Europe

The Influence of the Private Sector in Forest Policy
by Simon Counsell, October 1998

Acknowledgement

This paper is based upon a study originally prepared for the International Institute for Environment and Development, whom the author wishes to thank for permission to use this material.

1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Inappropriate and failed policies are generally held to be one of the key underlying causes of continuing mismanagement of the world’s forests. Policy often seems to reflect demands made by the private sector, although any causal relationship between the two is often implicit, or even covert.

This paper therefore sets out to explore the relationship between the private sector and the development and implementation of public policy on forests. Its focus is on the private sector principally interpreted as corporations, rather individual forest owners. The emphasis is on the activities of European companies, or European policy that has been influenced, but examples have also been drawn from around the world. The paper first considers briefly the private sector’s role in directly ‘managing’ forests. The various means, both legitimate and illegitimate, in which forest policy is influenced are then typified and described. The final section provides a case study, focussing on the European Union’s Ecolabelling scheme, as it related to the ‘eco-certification’ of forest products.

Specific legislation and general policy frameworks, as well as the public perception of forests that help to shape these policies, have long been strongly influence by the private sector. The paper concludes that, in terms of policies that promote forest conservation and sustainable management, the influence of the private sector is generally pernicious. Companies have largely sought policies which maximise short-medium term profits, eradicate competition and promote economies of scale. Any engagement of the private sector in public policy with a putative aim of promoting long-term sustainability and public benefits is only of very recent occurrence. The role of such influence in the promotion of damaging policies remains almost completely neglected in prescriptions for reforming or ‘improving’ forest policy.

2. THE PRIVATE SECTOR AND FOREST RESOURCES

There is general agreement that forest resources globally continue to be either poorly managed, abused, destroyed, or profoundly altered in their structure and purpose (see for example, FAO 1995; Dudley, 1992; CSD, 1997). This has been taking place in the context of an almost complete transition of ownership and management of forests from communities to the State, and more recently from States to the private sector (in some cases, the transition has been direct from communities to private sector). This trend may have accelerated in recent years, as governments and international agencies have sought to reduce the role of the state and facilitate free trade and private investment. The private sector’s role as a 'stakeholder' in forest management and forest policy making has consequently tended to expand.

There has been no global assessment of the extent of private sector control over forest resources, but the area under outright private ownership and leasing arrangements is certainly very substantial. Reflecting changes in other natural resource sectors, forest resources have become increasingly concentrated in the hands of fewer companies. In Canada, for example, seven of the largest forestry sector firms have rights to nearly 35 million hectares of forest; in Sweden, 24% of the forest estate is owned by forestry corporations, of which four own nearly 8 million hectares (TRN, 1995; FoE, n.d.); a selection of 15 companies studied in one report control some 45 million hectares of forests (EIA, 1996); the twelve largest Malaysian timber firms control more than 22 million hectares worldwide (WRM, 1998). Taking all of the above together, and adding other large private holdings in Finland, the US, Indonesia, Guyana and Congo-Brazzaville, one can estimate that just fifty of the largest corporations alone have control over some 140 million hectares of the world's forest (roughly equivalent to the entire forest estate of Europe and Scandinavia).

As the Environmental Investigation Agency has pointed out, the influence of such companies spreads to a much larger area through timber purchase agreements with governments and private landowners (EIA, 1996). The size of companies is not necessarily a guide to the amount of political ‘clout’ that they yield, but it is undoubtedly the case that larger corporations have greater opportunity for access to, and influence over, decision-makers. As Carrere and Lohmann have noted, given the large size of some of the forestry sector corporations, "it is hardly surprising that many of the largest are important political as well as economic actors. The sales figures for International Paper alone rank above the Gross Domestic Products of more than 75 countries" (Carrere and Lohmann, 1996).

3. INFLUENCE - WHO, WHY, WHERE, WHAT AND HOW?

3.1 Who does the influencing?

The forestry sector embraces a wide range of different size and types of companies. Each is likely to have specific interests which are pursued through specific policy channels, and their various interests are not necessarily consistent.

For example, larger enterprises have used their political influence to promote the adoption of policies which enhance their dominance over forest resources and markets and further marginalise smaller interests - often on the grounds of ‘improved forest management’ and ‘resource-use efficiency’. In British Columbia for example, restrictive legislation introduced in the 1940s and 50s, which was ostensibly aimed at promoting ‘sustained yield’ and addressing concerns about over-cutting of coastal rainforests, was actually used as a means of reducing the competitiveness of smaller companies and increasing the holdings and tenure security of the larger corporations (Marchak, 1983). Similar changes have apparently also taken place in the development of the forest industry in Tasmania (Dargavel, n.d).

