Europe

Examining the underlying causes of woodland loss from road-building:
a case study of the Newbury Bypass, UK
by Georgina Green

1. BACKGROUND TO STATE OF FORESTS AND NATURE PROTECTION IN THE UK

1.1 Forests in the UK

The UK is one of the least forested nations in Europe. Historically, woodland habitats would have predominated over much of the country, the most common climax vegetation being broadleaved forest dominated by trees such as oak, ash and lime. However, over the past 5,000 years, 90% of this cover has been lost, due mainly to human activity: cutting for firewood and clearance for agriculture. By the beginning of this century, woodland cover was reduced to just 5 % of the land area of Britain [1]. Today, forest cover is estimated at around 10% (2.5 million ha) [2], but much of that (7%) is composed of conifer plantations, mostly of non-native species, some of which have been planted on sites which had high biodiversity value as open ground. Ancient (defined as continually wooded since 1600) semi-natural woodland (broadleaved and yew) covers about 1% of the land surface of Britain (300,000 ha), and around 16,000 ha of distinctive Caledonian Pine Forest remains in a few Scottish glens [3]. In total, native woodland makes up just 2.5% of the land area of Great Britain[1].

Whilst much of the forest was lost in historical times, the middle part of this century also saw a significant decline, and approximately 45% of the ancient and semi-natural woodland that existed in 1945 has been lost since that time [4]. The major causes have been conversion to agriculture or replacement with conifer plantations. Losses from these causes should, in theory at least, have ceased in 1985 with the introduction of the government’s broadleaf policy [5].

Current government policy aims to increase woodland cover, both plantations of exotic species and native woodland, for production as well as for environmental and social purposes. There is a specific target to plant 5,000 ha of new native woodland each year [1], and a number of forest creation projects exist (e.g. the National Forest, Central Scotland Forest, the Millennium Forest (Scotland)) [3].

Size of forest areas in Britain is variable, from small woodlands of 0.25 ha to the 50,000 ha Kielder forest in the north of England, one of the largest man-made forests in Europe. The majority of forests in England, however, are less than 50 ha. In Scotland, on the other hand, two thirds of the forests are over 500 ha [1].

Forest and woodland ownership is divided between private and public. The government forest service, the Forestry Commission, manages about 35% of the country’s woodland, about 10% is owned by other public voluntary bodies, 20% by farmers and 35% by other private owners [1].

The extent of production forestry differs between woodland type, conifer plantations being very largely production forests. The UK produces around 15% of its timber needs from domestic forests; efforts have been and continue to be made to stimulate the timber industry, and it is predicted that the volume of wood from British forests will increase from almost 9 million cubic metres per year today (up from 4 million cubic metres in the 1970s) to 15 million cubic metres per year in 2020 [1]. Particular efforts are being made to revitalise traditional management in neglected broadleaved woodland.

The main legal framework for forest management is set out in the Forestry Acts of 1967, 1979 and 1981. The 1967 Act empowers the government Forestry Commission to issue felling licenses, which are required for the felling of almost any trees (exceptions being parks and gardens, individual trees or groups of small trees, and trees that need to be felled for developments that have already been granted planning permission). Licenses almost always require the felled area to be replanted. A system of government grants also exists to stimulate the private planting of new woodland (Woodland Grant Scheme and the Farm Woodland Premium Scheme). Grants for restocking woodland and woodland improvement work may also be available on a discretionary basis.

Other legislation which impacts on forestry operations includes the Plant Health Act 1967, the Countryside Acts of 1967 and 1968, the Wildlife and Countryside Act of 1985, the Environment Act 1995, and EC Directives on Environmental Impact Assessment, the Birds and Habitats Directives (see section 1.2).

The extensive historical woodland cover is reflected in the nation’s biodiversity, with more species of plants and animals dependent on woodland than on any other habitat: up to two or three hundred vascular plants and perhaps over 5,000 animal species [5]. As well as the decrease in total area of native woodland, a significant proportion of what remains suffers from poor management or neglect, and the quality of the habitat for biodiversity has decreased in recent times. A government survey in 1990 showed a drop of almost 20% in species diversity within sample native woodlands between 1978 and 1990 [5].

1.2 Forest and nature protection in the UK

The primary basis for nature protection in the UK is the 1981 Wildlife and Countryside Act (which built on two previous acts in 1967/8 and 1949) and an Amendment to the Act in 1985. The act allows for the designation of Sites of Special Scientific Interest (SSSIs), the objective of which are "to form a network of areas representing in total those parts of Great Britain in which the features of nature, and especially those of greatest value to wildlife conservation, are most highly concentrated or of highest quality" [6]. SSSIs may also be designated on other grounds, such as archaeological interest.

To day, there are over 6,000 SSSIs in England, Wales and Scotland. However, they by no means cover all the valuable woodland habitat in the UK: just 14% of England’s small amount of ancient woodland has been designated as SSSIs [7].

Britain also has over 250 National Nature Reserves, which are a subset of SSSIs that are much better protected.

A County Wildlife Site (also called Wildlife Heritage Sites in some counties) is a non-statutory designation that recognises an area that is important for nature and wildlife in the county. They have no protection in law.

The value of native broadleaved and yew woodland for biodiversity has been recognised by the government, and it is the subject of a Habitat Action Plan - part of the Biodiversity Action Plan drawn up to fulfil the requirements of the Convention on Biological Diversity, to which the UK is a signatory. The plan contains recommendations for the conservation, restoration and creation of these woodlands. Interestingly, the Plan specifically mentions clearance for roads as one of the factors negatively affecting broadleaved woodland [3].

A separate Habitat Action Plan exists for planted coniferous woodland. The main objectives are to enhance the value of such woodland for biodiversity through restructuring and diversification, and to ensure new areas are created on land of low biodiversity value. It is interesting to note that Habitat

Plans for other habitats, such as heath, moor and bog, recommend the removal of some conifer woods (i.e. deforestation), where they have been planted in inappropriate places [3].

The international importance of broadleaved woodland is also recognised in the EC Habitats Directive, which includes seven broadleaved woodland types and one yew woodland type on Annex 1 of the Directive. A number of the UK’s broadleaved woodlands have been proposed as Special Areas for Conservation (SACs) by the UK Government [3]. These areas, which are usually also SSSIs, should have much better protection, under European Law, than SSSIs.

The EC Birds Directive also requires the designation of priority areas, Special Protection Areas (SPAs), that are of particular importance for the conservation of birds. The UK has also signed the Ramsar Convention, and has designated around 60 wetlands as Ramsar Sites [6]

2. THE NEWBURY BYPASS

2.1 The town of Newbury and it’s traffic problems

Newbury is a small town (roughly 35,000 inhabitants, including the areas of Speen, Shore and Greenham) in Berkshire in the south of England, approximately 55 miles from London. An old market town, Newbury is relatively affluent with a high rate of employment: the town is situated in the so-called M4 corridor (the M4 is a major route from London to the south-west) and is host to several hi-tech companies (e.g. Vodaphone, Bayer). It is also within the "commuter belt" for London and Reading. In the past few decades, several of the satellite villages near the town (e.g. Thatcham) have expanded hugely, adding to the number of people who use Newbury’s shops and services. The town is also on a main traffic route (the A34) between Southampton (a major shipping port) and The Midlands region of England (a major industrial region).

