Se San, local and international NGOs, and provincial officials, was held at the end of May 2000 to discuss the effect of the dam. The call for changing the river back was far more dominant than any request for cash compensation.

"If they want to give us compensation will they be able to feed us all our lives? It seems impossible, and what about our children and grandchildren? How are they going to survive? We want the old Se San back so we can fish and do other activities the same as before", said Lamas Voen from Phi village.

Article based on information from: "Huge Viet dam devastates Se San valley and its people", by Bou Saroeun, Phnom Penh Post, June 9-22 2000; Kate Colvin and Dave Hubbel,"People of Se San River Suffer Dam-Induced Floods, Famine"; To see the study prepared by the Ratanakiri Provincial Fisheries Office and the NTFP Project, go to: http://www.cambodiacorps.org/VN_Dam-ImpactStudy-1.html 

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CENTRAL AMERICA

- Guatemala: A dam and the massacre of 400 people

Forced resettlement of local people living in the area where dams are built usually results in human rights abuses. One of the most terrible examples is that of the Chixoy hydroelectric dam, which was built during the military dictatorship in Guatemala. The project resulted in the massacre of more than 400 Maya Achi people, mostly from the community of Río Negro, one of the villages to be flooded by the dam.

The violence against the indigenous people began in 1980, when military police came to Río Negro and shot seven people. In July that year, two representatives from the village agreed to go to a meeting requested by the National Institute for Electrification (INDE). They took with them the village's only documentation of resettlement and cash payment agreements. The mutilated bodies of the two men were found a week later. The resettlement documents were never recovered.

In February 1982, 73 men and women were ordered by the local military commander to report to Xoxoc, a village upstream from the reservoir which had a history of land conflicts and hostility with Río Negro. Only one woman returned to Río Negro. The rest were raped, tortured, then murdered by the Xoxoc Civil Defense Patrol, one of the notoRious paramilitary units used by the state as death squads.

But the worse was yet to come. On 13th March, the military rounded up all the women and children and marched them to a hill above the village and proceeded to torture and murder 70 women and 107 children. Witness for Peace produced in 1995 a report based on interviews with survivors, where the terrible way in which these people were murdered is described in detail. Two months later a further 82 people were murdered.

Responsibily over this tragedy is shared by all those institutions and companies which, being aware of the brutality of the Guatemalan regime, collaborated in building this 300 megawatts dam. The Interamerican Development Bank and the World Bank provided more than 300 million dollars in loans. The Italian government provided bilateral aid and export-credit guarantees. The consortium that planned, designed and supervised construction for the dam included Lahmeyer International (Germany), Motor Columbus (Switzerland) and International Engineering Company (USA). Gogefar (Italy) and Swissboring (Switzerland) were the companies that actually built the dam. Hochtief (Germany) was the contractor for the repair work on the tunnels.

In spite of having been instrumental in building a dam which resulted in this tragedy, none of the above are willing to admit their responsibility. After an internal investigation, the World Bank acknowledged that a massacre had occurred, but admitted no responsibility. The companies involved in Chixoy have always denied knowledge of the massacres, but local eye-witnesses say that a Cogefar lorry was used by the army during the massacres and that kidnapped women were taken to the dam building site, from where they were carried away by helicopter. So many must have known. But even if they didn't notice anything: didn't they find strange that 400 people suddenly disappeared from the dam site?

The survivors of Río Negro have sought redress in national and international arenas. Material and spiritual reparations are still awaited by those who survived, but no compensation is possible for the cultural losses, violence, intimidation, loss of livelihood and psychological damage suffered by the affected communities.

Article based on information from: "Dams Incorporated. The Record of Twelve European Dam Building Companies", by Chris Lang, Nick Hildyard, Kate Geary and Matthew Grainger. Published by Swedish Society for Nature Conservation, February 2000; "A People Dammed." The Impact of the World Bank Chixoy Hydroelectric Project in Guatemala", Witness for Peace, 1995

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SOUTH AMERICA

- Brazil: Interamerican Development Bank promotes destruction of Upper Tocantins River

The Tocantins River is the main river in the hydrological system of the "cerrado" (savanna) and eastern Amazon region of Brazil. The Brazilian government is planning the construction of eight hydroelectric dams on the Tocantins and Araguaia Rivers. One of them is Cana Brava Dam, located 250 km north of Brasilia, in the state of Goiás, which together with the already operational Tucuruí Dam and the Serra da Mesa Dam will form a nearly continuous 2,000 km staircase of reservoirs.

The Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) is the agency involved in the provision of financial support to the project by granting a U$S 150 million loan so that Tractebel Brasil Ltda. --a subsidiary of Tractebel Belgium-- can build the dam. The Bank has already approved a loan for the construction of the North-South electricity transmission line, which runs along the Tocantins River, that will link the proposed dams network. If completed, this complex will severely affect the Tocantins and Araguaia Rivers, their associated ecosystems and the riverine populations. This biodiversity and resource-rich region --comprising part of the "cerrado" and the transition forests of the Amazon-- is already menaced by the high scale impacts to be provoked by the construction of the Araguaia-Tocantins hidrovia, an industrial waterway planned for soy bean transport.

The Environmental and Social Impact Brief for the Cana Brava project performed by the IDB to justify its loan has serious omissions and misstatements of fact. Its main assumption --that hydroelectric power is the most desired electricity generation alternative for the region-- is baseless, since the energy to be generated will be transmitted to the national electricity grid, principally to industrial cities in South-Central Brazil. Additionally the real financial, environmental and social costs of the project were not evaluated.

The IDB’s study ignores the fact that the "cerrado" is one of the richest sites in biodiversity in the world, by considering that endangered species were not identified during the surveys, and that the Upper Tocantins is a system less productive when compared with the middle and lower reaches. It is not even clear whether the survey refers only to the area where the reservoir would be formed, or also to the broader area which will suffer the impacts of the dam. Its considerations regarding the social impacts of the project are also to be questioned. Whereas the report considers that "there are no major indigenous populations present in the area of direct influence", it has been demonstrated by the FUNAI (National Indigenous Foundation of Brazil) and CIMI (Missionary Indigenist Council) that the area is inhabited by the Avá-Canoeiro indigenous people, a highly threatened ethnic group, known as the lords of the High Tocantins River and its entire valley. It is to be underscored that the Avá-Canoeiro have already suffered the loss of 10% of the area of their reserve because of the Serra da Mesa Dam. Additionally, an important community of "quilombos" --descendents of escaped black slaves who manage their land cooperatively-- live in the area affected by the project. The IDB’s report does not mention them. The impact of the project on the local rural population is minimized, since the number of families affected by the dam is far greater than the 110 indicated in the report.

The arrogant attitude of both Tractebel and the IDB have generated a conflictive atmosphere in the region. Local dwellers have undertaken direct actions to press the company to discuss relevant issues before the construction of the dam proceeds. For example, on January 16th 2000, 500 dam-affected people occupied the Cana Brava worksite, and on March 14th, marches and protests took place in Minaçu city. In March 2000 the coalition International Rivers Network (IRN) addressed the IDB President Mr. Enrique Iglesias to express its concern regarding the way in which the Bank was assessing the proposed loan, and to suggest some recommendations in order to avoid the negative impacts of the megaproject.

Nevertheless, the IDB has turned a deaf ear to protests and recommendations: in August 2000 a U$S 160,2 million was approved for the construction of the Cana Brava Dam. 

Article based on information from: "BID aprueba U$S 160,2 millones para apoyar proyecto hidroeléctrico Cana Brava en Brasil", 9/8/2000, http://www.iadb.org ; "O resurgimento dos Avá-Canoeiro", Folha do Meio Ambiente - Ano 11 - Edição 103 - Brasília/DF, abril-2000, http://www.folhadomeioambiente.com.br/fma-103/indio103.htm ; http://irn.org/programs/latamerica/000314.tocantins.html 

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- Chile: The struggle of the Pehuenche against the Ralco Dam

The Biobío River springs from Icalma and Galletue lakes in the Andes, in southern Chile and flows during 380 km through forests, agricultural lands and cities to the Pacific Ocean, draining a watershed of 24,260 km2. Over one million people use the resources of the Biobío for drinking and irrigation water, recreation, and fisheries.