There is very little evidence that such changes in legislation have brought about the objective of better forest management. In British Columbia, whereas in 1940 some 58 companies controlled about one-half of the timberland, by the late 1970s five firms were responsible for more than 80 per cent of harvesting (Marchak, 1983). The concentration of forest-land in the hands of an ever-decreasing number of companies has been found by successive Royal Commissions to be one of the key obstacles to sustainable management of British Columbia’s forests (Baltgailis, 1996).

Different types of forest sector companies seek to pursue their interests in different ways. Integrated companies involved in down-stream processing and retailing as well as logging may be concerned with a broader range of policies; pollution control legislation, employment and health and safety, taxing and tariff structures, as well as policies directly relating to forestry and land use legislation. US forest products companies, for example, have lobbied the US Government over legislation concerning the use of ozone-depleting chemicals (particularly methyl bromide) (AFPA, 1997), reform of the Clean Air and Water Acts, Endangered Species Legislation, labour laws and taxation treatment of timber (Cubbage, 1993).

Enterprises satisfying external markets may be positioned to exert greater influence than those supplying only internal markets, particularly where the government concerned is subject to heavy foreign debt-servicing arrangements and/or a Structural Adjustment Programme. In Papua New Guinea in 1996, for example, logging companies threatened to stop production in a dispute over proposed revisions to the forest rent structure, thus jeopardising the government’s ability to comply with a Structural Adjustment package (Barry, 1996).

3.2 What is the aim of ‘influence’

Any instrument of policy which has a bearing upon the private sector's activities is likely to attract attention. These include: regulatory instruments; normative instruments, where guidelines and standards are elaborated; trade policy; financial and incentive systems/taxation arrangements; research, training and education programmes, including 'public education' and formal curricula, and; tenure systems, including those of the forest sector and those outside it.

There are a number of general objectives which the private sector may seek through an influence over policy. These include: increasing or maintaining access to markets;

elimination of commercial competitors (by, for example, denying them access to markets or to sources of raw material); reduction of costs; increasing security (for example, over the resource base or capital investments); obtaining direct benefits (such as subsidies for afforestation or infrastructure development), and reducing the role in policy formulation of adversaries (such as environmental groups).

3.3 What are the targets of influence?

Potentially, any official agency, institution, forum or decision-making arrangement, at the local, national or international level, may be the target of private sector influence, as well as any civil institutions which play a role in forming or implementing policy. In addition, in democratic societies, the wider public, or key constituents within it, are also seen as important targets.

3.3.1 The international scene

At the international level, the key debate of interest to the private sector concerns the maintenance and expansion of free trade. As Dudley et al, have pointed out "The free trade philosophy of GATT has been enthusiastically embraced by members of the timber trade". They cite a Vice President of Corporate Affairs for Noranda Forest Inc. of Canada as saying "The forest products industry...share(s) a common interest in maintaining open international markets for trade in pulp and paper products. To this end, pulp and paper producers should work together to preserve the integrity of the open global trading system as embodied in the rules based WTO/GATT. (sic). Proposals for changes in existing trade rules and related initiatives to promote the use of trade measures as a mechanism to enforce environmental progress pose new threats to the integrity of the open trading system" (Dudley, et al, 1995).

An example of active opposition to trade restraint has been seen in the debate on the use of the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species (CITES) to regulate the trade in threatened tree species. The UK and US timber importing associations (National Hardwood Importers Section of the TTF, and the National Hardwood Products Association - NHPA), both strongly argued against the inclusion of Brazilian mahogany under the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species (CITES), when it was proposed for listing under Appendix II of the Convention in 1994, despite compelling scientific reasons to do so. The largest timber exporter in the Republic of Congo, Congolaise Industrielle des Bois, is reported to have provided support to Congolese government officials to attend the Convention of the Parties to the CITES Agreement in order to lobby against a similar proposal to list African timber species (Fay, 1996).