The combination of these factors, together with the massive national growth in traffic and reliance on the car, has resulted in serious traffic problems in Newbury, with both through traffic and movement of local inhabitants contributing. In 1966, the main A34 road (which originally ran down the main street of the town) was re-routed onto a new ring road, which is also well within the urban area. However, the amount of traffic on the road (both local and long-distance) continued to grow: between 1981 and 1995 there was an increase of 140% in the traffic count at a point just to the south of the town, and 26,500 vehicles a day were using it [8]. As a result, it too had become heavily congested.

2.2 The bypass proposal

The idea of a bypass to take the A34 around Newbury was first mooted in the 1960s. In 1979, the government commissioned consultants to come up with actual proposals to solve the traffic problems. In 1982, the consultants published a brochure stating that a bypass was needed, and detailing four possible routes: a Western Route, an Eastern Route, and two central routes. A public consultation exercise was conducted that included distribution of the brochure and questionnaires, and several days of exhibitions. Following the consultation, in June 1984 the government’s Department of Transport (DoT) announced their recommendation of the Western Route, with some minor modifications [8].

The Western Route and the woodlands affected

The 13.5 km proposed Western Route crossed three SSSIs, one of which (Snelsmore Common) is described as comprising a variety of woodland and heathland habitats, including ancient semi-natural woodland and birch woodland [9]. Around the fringes of the common are several stands of old woodland, mostly dominated by oak but with trees such as Birch, Sycamore and Sweet Chestnut also abundant [10]. Whilst the bypass route did not actually pass through the two main areas of ancient semi-natural woodland in the SSSI (Mapleash Copse and Withy Copse), the guidelines for selection of SSSIs state that "loss of or damage to certain parts [of a SSSI] would then detract significantly from the whole" [11]. The road did go though Swilly Copse, an area of broadleaved woodland just at the edge of the SSSI.

The route also crossed 6 County Wildlife Sites, three of which (Reddings Copse, Hills Pightle, and Speen Moor) are woodland sites [12]. Reddings Copse is an area of mature ash/oak woodland over now unmanaged hazel coppice. Dormouse, a species in serious decline and protected in the UK under the Wildlife and Countryside Act, and listed on Appendix 3 of the Bonn Convention and Annex IVa of the EC Habitats Directive [5], was found in the wood, several years after the route had been approved [13]. The proposed road would clip the edge of Hills Pightle, a narrow ancient woodland with oak, ash, hazel, birch and alder trees and 23 species recognised as characteristic of ancient woodland [10]. Speen Moor includes planted broadleaved woodland [14].

The proposed road would also cut into or skirt the edge of Whittle Copse, Great Penn Wood (secondary mixed plantation), Brown Hill Plantation and Ball’s Plantation (both birch/alder woodland interspersed with plantations of Scots Pine) and The Chase (a local woodland nature reserve owned by the National Trust). In addition to these, several unnamed areas of trees or individual or veteran trees were in the path of the road or accompanying slip-roads and developments. In total, after the clearance work had been completed it was estimated that 10,000 trees had been destroyed to make way for the road [15].

As well as the woodland sites, the western bypass would damage the Kennet and Lambourn floodplain SSSI and the River Lambourn SSSI, Rack Marsh (a local nature reserves), two civil war battle sites, and twelve archaeological sites [16].

In general terms, the area through which the road would pass was extremely appealing, having been less affected by development and modern agriculture than much of England’s countryside. It was described as an intimate landscape, and its beauty and naturalness were highly valued by many of the local residents.

2.3 The anti-bypass campaign

It was clear that, with the level of damage and the great beauty of the landscape, the bypass proposal would be controversial. Indeed, in 1985, the Government’s Landscape Advisory Committee predicted that the bypass would be "one of the most environmentally contentious proposals in recent history." They also stated that "The damage by these routes (the Western Routes and Alternative Lines) to the Lambourn Valley and Snelsmore Common would be quite unacceptable" [13].

Organised opposition to the road started at the time of the 1982 public consultation exercise, when a group of local residents formed the Society for the Prevention of the Western Bypass (SPEWBY). Whilst not specifically anti-bypass per se, this group believed the Eastern Route was the preferable option, and they submitted a comprehensive report to the consultation setting out their case. The group also did significant work raising awareness of the issues through the media, posters etc.

SPEWBY continued its campaigning after the public consultation and announcement of the preferred route in 1984, and in 1985, another group of local residents formed the Newbury Bypass Supporters Association, to counter SPEWBY and to publicly support the Western Bypass Route. When, in October 1986, draft orders to initiate procedures for construction of the road were issued, the controversy was at such a level that a Public Inquiry was called.

2.3.1 The Public Inquiry

The Public Inquiry into the selection of the bypass route ran from June to November 1988, during which time 147 witnesses presented evidence to the government-appointed Inspector. General support for the Western Route was expressed by the four Councils in the area, although some expressed objections to certain parts of it, and the support was not necessarily unanimous within all the Councils (for example, Berkshire County Council’s archaeology department opposed the route). The Newbury Society and the Newbury Bypass Supporters Association were amongst others who voiced their support, the latter presenting a petition with 6,000 signatures.

The MP at the time, Conservative Sir Michael McNair-Wilson, supported the western bypass, although he pointed out that the road would give just 10-15 years relief to the town’s traffic problems, after which it would be back to its current congested state.

Objectors included SPEWBY, the National Trust (who owned one of the woodlands, The Chase, that would be affected by the bypass), some local farmers, Speen Parish Council, and a Christian retreat at Snelsmore House. The Government’s nature protection authority (now called English Nature), the National Rivers Authority and Berkshire County Council all objected to the impact of the route on the Kennet river valley (a SSSI).

As well as hearing the views of those that appeared before it, the Inquiry also had to consider the financial implications of the various options, and ultimately use a cost/benefit analysis to reach a decision. Indeed, the Inquiry ruled against the use of a viaduct as proposed by English Nature (the government nature authority) to reduce the impact of the road on the Kennet Valley SSSI, purely on the grounds of cost. It is also worth noting that the Inquiry was not mandated to consider whether or not a bypass of any sort was the best solution to the town’s problems, but simply to assess which route should be chosen (see section 3.2.5). Indeed, a local resident who tried to put a case for the introduction of traffic management schemes instead of construction of a bypass was not allowed to present evidence to the Inquiry.