In the decade of 1990, Spanish corporation ENDESA (Empresa Nacional de Electricidad S.A) began to implement its plan to install six hydroelectric dams on the Biobío, with a total capacity of 2,300 megawatts. Plans to dam the Biobío originated in the1950s, when electricity generation in Chile was still state-owned. The first dam, called Pangue, was completed in 1996, and now the company is working in the construction of Ralco, the largest of the planned dams in the Biobío.

During the construction of Pangue, started in 1990, severe impacts took place to the detriment of forests and the Pehuenche indigenous people, traditional inhabitants of the region who resist any attempt of displacing them from their territories. The role of the International Finance Corporation (IFC) --private sector arm of the World Bank-- was severely questioned because of its lack of transparency and its financial support to such an unsustainable project. During a visit to Santiago in April 1998, Mr. James Wolfensohn, President of the World Bank, admitted that the Bank's support to the Pangue hydroelectric project had been a mistake, and that the Bank had performed "bad work" during the evaluation of the environmental impact of the project, since the Pehuenche indigenous peoples that inhabit the area had not been consulted. Nevertheless this sad story is being repeated in the case of Ralco.

The construction of the 570 megawattt Ralco Dam started shortly after Pangue was completed, because both dams are supposed to work together for the generation of electric energy. As a matter of fact, the Ralco Dam has been designed to regulate the water flow to the Pangue and the other dams proposed downstream. This 155 meter-high dam with a 3,400 hectare reservoir, would displace more than 600 people, including 400 indigenous Pehuenches. The dam would flood over 70 km of the river valley, inundating the richly diverse forest and destroying its biodiversity.

The Pehuenche, supported by the Biobío Action Group, went to court and at the same time implemented direct actions on the ground to avoid that the works for Ralco continue. They completely refuse to abandon their ancestral lands and to accept the resettlement plans of ENDESA to locate them in a place high in the Andes, where harsh conditions during winter reign. Reality is giving the reason to the opponents of the resettlement: a few families who have already been relocated to the El Huachi and El Barco areas have publicly denounced ENDESA’s failure to honour its commitments to them in exchange for their land. They are suffering their livestock’s miserable condition during the heavy winter snows, lack of technical assistance, shortage of firewood and lack of medical assistance. Pehuenche women are playing a leading role in this struggle, facing the arrogance of ENDESA and the indifference of the Chilean authorities.

In spite of the growing awareness at home and abroad about the severe impacts that dams are generating in the Biobío area, the Export Development Corporation of Canada’s government is granting financing equivalent to US$ 17 million dollars for the ENDESA company to purchase generating equipment for the planned Ralco Power Station, from the ABB Power Canada company of Tracy, Quebec.

The future of the Pehuenche and the Ralco Dam is now in the hands of Justice. In essence, this is a court battle between the Indigenous Law of 1993, designed to protect the lands of the indigenous population, and the Electricity Law passed during Pinochet's regime, that promotes any energy generation project. Nevertheless, much depends on the mobilisation of the Pehunche people for environmental justice and the support it can achieve at the national and international levels. Within this context, the Heinrich Böll Foundation's decision to award the Petra Kelly Prize 2000 to two Mapuche women --Berta and Nicolasa Quintremán Calpán-- as a recognition of their struggle to protect the Mapuche Pehuenche's rights shows the increasing international support to this struggle.

Article based on information from: http://irn.org/programs/biobio/ ; Lang, Chris et al., "Dams incorporated. The record of Twelve European Dam building Companies", A Report by the Corner House published by the Swedish Society for Nature Conservation, February 2000; WRM Bulletins 11 and 41.

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- Colombia: The Urrá Dam and the death of the Sinú River

The Urrá Dam megaproject on the Sinú River in the Department of Córdoba, in the Colombian Atlantic region, constitutes a worldwide known environmental catastrophe as well as a complete disaster to the local people. The dam built by the company Urrá and openly supported by the Colombian government --which considers the project vital for the country's economy-- will flood more than 7,000 hectares of forests and directly affect the livelihoods and the very existence of the Embera Katío indigenous people and the fisherfolk communities of the area.