The private sector has argued strongly that CITES should defer to ITTO on such matters, perhaps because the private sector’s influence within ITTO is much greater. According to one study of the ITTO, "a process of privatisation has taken place [within the ITTO] in which the public sector is yielding influence and authority to private sector interests...profit making concerns have gained strong representation that has enabled them to influence a broad range of activities" (Lee, et al, 1997). Evidence of such influence is found in, for example, the chairing of ITTO’s council and committees by timber company representatives at various times, and financial contributions to the organisation's funds from Japanese corporations. It is believed that the influence exerted through these means "has given such interests a largely self-regulatory role" (Lee et al, 1997).

International agreements also have the advantage to the private sector that they necessarily generalise about forest conditions and prescriptions, thus providing scope for interpretation which can be used to legitimise or justify the present status quo. Thus, the Canadian private sector has been one of the strongest advocates in favour of a global agreement on forests which, the Canadian Pulp and Paper Association has noted, " will have to be based on general principles and adaptive criteria of forest and environmental management. [It] will be incapable of prescribing stand-level forest management or regional policy. For instance, some forests respond well to a silvicultural system employing single tree selection, while others are best suited to clearcutting" (CPPA, 1995a). Such an agreement would thus be particularly favourable to an industry facing fierce criticism for its clear-cutting practices. It is interesting to note that the Canadian government has been firmly in favour of a globally binding international agreement, despite much evidence that, in terms of promoting sustainable forest management, such an agreement would be at least premature and possibly counter-productive (see for example: WCFSD, 1996; EFI, 1996).

3.3.2 National targets

The national legislative framework is, of course, of key importance to the private sector. Clearly, Forest Ministers and their staff are prime target of influence. However, advisory bodies, policy consultation fora and legislative committees, at the local as well as national level, are also of great importance. In the US, for example, the forestry private sector participates in fora ranging from local wilderness allocation hearings (Cubbage, 1993) to the President's Council for Sustainable Development.

One example of private sector lobbying and national legislation has been the US Endangered Species Act (ESA). The decision by a Federal Court in 1991, that under the ESA, nearly all timber sales from national forests with spotted owls present should be stopped, pending preparation of an environmental impact statement, represented a serious threat to the availability of timber to the wood industry. Subsequent congressional moves to reform the ESA were clearly connected to the pursuit of private sector interest. The Boise Cascade corporation may have had the greatest interest in seeing changes to the ESA, as it was, in the early 1990s, the largest purchaser of timber from federal lands affected by the ruling (Wilson, 1995). The company has stated publicly it's views on the ESA: "we believe the Act, as it has been interpreted and implemented, is seriously flawed and has unnecessarily negative impacts on Boise Cascade and the entire country. We support amendment of the act...." (BC, 1995).

Boise Cascade is reportedly a very active member of the American Forest Resource Alliance, is a major contributor to timber industry political action committees, and has direct access to decision makers. A former Senator, James McClure, sits on Boise's Board of Directors, and runs a Washington DC lobbying firm (Wilson, 1995). McClure invited businesses to subscribe (at a cost of up to $100,000 each) to the 'National Endangered Species Act Reform Coalition' (ESC, 1995).

A moratorium on the listing of further species under the ESA was duly introduced in 1995 under a House Interior Appropriations Bill. A complete suspension of the ESA, under certain conditions, followed in July 1995 with the 'Taylor Salvage Timber Rider' Recissions Bill. This had the effect of releasing billions of board feet of timber for felling in areas that were otherwise protected but where felling could be justified on the grounds of ‘salvaging’ timber. Such had been the effectiveness of the private sector’s lobbying effort that the bill was passed against the advice of the US Government's own Forest Service, who repeatedly testified before Congress hearings that the Forest Service itself had adequate authority to carry out an effective salvage program and that the ‘salvage rider’ was not necessary to log dead trees.

Such is the closeness of the interests of the private sector and decision-makers in the US that one observer has been prompted to comment that "there are a number of congressman with direct interest in the federal forests and in natural resources generally. There exists an "iron triangle" of user groups, federal bureaucrats, and congressman among whom there is a common interest in promoting federal expenditures from which advantages are expected to flow to each of the parties. These three groups may argue and even quarrel among themselves as to specific measures and as to the division of the spoils, but they are united against the rest of the world in striving for their objectives. Some of the congressmen with these views are on the appropriations committees and more are on the legislative committees dealing with resource interests" (Clawson, n.d).