In July 1990, the government announced that, following the Public Inquiry, the decision had been taken to go ahead with the Western Bypass. A lawyer consulted by SPEWBY concluded there was no grounds for appeal against the decision.

Preliminary procedures were then started to prepare for construction of the road, and a smaller inquiry was held in 1992 over land purchases, re-routing of footpaths etc. The National Trust continued to object strongly over the road going through its land, The Chase. This land had been given in perpetuity to the Trust and legally was "inalienable" i.e. any attempt at compulsory purchase can be challenged by an appeal direct to Parliament. Despite this, the government rejected the National Trusts proposed alternatives and confirmed that they would go ahead with the compulsory purchase of the land. The Trust decided not to proceed with the Parliamentary appeal.

2.3.2 The Third Battle of Newbury

Following the Public Inquiry, SPEWBY ceased to be so active in opposing the road, and the group ultimately dissolved. In 1993, following a long-running and high profile campaign, the government announced that is was dropping plans to put a motorway through an 8,000 year old woodland in London, Oxleas Wood. According to Stephen Norris, Transport Minister for London, the road failed to meet the "high environmental standards we now apply to new road schemes" [13].

Partly inspired by this success, at the start of 1994 a number of residents decided to reactivate the campaign against the Newbury bypass, and the Third Battle of Newbury group was formed (Newbury had already been the site of two famous battles during the English civil war). Support was received from several national organisations and networks, such as Road Alert (a transport network) and the environmental pressure group Friends of the Earth.

The Third Battle group started raising the issue of the road both locally and nationally. In response to an appeal, a considerable number of letters of support were received from members of the public around the country. The growth of traffic congestion throughout the UK, despite the repeated destruction of the countryside for more roads to try and solve the problems, was leading people to question the sustainability of UK transport policy, and the dilemmas at Newbury stuck a chord with many.

2.3.3 EU complaints
2.3.3.1 Breach of EU Environmental Impact Assessment Directive

One important argument used in the campaign was that there was never a proper Environmental Impact Assessment for the road. The studies that were done were described by the local Wildlife Trust as "a highly superficial ecological assessment" and condemned as "inadequate" [13] . This was re-inforced by the discovery of Dormice (a protected species in the UK) in the path of the road as late as May 1994. According to a letter to Friends of the Earth, English Nature (the government’s nature conservation body), had been unable to gain access to certain parts of the route to carry out a proper assessment at the time of the Public Inquiry.

According to a European Union Directive (85/337/EC) , an Environmental Impact Assessment is compulsory for all large projects, which includes major trunk roads. The Directive was notified to EU Member States on 3 July 1985, and had to become part of national law in each state within three years from that date [17].

Bypass opponents thus lodged a formal complaint to the European Commission that the UK government was in breach of the Directive, and was acting illegally by going ahead with the bypass without having done an EIA. In a letter to Friends of the Earth, the Commission agreed that no formal assessment of the impacts of the road was carried out [17]. However, the Commission finally ruled that the Directive applied only for projects where the "procedure for consent was started after 3 July 1998, i.e. after the latest date for transposing the Directive into national law" and that although for the Newbury by-pass, "development consent was given ….after 3 July 1988, lengthy consent procedures started well before that date" [18].

2.3.3.2 Breach of EU Habitats Directive

Attempts were made to use European law to stop the Newbury Bypass on a second occasion when, during the clearance phase, the rare Desmoulin’s Whorl Snail was found in the path of the proposed road in the Kennet and Lambourn floodplains. The snail is listed on Annex II of the EC Habitats and Species Directive, and the UK is obliged to ensure its "favourable conservation status" is achieved, by designating and protecting Special Areas for Conservation (SACs) [19]. In the light of the snail’s discovery, a group of wildlife organisations applied for permission to seek a judicial review of the government’s decision to go ahead with the bypass. The High Court judge refused permission, saying he could not see that the government’s decision could be said to be against the law. He also said, however, that his decision was "regretful" since "one can appreciate the force of the view that if the protection of the natural environment keeps coming second, we shall end by destroying our own habitat" [20].

2.3.4 Highways Agency review

By the end of 1994, controversy over the Newbury bypass had reached such a level that the then Transport Minister Brian Mawhinney announced a review of the planned road, to be undertaken by the Highways Agency and to take about a year. The review was to include an examination of possible alternatives to building a bypass to solve Newbury’s traffic problems. By-pass opponents commissioned research into alternatives, such as traffic management, to feed into the review.

Unfortunately, despite knowing of the opponent’s study, just six months later, before the opponents’ study was complete and on the eve of leaving office, Mawhinney announced that the review was over and that the bypass would go ahead [21].

The review was heavily criticised as being totally inadequate. Keith Buchan of the Metropolitan Transport Unit said it "simply reviewed the choice of route, not whether a road is needed or not," and thus failed to fulfil its own terms of reference. According to Friends of the Earth, the Highways Agency had also failed to conduct a consultation process or invite evidence from interested or relevant parties etc., and had failed to take account of the changes in national policies and thinking on transport in the six years since the Public Inquiry of 1988 [22] .

2.3.5 Alternatives to the bypass

Bypass opponents, and even some of its supporters, have always stated that a bypass would not provide more than a very temporary respite to the town’s problems, given the predicted rise in road traffic in the UK (65-106 % between 1992 and 2025 [13]). In fact, predictions showed that traffic on the A34 in the centre of Newbury would be back to the intolerable levels of the mid-1990s just five to ten years after the bypass opened [23]. Further figures from the Highway’s Agency, not released until clearance work had started, showed that even when it first opened, the time saving for through traffic using the bypass at off-peak times would average just two minutes. At peak hours, there could be a saving of up to 15 minutes. They also conceded at this time that the area around the A34 would remain congested even after completion of the bypass [24].

In fact, the Newbury bypass was never designed specifically to solve the traffic problems of the town, but aimed to provide a high standard route between the industrial region of the Midlands and the ports on the South Coast [23]. However, figures collected by the Highways Agency and used to justify the bypass show that around 92% of all the traffic in the Newbury / Thatcham area starts and ends its journey within the local area, the neighbouring area, or the southern region of England, with just 8% being truly "national" traffic [23]. (Bypass opponents also pointed out that these figures were collected in the late 1970s and early 1980s, since when other major road schemes have opened, and more up-to-date data was urgently required.) Bypass supporters pointed out that on the A34 itself, the percentage of through traffic was much higher, varying from a daily average of 75% on the section just south of the town (the Newtown Straight) to about 50% in the centre of the town [8], and therefore the bypass would provide considerable relief.

The study commissioned by the road’s opponents was undertaken by independent transport experts and published by Friends of the Earth in September 1995 in a report called End of the Road [23]. It presented a package of demand management measures which, the study claimed, would reduce traffic levels in the town more effectively than a bypass. The package includes measures such as:

- Sophisticated computer junction management schemes
- Pedestrian, cycle, high occupancy vehicle and bus priority schemes
- Speed limits, traffic calming and parking restrictions
- Park and Ride schemes
- Special rail services for North-South long-distance freight
- Car-share schemes, telecommuting and flexible working arrangements
- School buses and "safe routes" for cycling and walking to school.