Urrá’s story is a very long and painful one. The project has provoked concern and resistance since its start in 1977. The Embera Katío indigenous people, ancestral dwellers of the affected area, who live on fishing and hunting, and the fishing communities of the Upper Sinú, with the support of national and international organizations, have repeatedly claimed against this megaproject and resorted to every peaceful available way, including trials at the Court, interviews with the authorities and occupations of Ministry buildings and resistance to abandon their lands. Nevertheless, both Urrá and the Ministry of the Environment have ignored them, as well as several decisions of the Constitutional High Court of Colombia. The works continued and in November 1999 the filling up of the Urrá 1 dam on the Sinú River began.

In the meantime, Urrá also tried to generate conflicts among the Embera Katío and to weaken their resistance by reaching partial agreements with some of their groups to the detriment of the others. During this unequal struggle, the Embera Katío and the fisherfolk, as well as many of those who support them, have also suffered severe human rights violations, some of them being even murdered, threatened or forced into exile. The Department of Córdoba, where the dam is located, is controlled by paramilitary groups.

An international mission of independent observers that visited the conflict area in March 2000 confirmed the environmental and social impacts of the project. Downstream from the dam, the river level has already decreased dramatically, resulting in the collapse of the river's banks and the entailing destruction of the peoples' houses. The population of the fish "bocachico" --which is the main source of protein for the Embera Katío and a basic product in the economy of the local fisherfolk, has drastically decreased because of the sudden dry up of the wetlands of Ciénaga Grande de Lorica and other wetlands of the Lower Sinú, provoked by the reduction of the natural floods of the river after the construction of the dam. The reservoir was filled up without removing the existent biomass, which will result in the eutrophication of waters and increase the emissions of methane and carbon dioxide to the atmosphere, the two main greenhouse gases. Logging and burning of wood is being practised in several places nearby the dam, which will further enhance the sedimentation process in the reservoir.

The loss of their lands by the Embera Katío is complete. Additionally, those living upstream are powerless to prevent the flooding of their fields, houses, sacred sites and cemeteries. Effects are also apparent downstream. Because of the disruption of the hydrological system, the natural flow has diminished and water quality has deteriorated disturbing the food network. Further impacts are anticipated on plankton, riparian vegetation, invertebrates, birds and other animals. The Sinú River is dying.

What will happen with the indigenous people and fisherfolk displaced from their world in contact with nature? Without land and resources, and deprived of their own culture, they will be forced to settle in any of the shanty towns existing in the main Colombian cities. "Dueda tu beu ea embera neta Embera ea" ("The life and the dignity of the Embera Katío will not be drowned") is the motto of a struggle that goes on to avoid such an appalling future.

Article based on information from: http://irn.org/programs/latamerica/000105.urra.html ; "Informe Final de la Misión Internacional de Observación para Evaluar la Situación de los Pueblos U’wa, afectados por Occidental, y Embera-Katío y Comunidades de Pescadores y Campesinos del Bajo Sinú, afectados por la represa Urrá. Colombia, Marzo 15-21, 2000" por la Misión Internacional de Observación. Berkeley/Quito, 25 de mayo de 2000; WRM Bulletins 29 and 30.

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GENERAL

- The World Commission on Dams' report

The World Commission on Dams (WCD) released its report on November 2000, after having carried out detailed studies and surveys on a number of large dams throughout the world. What follows are quotes from the sections "People and Large Dams" and "Ecosystems and Large Dams." The full report --in several languages-- is available at: http://www.dams.org/report/ 

"In terms of the social impacts of dams, the Commission found that the negative effects were frequently neither adequately assessed nor accounted for. The range of these impacts is substantial, including on the lives, livelihoods and health of the affected communities dependent on the riverine environment:

- Some 40-80 million people have been physically displaced by dams worldwide - Millions of people living downstream from dams - particularly those reliant on natural floodplain function and fisheries - have also suffered serious harm to their livelihoods and the future productivity of their resources has been put at risk - Many of the displaced were not recognised (or enumerated) as such, and therefore were not resettled or compensated - Where compensation was provided it was often inadequate, and where the physically displaced were enumerated, many were not included in resettlement programmes - Those who were resettled rarely had their livelihoods restored, as resettlement programmes have focused on physical relocation rather than the economic and social development of the displaced - The larger the magnitude of displacement, the less likely it is that even the livelihoods of affected communities can be restored - Even in the 1990s, impacts on downstream livelihoods were, in many cases, not adequately assessed or addressed in the planning and design of large dams

In sum, the Knowledge Base demonstrated a generalised lack of commitment or lack of capacity to cope with displacement. In addition, large dams in the Knowledge Base have also had significant adverse effects on cultural heritage through the loss of cultural resources of local communities and the submergence and degradation of plant and animal remains, burial sites and archaeological monuments.