The incentive and subsidy structures within forest policy are of particular importance to the private sector. Despite the promotion of policies and ideology in support of ‘free markets’, the private forestry sector in almost all countries has benefited from large state handouts and fiscal incentives and, in many cases, relies heavily upon these. Such ‘incentives’ may include explicit provision of grants and subsidies for the establishment of infrastructure, processing plants and reafforestation, as well as implicit subsidisation through low stumpage fees, and other forms of forest rents and trade tariffs. The maintenance of such benefits has required intimate and consistent engagement in the political process. As companies have become larger, so the requirement to support the necessary infrastructure and start-up costs has become ever greater: "Because today's immense mills cannot generate profits without a large-scale re-engineering of their social and physical surroundings, the pulp and paper industry relies heavily nearly everywhere on political campaigns to capture handouts from the state and public" (Carrere and Lohmann, 1996).

In some developing countries, the pattern of forest development has been strongly influenced by foreign development assistance; as Jack Westoby has noted, development programmes have had a close relationship with the interests of the private sector, particularly in donor countries: "the growing interest in, and acceptance of, forestry projects (by development agencies)...had everything to do with the fact that many of the rich industrialised countries needed, and badly needed, new wood material resources; and their forest industries, their equipment manufacturers, together with miscellaneous agents and operators, scented golden opportunities for profit in those underdeveloped countries with forest resources. This was the dominant consideration which determined the location, shape and direction of forest and forest industry development projects" (Westoby, 1987).

Advantage has been taken of the fact that development agencies have been willing to promote private interests for geopolitical reasons. This 'inter-meshing' of private sector and national interest through development assistance has been acknowledged in an unusually candid view given by the Canadian government: "As the leading trading nation in forest products and one of the principal forest nations of the world, Canada has a responsibility to be active in the global issues of forest product trade, conservation of biodiversity, climate change, sustainable forest management and research. How these issues are resolved affects the very fabric of Canadian society, with enormous impacts on our economy. Being active internationally through our official development assistance programme increases Canada's leverage to promote our national strategic interests" (CIDA, 1995).

3.3.3 Science and academia

As many of the policy processes involved in the forestry sector have become increasingly technical, so access to appropriate techniques and scientific research has become increasingly important in policy formulation and implementation. Scientific authorities and Inspectorates, university forestry research departments and standards organisations have consequently all become important targets for private sector influence and control.

In some countries the level of private sector control of research is already high. In the United States, for example, total investment in forestry and forest products research is estimated at $1.3 billion, of which approximately two-thirds originates from the private sector (Ellefson, 1995). In 1987, 51 US universities had co-operative research projects with wood-based industries. Of the largest programmes, 56% of the co-operative programme at North Carolina was industry-funded, 50% at the University of Florida and 75% at the University of Maine (Ellefson, 1995). In Sweden, 42% of forestry researchers are employed in the private sector (Hellstrom and Palo, 1995). As Leslie has pointed out, the increased ‘contracting out’ of forestry research to the private sector has its dangers; "Academic freedom does not sit well with the confidentiality interests of sponsors or their views of their property rights... With the revolution in public sector management inexorably forcing contracted research on to all parties on a much greater and more continuing scale... something then will have to give and the danger for research is that, under financial stress, it will be academic freedom" (Leslie, 1995).

Such trends have important implications for the private sector's role in policy processes. Monopolisation of scientific research and technology increases influence over decision-making processes, and can provide legitimisation of private sector interests. As Cubbage has noted, "More public and private funding to investigate the impact of forest practices could provide better information for policy making...If research finds that forestry does not harm soil productivity, water quality, or game and non-game wildlife populations or habitat, such evidence would support the lack of need for regulation" (Cubbage, 1991).

Control of expertise, information-gathering technology and data can be an important determinant in the private sector's ability to negotiate terms with forest agencies, particularly where these are lacking in such information themselves. A spokesman for one international forest products corporation has noted "As for superior knowledge of forest resources, yes, we make sure we know what we are talking about - being responsible for the profitable investment of millions of dollars of other peoples money and in other peoples future in today’s investment climate concentrates the mind wonderfully well. Perhaps this is what has triggered statements about unequal bargaining power" (McNeil, 1980).

3.3.4 Civil society; influencing public perception and behaviour

Civil society and the public at large can also be very important targets of influence, especially where there are well-developed and articulated ‘counter-views’ to that of the private sector.