Since such measures would involve a fraction of the expenditure that was planned for the bypass, the report recommended that they should at least be introduced for a trial period and their effectiveness monitored before the bypass was constructed.

Unfortunately, as mentioned above, the review was ended prematurely, before this report was complete.

2.3.6 Clearance phase and direct action campaign

As it became clear the road would go ahead, hundreds of direct action protesters set up camps on the route and built tree-houses in the trees that would have to be destroyed. The Highways Agency required eviction orders to remove the protesters from the camps; applications to the courts for these were lodged just a couple of days before Christmas 1995. Work to clear the route finally started in January 1996, and became one of the biggest direct action campaigns ever witnessed in the UK. The operation, which took four months to complete, required the engagement of several hundred security guards and the use of climbers and machinery to remove the extremely dedicated protesters from the trees and evict them from the camps. Several hundred protesters were arrested, mainly for a new offence under British law known as "aggravated trespass". Although there were some isolated incidents of violence, the protests were very largely peaceful despite the incredibly strong emotions that were involved.

The struggle attracted an enormous amount of national and even international publicity. The pictures of people living in tree-houses through the bitter cold British winter, valiantly defending the trees against the bulldozers, the presence of hoards of security guards and police, and the scenes of once-wooded areas devastated, with hundreds of trees flattened, were emotive images that made the public really start to question government policy and the on-going destruction of the nation’s countryside in the name of development. A national survey in March 1996 (during the clearance work and direct action campaign) showed that 82% of people questioned had heard of the Newbury bypass. Of them, 61% thought that the Government should have tried alternative methods of traffic control before building the bypass (21% disagreed), and 53% thought that work should be stopped, even at that late stage [25].

In the period leading up to the clearance work, and in parallel with the direct action struggle itself, a wide variety of tactics and activities were used by the Third Battle group, Friends of the Earth and other bypass opponents to highlight the issues, demonstrate the depth of opposition to the scheme, and to try to stop the work. These included public rallies, letters to the press, petitions, public meetings, lobbying of Members of Parliament, legal challenges, research, public opinion surveys, press conferences and photo opportunities, newspaper advertisements etc. The law courts were again used to contest the eviction orders required to remove protesters from their camps, and the compulsory purchase orders that gave the Highway’s Agency ownership of the land. The campaign made much of the fact that the local MP for Newbury, David Rendel, was active in his support for the road, and appeared to be totally out of line with his party, the Liberals, who had a reasonably progressive transport policy.

The combination of direct action protesters, dedicated local campaigners and experienced, well-resourced national organisations was a powerful, mutually supportive force. As well as the organisations and individuals that were intimately involved with the campaign, a number of other groups and high profile individuals (e.g. WWF, Lady Barber, leading archaeologists, clergy) were also involved during the course of the campaign in various tactics or activities to try to stop the road.

2.4 The local community

Throughout the saga of the bypass, the local community was divided between pro and anti bypass supporters. Feelings ran high in the town, and hostilities were experienced by those that were prominent in the campaign.

The proportions of people supporting either side was itself the subject of disagreement. According to local politicians, the majority of the inhabitants of Newbury were in favour of the bypass. However, these claims by the local MP and others were based at least partially on telephone phone-ins, which, as the Chair of respected poll company MORI pointed out, are self-selecting in the people that respond, and cannot be used to indicate the views of people in an area as a whole [26, 8]. Both sides collected petitions with significant numbers of signatures at various times during the campaign. In the national survey mentioned above (section 2.3.6), the results for the region in which Newbury is situated showed more people thought the government should stop work on the bypass than disagreed with that suggestion [25].

While several of the big businesses in the town (e.g. Vodaphone, Bayer) were very active in supporting the pro-bypass campaign (including financially), many other smaller businesses came out against the road [27], and held a press conference to make their opposition known. It is interesting to note that Vodaphone have reportedly applied for permission to build a large new development on the route of the old road, a development that, arguably, may not have been allowed had the bypass not been built.

Many local inhabitants were active in their support of the direct action protesters (most of whom were from outside the locality), giving them food and other practical help. A number got involved in direct action themselves, staging a sit-down protest in front of the bull-dozers. Whilst the bypass campaign clearly divided the local community, on the positive side it brought together some of the middle classes with the classically "ragged-dressed" protester types, and perhaps helped to break down the some of the barriers and preconceptions these groups typically have of each other.

2.5 Examples of similar campaigns in western Europe

Struggles similar to that at Newbury have taken place in other countries in western Europe, trying to prevent the destruction of forest, woodland or other natural habitats by roads. For example, plans to build a road and five mile tunnel through the Aspe valley in the French Pyrennes - a relatively undisturbed area of mountain and forest home to the last population of Brown Bears in France - met with fierce opposition and produced an international outcry. In the Netherlands, there was a high-profile campaign against construction of a road at Amelisweerd, near Utrecht.

3. UNDERLYING CAUSES OF WOODLAND LOSS FROM THE NEWBURY BY-PASS

While the direct cause of the loss of woodland at Newbury was clearly road-building, the underlying causes and some of the main related factors (as proposed in the diagnostic framework model of the Intergovernmental Fora on Forests) are set out in Table 1, and discussed in more detail below.

DIAGNOSTIC FRAMEWORK OF UNDERLYING CAUSES AND RELATED FACTORS
OF WOODLAND LOSS DUE TO ROAD-BUILDING IN THE UK

Direct cause of woodland loss: Road construction.

3.1 Underlying cause: lack of protection and intrinsic value given to nature

Related factors

3.1.1 Poor designation of woodland sites

Although the UK has so little forest cover, only 14% of ancient semi-natural woodland (the closest there is to natural forest) is within the network of protected areas (SSSIs) [7]. This failure in the nature protection authorities could be attributed to a lack of resources and a lack of priority and political will. In addition, some landowners may resist the designation of their land as SSSIs, because of the restrictions such designation imposes on them.

3.1.2 Poor legal protection for designated sites

In fact, even SSSIs status does not guarantee protection of a site. The law simply obliges the owner of the site to notify the government conservation body if he/she wishes to perform activities that would damage the SSSI or its natural values. Attempts are then made to reach a "management agreement", which normally includes some compensation to the owner for not going ahead with the damaging operation. If agreement is unable to be reached, the site may be damaged or destroyed. For sites that are deemed of "national importance", the government minister has the power to stop the damage through issuing a "Nature Conservation Order", but this very rarely happens.

Development activities requiring planning permission (e.g. road building) may also damage or destroy SSSIs. During the process of planning permission approval, the government’s nature conservation bodies can object to an application that will damage or destroy a SSSI (as happened with the Kennet and Lambourn floodplain SSSI), but they have no powers to ensure the application is refused.