The Knowledge Base indicated that the poor, other vulnerable groups and future generations are likely to bear a disproportionate share of the social and environmental costs of large dam projects without gaining a commensurate share of the economic benefits:

- Indigenous and tribal peoples and vulnerable ethnic minorities have suffered disproportionate levels of displacement and negative impacts on livelihood, culture and spiritual existence - Affected populations living near reservoirs as well as displaced people and downstream communities have often faced adverse health and livelihood outcomes from environmental change and social disruption - Among affected communities, gender gaps have widened and women have frequently borne a disproportionate share of the social costs and were often discriminated against in the sharing of benefits

Where such inequities exist in the distribution of the costs and benefits, the Global Review emphasises that the 'balance-sheet' approach to adding up the costs and benefits is increasingly seen as unacceptable on equity grounds and as a poor means of choosing the 'best' projects. In any event, the true economic profitability of large dam projects remains elusive, as the environmental and social costs of large dams were poorly accounted for in economic terms.

More to the point, failures to account adequately for these impacts and to fulfil commitments that were made have led to the impoverishment and suffering of millions, giving rise to growing opposition to dams by affected communities worldwide. Innovative examples of processes for making reparations and sharing project benefits are emerging that provide hope that past injustices can be remedied and future ones avoided."

Regarding the environmental impacts of large dams, the report states:

"The generic nature of the impacts of large dams on ecosystems, biodiversity and downstream livelihoods is increasingly well known. From the WCD Knowledge Base it is clear that large dams have led to:

- the loss of forests and wildlife habitat, the loss of species populations and the degradation of upstream catchment areas due to inundation of the reservoir area - the loss of aquatic biodiversity, of upstream and downstream fisheries, and of the services of downstream floodplains, wetlands, and riverine, estuarine and adjacent marine ecosystems; and - cumulative impacts on water quality, natural flooding and species composition where a number of dams are sited on the same river

On balance, the ecosystem impacts are more negative than positive and they have led, in many cases, to significant and irreversible loss of species and ecosystems. In some cases, however, enhancement of ecosystem values does occur, through the creation of new wetland habitat and the fishing and recreational opportunities provided by new reservoirs.

The Commission found that reservoirs sampled so far by scientists all emit greenhouse gases, as do natural lakes, due to the rotting of vegetation and carbon inflows from the catchment. The scale of such emissions is highly variable. Preliminary data from a Case Study hydropower dam in Brazil show that the gross level of these emissions is significant, relative to emissions from equivalent thermal power plants.

However, in other reservoirs studied (notably those in boreal zones), gross emissions of greenhouse gases are significantly lower than the thermal alternative. A full comparison would require measurements of the emissions from natural pre-impoundment habitats. More research is needed on a case-by-case basis to demonstrate the capacity of hydropower to offset climate change.

Efforts to date to counter the ecosystem impacts of large dams have met with limited success due to the lack of attention to anticipating and avoiding such impacts, the poor quality and uncertainty of predictions, the difficulty of coping with all impacts, and the only partial implementation and success of mitigation measures. More specifically:

- It is not possible to mitigate many of the impacts of reservoir creation on terrestrial ecosystems and biodiversity, and efforts to 'rescue' wildlife have met with little long-term success 

- The use of fish passes to mitigate the blockage of migratory fish has had little success, as the technology has often not been tailored to specific sites and species 

- Good mitigation results from a good information base; early co-operation between ecologists, the dam design team and affected people; and regular monitoring and feedback on the effectiveness of mitigation measures 

- Environmental flow requirements (which include managed flood releases) are increasingly used to reduce the impacts of changed streamflow regimes on aquatic, floodplain and coastal ecosystems downstream

Given the limited success of traditional mitigation measures, increased attention through legislation is now given to avoidance or minimisation of ecological impacts through setting aside particular river segments or basins in their natural state and through the selection of alternative projects, sites or designs. In addition, governments are experimenting with a 'compensatory' approach, offsetting the loss of ecosystems and biodiversity caused by a large dam through investment in conservation and regeneration measures and through protection of other threatened sites of equivalent ecological value.