As a result, every year more than 300 SSSIs are destroyed or damaged.

Non-government organisations have been campaigning for a revision to the laws on SSSIs (which are contained in the Wildlife and Countryside Act) for many years, and a Private Members Bill promoted by Friends of the Earth very nearly made it through parliament in the 1995-1996 session. It was blocked in the final stages by maverick activities of certain large landowners with access to the corridors of power (see also section 3.4 below).

There is now a strong alliance of organisations promoting a Wildlife Charter, which sets out how and why the law needs to change, and the new labour government has committed to introducing new laws. However, the introduction of new legislation is slipping down the political agenda and there are fears that it will not be regarded as sufficient of a priority to get parliamentary attention. The campaign continues!

3.1.3 Society based on financial values

The system used to assess proposed road schemes, known as COBA, is based on assigning financial values to all relevant factors (the financial benefit of saving five minutes on a journey time, for example). Clearly, it is very difficult to value nature or landscape in this way, and the "intrinsic" value to society of these resources is not accounted for. Moreover, the financial values of time savings are calculated from motorists’ apparent "willingness to pay" for shorter routes. However, the questions to motorists are posed in isolation from any other factors - for example, the environmental impact of the shorter route. It is possible that, if the motorist were told that a site of great nature conservation value had to be sacrificed for the shorter route, he would chose to use the longer one, and the survey would show that he was not willing to pay for the time saving.

A document produced as early as 1990 by the government’s nature authority, then known as the Nature Conservancy Council, points out "In particular, the approach to scheme appraisal has been criticised for placing undue emphasis on those costs and benefits which are most easily measured and valued in both money and economic terms, to the neglect or undervaluing of less tangible environmental or social disbenefits". The document concluded that "..the protection of nature conservation interests are either not taken sufficiently into account or else are given too low a weighting" [28].

In a wider context, the values in society means that development or economic goals frequently take precedent over nature protection. Even when the laws look good on paper and sites have been designated, economic reasons, defined as being of "over-riding public interest" can allow the law to be ignored. This point is discussed further in sections 3.3 and 4.2ii.

3.2 Underlying cause: roads-dominated transport policy

To understand the causes of woodland and other habitat loss due to road-building (and perhaps to learn lessons for other countries), it is useful to look briefly at the recent history of transport policy in the UK. The demise of the public transport system in the UK and the rise of the private motor car in its place began after the second world war, when the decision was taken to abandon the country’s urban tram systems. This was followed in the 1950s by the closure of a large portion of the country’s rail network, especially the rural links, under the infamous programme of Sir Thomas Beeching. The rise in private car ownership was seen as demonstrating the country’s prosperity and economic progress, and successive governments encouraged it, investing in new and improved roads while neglecting public transport systems. Of course, the inherent advantages of the convenience of the car were very attractive to the public, and car ownership was extremely popular. Within society, owning your own car became a status symbol, the bigger or more expensive the vehicle the more status that was implied - an image greatly enhanced by the clever advertising strategies of the motor manufacturers.

It was the Conservative government of Margaret Thatcher that really championed the car and road transport, referring with pride to "the great car economy". Between her election in 1979 and the defeat of the Conservatives (then led by John Major) in 1997, the number of vehicles on Britain’s Groads grew by over a third, the distance they travelled by more than two thirds, and the motorway network grew by 30% [29]. Despite this increase in the number of roads, traffic jams were becoming commonplace on many routes and many town centres were becoming polluted with fumes and congested with traffic. In 1989, a Government paper entitled Roads for Prosperity proposed 2,700 miles of new or improved roads in Britain, and the Conservative party manifesto in 1992 promised to spend £2 billion a year on road building.

At the same time as the 1989 policy, however, transport experts were starting to predict that even this road-building programme would not be enough to accommodate the massive traffic growth that was expected (around twice the number of vehicles on the road in 2025 compared to the late 1980s) [29]. A report from a government Committee (the Standing Advisory Committee on Trunk Road Assessment) in 1994 confirmed that building new roads actually creates more traffic. Experts were increasingly saying that, in the long-run, road-building was not a solution to the congestion on the country’s roads.

In addition to the issue of congestion, pollution from vehicles and the effect on health, the accident rate on the roads, the effects on society and people’s lives of crowded, unsafe roads and city centres, and emissions of carbon dioxide leading to global warming were all showing that the continuing growth in road transport was simply not sustainable.

The issue of road building and the Government’s transport policy was brought to the fore in 1992, with a high-profile campaign against a road through an area known as Twyford Down. It soon became clear that, as well as the experts predicting the policy was flawed, public opposition to road building and the government’s policy was also mounting, not only amongst the environmentalist lobby, but across all sectors of society, even traditional Conservative party supporters. After the cancellation of a number of other controversial schemes in the early 1990s (e.g. the Hereford, Aylesbury and Crickhowell bypasses) the Government conducted a roads review in 1994, which resulted in the cancellation of 49 schemes that were part of the national roads programme, and the postponement of another 67. Further cuts followed in 1995 and 1996 (purportedly largely on financial grounds). By 1997, the Government’s national roads programme contained 110 roads, with another 34 to be built with private finance - a massive drop from the programme of almost 500 roads proposed in 1990 [29].

There has thus been a gradual shift in thinking, and the official approach to transport in the UK is now changing. The new Labour Government, which came to power in May 1997, issued a policy paper (a "White Paper") in July 1998, in which the Secretary of State wrote "We cannot go on as we were, trying to build more and more new roads to cope with growing levels of traffic". The paper sets out the government’s commitment to an integrated transport policy, with more emphasis on public transport [30].

There is still a long way to go, however, before transport policy is truly sustainable. Although road building is no longer the threat it once was to woodland in the UK, significant areas of countryside, including woodland and 94 SSSIs, remain threatened with destruction through road-building (see section 4.1) [31].

Related factors

3.2.1 Inherent advantages of the car

The car undoubtedly has the advantage of convenience, giving the ability to travel door to door at a time of one’s choosing, carry luggage easily etc. The demise in the public transport system means that in the large majority of cases, undertaking a journey by public transport will be a lot less convenient than using your own car - if it is an option at all. In addition, fiscal policies and the structure of paying for the costs of a car mean that using a car is often a relatively cheap option (see section 3.2.3).

3.2.2 Power of car lobby

Car manufacturing companies, the road construction industry, the motoring organisations, road haulage firms, petrol companies etc. have an obvious interest in promoting a roads-dominated transport policy. In the UK, many of these companies and organisations (including some massive trans-national corporations such as BP and Shell) join together to form the British Roads Federation (BRF). This, and other bodies or groups of companies, lobby over issues of policy and legislation that relate to their spheres of business. For example, the road haulage trade bodies have run a long campaign for the introduction in Britain of heavier lorries, and against the levels of tax on vehicles and vehicle fuel [29]. Similarly, motor manufacturers have campaigned against the requirement for catalytic converters to be fitted on cars, and against legislation requiring certain safety features, both measures that would increase the cost of car manufacture.

This lobby has had an undoubted influence on transport policy. According to transport writer Christian Wolmer in his book Unlocking The Gridlock (written for Friends of the Earth) "...the lobby has been a major force from almost the very start of motoring, and has clearly determined transport policies for much of the post-war period" [29]. Clearly, some of the companies involved have significant resources at their disposal. Indeed, the increasing power and influence of large companies on policies and decision-making in many spheres is becoming well recognised (see, for example, David Korten’s book When Corporations Rule the World).

3.2.3 Failure to include true costs of road transport, and the vehicle tax system

The fact that the full costs of the impacts of car use are not borne by the motorist has undoubtedly contributed to the popularity of road transport. Pollution from cars and its damaging effect on human health is a major externality, the cost of which is borne by the state or the individuals affected, not the car user. The government’s Department of the Environment said in 1997 that air pollution was responsible for several thousand advanced deaths, for ten to twenty thousand hospital admissions and for many thousands more incidences of illness. An article in the magazine New Scientist in 1994 estimated that an extra 10,000 deaths per year in the UK may be due to particulates in the air (road transport is responsible for 26 % of particulate emissions). Transport is also responsible for 26% of the UK’s carbon dioxide emissions, the chief gas responsible for global warming [32]. One estimate puts the total cost of air pollution from road transport in the UK at around £19.7 billion a year [29].

Congestion is another major cost, because of the time wasted. It is estimated that road congestion currently costs the UK economy up to £19 billion a year; this is predicted to increase further as traffic levels increase [32].

Road accidents kill over 3,500 people annually in the UK, seriously injure almost 50,000 and slightly injure over 300,000 [32]. The financial costs of fatalities depends on the monetary value put on human life; the cost to the emergency and health services of dealing with accident victims is significant.

There is also a further cost to the health service and to society as a whole from the lack of exercise people take by using cars instead of walking or cycling, and a reluctance to let children walk or cycle to school or play outside because of danger from traffic and pollution.

There are also elements within the UK tax system that encourage car use. Company cars are still a tax break (although less so since a change in policy in 1994), the further they are driven the better the tax break, thus encouraging excessive use. There are around 2 million company cars in the UK, and a half of all new car sales go to companies. Since the cost of the car is not born by the driver, there is a tendency for larger, less fuel-efficient vehicles to be bought as company cars. The provision of free fuel to company cars is also advantageous in tax terms [29].

The tax on cars (road tax) is the same no matter what type of car it is, and how many miles it is driven. Campaigners have been calling for a variable tax that depends on the credentials of the car (so that fuel-inefficient, heavily polluting models are charged more) and on the number of miles it is driven per year.

Another problem with the majority of costs associated with motor travel (e.g. vehicle purchase, insurance, road tax) is that they are one-off costs that are paid up-front. By contrast, the whole cost of each journey on public transport is paid for at the time of the journey. This makes using a vehicle, once you have one, the cheapest option in a large number of cases.

3.2.4 Greater demand for transport

Secondary related factors

3.2.4.1 link to economic development

Improving transport is often seen as an essential prerequisite for the economic development of a region. However, there is growing evidence that this is not necessarily always the case. As early as 1978, a British parliamentary committee concluded that improvements to the national trunk road system would have only a limited effect on industrial location and growth, and that the theory that improvements in trunk roads would benefit depressed areas relative to affluent ones was unconvincing. A study by a Dutch academic published in 1985 also concluded that road building did not generate economic growth. Even the European Investment Bank has questioned this link [33].

A study of the effect of improving the A55 road linking Chester (a town in north-west England) to Holyhead (on Anglesey, a small island just of the north coast of Wales) showed that whilst the changes had meant increased competitiveness for some local firms through improved access to markets, other local suppliers had actually lost out, since items could now be brought in from other sources outside the region. In addition, a year after the route was opened there had been little new manufacturing investment in the region. The improvement to the road cost £720 million, which could of course have been invested in the region in other ways. Moreover, the region is popular with tourists largely because of its unspoilt countryside; more traffic and more industrial development could well result in a decrease in the tourist industry [29].

Logistics expert Professor Alan McKinnon has written that while there is some empirical evidence that road building encourages regional development, there is little evidence that it contributes to general economic growth. The effect of new or improved roads can be simply to displace economic activity from one region to the other, often to the detriment of the first area [29].

3.2.4.2 Globalisation of markets and consolidation of industries

The free market economy means that it may now be cheaper to transport a product manufactured elsewhere a considerable distance rather than buy a locally or nationally made item. At the same time, the consolidation of industries and companies means that goods are often transported longer distances from huge factories. Similarly, this consolidation of industry, retail services and the economies of scale, together with increased mechanisation, has contributed to local job shortages, meaning that people more often travel significant distances from their homes to work.

3.2.4.3 Increased living standards and aspirations of population

As prosperity and the average disposable income increases, so the demand for consumer goods or more exotic items (e.g. foreign food) goes up. Similarly, people have not only the money but also the time to travel for a range of activities in their (usually increased) leisure periods.

3.2.4.4 Urban degeneration and town planning (out-of-town development)

The degeneration of city centres and the rise of out-of-town development in the UK (large super-stores and shopping centres, housing developments and industrial estates), most of which are poorly served by public transport, has increased the need for car journeys. Out-of-town developments frequently lead to high-street shop closures so that people have to travel greater distances to shop; city centres thus become more run-down, less desirable and a self-perpetuating downward spiral begins.

3.2.5 Lack of debate on key issues

As described earlier, the Public Inquiry system used to gather public views on road proposals and other developments is deficient in that it is only instigated after a decision to build a road has been taken, and it does not allow debate of whether the road is needed or whether there are better alternatives. In the Newbury case, such a debate was never had; the public consultation exercise in 1982 was also about which of the four routes already drawn up by the engineers was preferable, and the 1994 review failed to invite views from relevant or interested parties.

Wolmer in his book Unlocking the Gridlock, while discussing the public transport system in Zurich - one of the best in the world - notes that the Swiss make a lot of use of referenda, and that many of the improvements in transport in Zurich have been voted for directly by the public [29].

3.2.6 Capitalist philosophy

The fundamental philosophy of a capitalist society is to foster the individual over society. In the UK, the basically capitalist Conservative Party held power for 18 years from 1979-1997. Their values led them almost by default to a car-centric transport policy, and a lack of investment in or priority to public transport services. The whole market economy, in which individuals or companies seek competitive advantage over each other, has a similar effect of promoting individual interests rather than those that benefit groups or wider society.