Finally, in a number of industrialised countries, but particularly in the United States, ecosystem restoration is being implemented as a result of the decommissioning of large and small dams."

In general terms, the above findings reaffirm what local peoples and environmentalists have been suffering and denouncing for years. But the report's importance is that it now gives an official stamp of approval to those claims. We hope that this will signal the beginning of the end of large destructive dams which have resulted --as the report rightly states-- in "the impoverishment and suffering of millions."

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- Hydroelectric dams are no solution to climate change

The international and national dam lobbyists have been fast to adapt their discourse to the changing world situation. Given the widespread concern over climate change related to greenhouse gas emissions, dam promoters are now stressing that hydroelectricity is a clean source of energy, thus being the best candidate to substitute fossil fuel-based energy sources. But: is it really clean?

The existing research shows that hydropower is not only socially and environmentally destructive, but that it can also make a significant contribution to global warming, particularly in the tropics.

Through the processes of growth and decay, soils, forests and wetlands continuously consume and emit large amounts of carbon dioxide and methane, the two most important greenhouse gases. When those ecosystems are flooded by the dams' reservoirs, the pattern of fluxes of CO₂ and methane with the atmosphere is totally altered. Plants and soils decompose when flooded and will eventually release almost all their stored carbon. Permanently flooding tropical wetlands will tend to increase their methane emissions as well as making them a net source of CO₂.

Researcher Philip Fearnside carried out studies in 1995 on two dams in Brazil: Balbina and Tucuruí. He calculated their impact on global warming by assessing the amount of forest they flooded and the rate at which vegetation would decay at different depths of their reservoirs. His findings were that in 1990 (6 years after Tucuruí started to fill and 3 years after the gates were closed at Balbina), the Tucuruí reservoir had emitted 9,450,000 tonnes of CO₂ and 90,000 tons of methane, while Balbina had emitted 23,750,000 tonnes of CO₂ and 140,000 tons of methane. His conclusion was that Tucuruí had 60 per cent as much impact on global warming as a coal-fired plant generating the same amount of electricity, while Balbina had 26 times more impact on global warming than the emissions from an equivalent coal-fired power station.

The above should suffice to show that hydropower is not clean regarding climate change. But there's even more. A comprehensive accounting of a dam's contribution to global warming should also include the emissions from the fossil fuels used during dam construction, those from the production of the cement, steel and other materials used in the dam, as well as the changes in greenhouse gas fluxes due to the land use and other changes which the dam encourages, such as deforestation, the conversion of floodplain wetlands to intensive agriculture, the adoption of irrigation on once rainfed lands, and the increased use of fossil-fuel-based artificial fertilizers.

In sum, large hydroelectric dams are not only no solution to climate change but, on the contrary, are part of the problem.

Article based on information from: Patrick McCully, "Silenced Rivers. The Ecology and Politics of large Dams", Zed Books 1996

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- International Day of Action against dams

Many people around the world are preparing an International Day of Action Against Dams and for Rivers, Water and Life, which will take place on March 14th, 2001. Last year, nearly 70 actions took place in 26 countries to celebrate the Day of Action. From Australia to Uganda, tens of thousands of people participated in demonstrations, rallies, educational events and ceremonies. Even more people are expected to participate this year.

The Day of Action was inspired by participants at the First International Meeting of People Affected by Dams held in Curitiba, Brazil in 1997. They declared, "We are strong, diverse, and united and our cause is just. To symbolize our growing unity, we declare that March 14th --the Brazilian Day of Struggles Against Dams-- will from now on become the International Day of Action Against Dams and for Rivers, Water and Life."

Over the last year, the anti-dam movement has gained huge momentum --from the release of the highly critical World Commission on Dams report to unprecedented networking in Latin America, Asia and Africa to promising dam removal efforts in Asia, Europe and North America. The idea is to keep the momentum growing.

People and organizations throughout the world are asked to plan an event on March 14 as part of the Day of Action. International Rivers Network serves as the International Coordinator for the Day of Action and its website contains information on previous Days of Action as well as on this year's:  http://www.irn.org/dayofaction. 
For more information, please contact: dayofaction@irn.org 

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