3.3 Underlying cause: lack of policy integration and priority of economic interests

Whilst some good targets and policies for nature protection have been set (e.g. the UK Government’s Biodiversity Action Plans), the implications of these policies and targets has not yet been fully integrated into other government departments. The destruction of the habitat for the Dormouse (one of the UK Biodiversity Action Plan species with its own Action Plan) by the Newbury Bypass is one example. The government’s nature conservation body in a document about road projects describes SSSIs as "irreplaceable" and says that they "should not be subject to bargaining and trade-off" [28]. Clearly, the policies of this part of government are not integrated into the decision-making process, or given sufficient weight within it.

Even when nature protection is enshrined in laws which look reasonable on paper, they are often simply ignored in favour of perceived economic benefits, described as "overriding public interest". One very clear example comes from Germany: the case of the A20 Lubeck to Szezecin Baltic coast motorway, which runs through an area designated as a Special Area for Conservation (SAC) under the Habitats Directive, and which should, therefore, have been protected. Despite a legal challenge, the road was allowed to go ahead because of "overriding public interest"; this "interest" was given as being the local economy needed a boost, alternative solutions did not exist, compensatory measures were envisaged and the road was part of the trans-European road network masterplan (see section 4.2) [33]. The UK government similarly ignored the Habitats Directive to build the Newbury bypass, damaging the Kennet and Lambourn floodplain, which should have been (and later was) designated an SAC to protect the Desmoulin’s Whorl Snail (an Annex II Species under the Directive).

3.4 Underlying cause: political structures and personal interests

In Britain, as in most places, there are people who are "close to power" and in a good position through personal or business relationships to exert influence over decisions, in the same way that large companies do (see section 3.2.2). The existence of a second, unelected house in the British Parliament, the House of Lords, exacerbates this situation in the UK. As mentioned in section 3.1.2 above, it was political activity by members of the House of Lords that prevented a new wildlife bill giving better protection to SSSIs continuing its passage through parliament.

There are a some interesting alleged personal connections in the Newbury bypass saga. Now that the bypass is nearing completion, there are a whole host of planning applications for developments (e.g. a petrol station, hotel, McDonalds restaurant) along the route of the new road, and at least one proposed development along the old A34. It is claimed that a couple of people in positions of influence who were active in lobbying for the road, have families who own land which can now be (and allegedly has been) sold at a high price for bypass-dependent development.

The election cycle (every 5 years in the UK) and the emphasis on short-term economic prosperity to win votes acts against far-sighted policy making, in the UK and many other countries.

4. THREATS FOR THE FUTURE

4.1 The threat to woodland from road building in the UK

Whilst the car-centric transport policy of recent years in the UK has clearly changed, there are still plans for many new or improved roads in the government’s national programme. Sixty-three SSSIs are threatened by these national (trunk) roads, and 32 SSSIs are threatened by roads planned by local authorities [31]. An analysis of how many of these are woodland sites has not been undertaken, but it is clear from the list of sites that it is a significant number. In addition to these, there are the many areas of woodland that are outside the SSSI system (remembering that only 14% of remaining ancient semi-natural forest is within SSSIs). Road-building therefore remains a significant threat to woodland in the UK.

4.2 European Union policy and plans

As well as national policies, ambitious plans to develop cross-border transport infrastructure throughout the continent could pose a threat to forest areas in other European countries. The European Commission has drawn up a series of plans known as the transport Trans-European Network (TENs). The objective of this network is to enable the free movement of people and goods within the community, complementing national policies that generally focus on transport within one country only.

The transport TENs have been heavily criticised by environmental groups for their lack of attention to potential environmental impacts, and for their over-emphasis on road transport. In August 1995, there were 140 road schemes in the plans, compared to just 11 rail links, 26 inland waterways and 57 combined transport projects - although it should be noted that the list is changing all the time. The European Parliament’s transport and tourism committee produced a document in 1994 that also expressed concern over the Commission abandoning environmental goals and including damaging road schemes in the plans. Even the Commission itself has recognised this as an issue: a European Commission report published in May 1994 said that the environment seems to have been neglected in the TENs [33].

Several factors identified as underlying or related causes in the Newbury case are relevant at this level too.

i) Power of the roads lobby

The power and influence of the roads lobby and big business has been significant in the development of the TENs plans. Two reports, Missing Links and Missing Networks, produced in 1984 and 1985 by the European Round Table of Industrialists (a group of 45 of Europe’s largest companies), called for the development of a trans-European transport network, mainly comprising road transport. The TENs plans show a marked similarity to the proposals in these reports. In developing the first TENs plan for roads, the European Commission took account of the recommendations of a "Motorway Working Group", made up of road and industry groups. By contrast, the initial TENs transport masterplan involved no consultation with environmental groups at all.

ii) Lack of policy integration and priority to economic interests

As discussed in section 3.3, there is some useful European legislation that should help protect the environment and woodland (e.g. the Directive on Environmental Impact Assessment, the Birds Directive and the Habitats Directive). However, there are examples from several different countries (as well as the Newbury bypass) of this legislation being over-ridden, and a report for the Commission in 1992 showed that numerous environmental laws were being ignored [33].

iii) Link between transport and economic development

Proponents of the TENs links claim that they will stimulate regional development, boost the economy, improve employment etc. This is stated, for example, in the European White Paper on Growth, Competitiveness and Employment [33]. However, as discussed in section 3.2.4.1 above, evidence does not entirely support these claims. In the European context, the true effect could simply be a redistribution of economic activity from one region or country to another, resulting in no net benefit to the Community as a whole. On a national level, any investment in one area could be to the detriment of other businesses in that area, or those in another area - i.e. the development is effectively substitution, rather than addition.

iv) Failure to include full costs

As with the UK (see section 3.2.3), the TENs and the justification for them do not account for the full cost of the transport and infrastructure. While this is recognised in the European White Paper on Transport, no measures have so far been taken to correct it. There is also a recognition in the White Paper that the growth in road transport cannot go on indefinitely [33]. This recognition does not seem to be reflected by the TENs proposals and the philosophy behind them.

4.3 Central and Eastern Europe - on the road to repeating the mistakes of the west?

Central and Eastern European countries are now placing priority on, and investing millions in, expanding and improving their road networks, seeing it as a pre-requisite to economic development. Some western analysts have warned that such policies will lead to the same congestion, pollution and environmental damage as seen in western Europe. Indeed, parallels have been drawn between western Europe in the post-second world war period, when, for example, the UK’s tram system was abandoned and the demise of the public transport system began, and the current situation in post-Stalinist Eastern European countries [34].

The EU TENs concept extends to Eastern and Central Europe, to allow trans-continental links to be developed. Substantial loans are being made to improve transport networks, especially those that form part of TENs. For example, earlier this year, the European Investment Bank (EIB) announced loans to Albania (22 million ECU for a new road between the port of Durres and the capital Tirana); Bulgaria (40 million ECU for upgrading road links to Greece); Slovenia (130 million ECU for a major motorway project); Czech Republic (230 million ECU for motorway projects); Poland (280 million ECU for motorway projects [35]. The EIB makes frequent reference in announcements about these loans to the contribution of these roads to economic development (e.g. "This project is another step in the development of an adequate road network which is essential for economic and social development in Bulgaria" [35]). The up-grading of transport links is also seen as a pre-requisite to membership of the European Union, to which several of these countries aspire. As discussed above, this link between road building and economic development may be prove to be flawed.

5. SOLUTIONS AND CHANGES REQUIRED

5.1 Road-dominated transport policies, associated factors, and the increasing need for transport

Shifting national and international transport policies away from the focus on roads and towards more sustainable forms of transport (e.g. rail) is the first step towards a solution. This needs to be accompanied by the incorporation of the true cost (including externalities) of each mode of transport in the price paid for the service.

As well as reducing the financial attractiveness of car use, fiscal adjustment could also tackle the ever-increasing demand for more and more transport. An increase in the tax on transport is needed, so that the full cost of using it is reflected in the price paid. In order not to harm overall economic activity, an increase in tax on transport should be accompanied by a decrease in another area, the tax on labour being most frequently suggested. This is the basis of eco-tax reform, advocated by many environmental groups and some environmentally minded economists. Such a shift in taxation would make it less attractive for goods and people to be moved around, but cheaper to employ people, therefore stimulating local and intra-regional economic activity, and avoiding the damaging and unsustainable impacts associated with the increased transport of inter-regional trade.

This is effectively the opposite model to the current globalisation of markets that has been almost ubiqitously accepted, but that environmentalists and others are increasingly showing is fundamentally unsustainable. Of course, such a shift is strongly opposed by the big trans-national corporations, since it is totally against their interests. Given the strong influence of big business and industry over national and international policy making, these changes will inevitably be difficult to advance.

5.2 Lack of protection for forests and nature, undervaluing of these resources, lack of policy integration and the over-riding priority of economic development

Tackling the more proximate of these causes through an improvement in nature protection laws and their enforcement may be a matter of effective campaigning at a national level. Ultimately, however, what is needed is a far-reaching change in the political climate, stemming from a change in public mood, so that the environment is seen as a top priority rather than a secondary consideration that can continually be subsumed to the goal of increased economic growth.

REFERENCES

1. Forestry Commission (1998). The future for Forestry. Forestry Commission, Edinburgh.

2. Forestry Authority (1998). UK Forestry Standard - The Government’s Approach to Sustainable Forestry. Forestry Authority, Edinburgh.

3. Department of Environment (1995). Biodiversity – the UK Steering Group Report Vol.2: Action Plans. HMSO, London.

4. Friends of the Earth (1995). Paper to the Government Panel on Sustainable Development – Forestry. Friends of the Earth, London.

5. Department of Environment, (1994). Biodiversity: the UK Action Plan. HMSO, London.

6. Friends of the Earth (1994). Gaining Interest: The UK’s Wildlife Wealth and the Law. Friends of the Earth, London.

7. Royal Society for the Protection of Birds (1998). Land for Life. RSPB, Sandy, Beds.

8. Rollinson, G. (1997). Only Just - A history of the A34 Newbury Bypass 1979-1998. Gordon Rollinson, Winchester.

9. English Nature, undated. Snelsmore Common SSSI notification. English Nature, Peterborough.

10. Ecological Planning and Research (1993). Snelsmore Common Management Plan. Newbury District Council.

11. Nature Conservancy Council (1989). Guidelines for the Selection of Biological SSSIs. Quoted in: Friends of the Earth (1994). The A34 Newbury Bypass. Friends of the Earth , London.

12. Colston, A. (ed) (1997). Head on Collision – Wildlife and Roads Report. Bedfordshire, Berkshire, Buckinghamshire, Cambridgeshire, Essex, Hertfordshire, Northamptonshire, Oxfordshire. The Wildlife Trusts.

13. Friends of the Earth (1994). The A34 Newbury Bypass. Friends of the Earth, London.

14. West Berkshire Council, undated. Speen Moor Wildlife Heritage Site notification. West Berkshire Council, Reading.

15. Juniper, T. Pers.comm.

16. Friends of the Earth Press Release, 9 March 1996. Hundreds of archaeologists gather at the site of the Newbury bypass.

17. Friends of the Earth (1995). A 34 Newbury Bypass – Environmental Assessment. Friends of the Earth, London.

18. European Commission Spokesman’s Service Press Release, 20 October 1995. The Commission rules out infringement procedures against the United Kingdom for the Newbury Bypass and the M77.

19. Friends of the Earth Press Release, 15 February 1996. Ice age snail could freeze bypass route.

20. Friends of the Earth Press Release, 25 June 1996. High Court ruling on Newbury snail demonstrates the need for tougher wildlife law.

21. Friends of the Earth (1995). Environmentalists are continuing their campaign against the Newbury Bypass. Why? Friends of the Earth, London.

22. Friends of the Earth Press Release, 11 July 1995. Review of Newbury Bypass is deeply flawed say independent experts.

23. Friends of the Earth (1995). End of the Road. Managing Newbury’s traffic to reduce congestion and pollution without a western bypass. Friends of the Earth, London.

24. Friends of the Earth Press Release, 19 February 1996. Newbury Bypass will save two minutes on most journeys says Highways Agency.

25. Friends of the Earth Press Release, 20 March 1996. Newbury Bypass rejected by national opinion survey.

26. Newbury Friends of the Earth (1996). Bypassing the Truth. The Liberal Democrats and the Newbury Bypass. Friends of the Earth, London.

27. Friends of the Earth Press Release, 15 January 1996. Newbury Business Against the Bypass.

28. Nature Conservancy Council (1990). The treatment of nature conservation in the appraisal of trunk roads. Nature Conservancy Council, Peterborough.

29. Friends of the Earth (1997). Unlocking the Gridlock; the key to a new transport policy. Friends of the Earth, London.

30. Department of the Environment, Transport and the Regions (1998). A new deal for transport: better for everyone - a summary of the Government’s White Paper. HMSO, London.

31. Friends of the Earth (1998). Wildlife and Road Building. Friends of the Earth, London.

32. Higman, R. (1997) Developing an integrated transport policy; response from Friends of the Earth. Friends of the Earth, London.

33. Bowers, C. (1995) Ten Questions on TENS. A look at the European Union’s proposals for trans-European transport networks from an environmental perspective. European Federation for Transport and the Environment, Brussels.

34. The Times, 2 January 1992.

35. European Investment Bank Press Releases, 9 February, 12 February, 6 March, 28 May, 27 July, 28 July 1998.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Thanks to Friends of the Earth, particularly Paula Smith, for access to the organisation’s files, and to Bernard Mackey and Jill Eisley of the Third Battle of Newbury.

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