The need to proactively convey a message and image to the public is now widely recognised within the forestry private sector, which has made increased efforts to shape the public's view in a way which accords with its own practices and perceptions. ‘Public relations’ is increasingly seen by the private sector as providing the catalysing element in the political process; "(Politics) provides the packaging and the vehicle to achieve the industrial objectives...There are two elements to the political subsystem...the message and the target. The message needs to be short; for example, 'Trees are good. We need more trees not less'. Our objectives should be to create and move inside an ever-increasing friendly circle of public opinion" (Fernandez Carro and Wilson, 1992).

Industry claims about the sustainability of forests and forest products have become ubiquitous. These often include simplified statements such as 'we plant two trees for every one we fell", which clearly reflect a set of values reducing the role of forests to fibre factories, and implicitly promoting perceptions which support these values. Such perceptions might include, for example: that forests are de facto defined by the presence of trees; that plantations and forests are equivalent and transposable; that 'forests' can be re-created through planting; that forests have to be replanted otherwise they senesce and die; that forests can be harvested in a way which evokes the perennial sustainability of agricultural systems. Terminology such as 'Tree Farms', introduced by the private sector and governments into popular vocabulary, with the help of public relations' companies, has tended to reinforce such perceptions.

In the context of multi-purpose management of forests, there are obvious inconsistencies and contradictions in such a set of perceptions. As Carrere and Lohmann point out, these inconsistencies require the promoters of such perceptions to address different audiences with different messages. Thus, whilst spokespeople for the forest industry may be keen to promote to undiscerning audiences the simplistic notion that "trees are good", they are quick to disavow such confusions with more sophisticated audiences, with whom it is argued that industrial plantations should be regarded in the same way as agricultural crops (Carrere and Lohmann, 1996). The connection between public perception of forests and forestry policy, as well as the differences in perceptions of forestry amongst different sections of society, has been recognised by Cubbage (1991): "People living in cities, and the more affluent and educated generally favour increased regulation. Forestry is still viewed favourably by rural residents, and by the poorer and less educated, but the number and influence of these people are declining...Foresters may practice good forestry, but if the general public believes otherwise, laws to regulate forest management and logging can and will be passed".

The promulgation of particular perceptions of forests has been necessary as a means of marketing forest products, as well as maintaining public support within the political process. This has been particularly true as forest product companies have become increasingly vertically integrated. Highly integrated companies obviously seek to achieve economies of scale and efficiencies of production, but this has been achieved only through very heavy capital investment and dependency on regularity and consistency of supply throughout the manufacturing-retailing process. Hence, larger integrated companies have tended to support forestry policies that promote plantations rather than natural forest management.

More importantly, perhaps, the development of heavily capitalised production systems which requires consistency of throughput and outturn may not be well adapted to major changes in the external environment, particularly economic shocks. Downturns in one sector, such as house-building, for example, may drastically reduce a part of an integrated forestry corporation's system - such as sawmilling, which in turn may have effects on other parts, such as reducing the raw material feed to pulping activities. Under these conditions, integrated firms will seek to develop new wood-based products and materials either to provide outlets for surpluses or to make greater efficiencies in times of relative raw material shortage. Fortunately for the private sector, wood has proven to be an ideal raw material upon which to base the manufacture of products which have the commercial advantages not only of high value-added, but also of high obsolescence and high turn-over. There has thus been a strong incentive to develop markets in paper, tissue and packaging, regardless of whether there is a genuine social need for such products, or of the long-term ability of forests to provide the raw material required for their manufacture.

There is evidence that integrated forest products companies have for some years understood this dilemma, and have adjusted their production and marketing strategies accordingly. In 1979, referring to the transition from ‘natural’ wood fibre to material drawn mostly from plantations, a spokesman for the Weyerhaeuser Corporation noted that: "as the average size of our materials decreases significantly, and as we attempt to recover wood values even from precommercial thinnings, research, production and marketing priorities all will change. We shall have to develop new markets, new products, new systems, and new processes to increase efficiency, to reduce costs, to increase values, and to generate acceptable economic return" (Bingham, 1979).

The political context of the need to constantly create new markets is well understood by the private sector, particularly in relation to opposition from other stakeholder groups. A representative of the Confederation of European Paper Industries (CEPI) has noted that "More and more we shall have to fight for our future and create our own growth. In this respect paper itself becomes increasingly a consumer product where total demand has to be stimulated. The alternative, to do nothing, could produce a static or even declining demand with serious implications for the industry, its reputation, its technology and the quality of the people it attracts. Until the paper industry and its allies come together to...convince the public of the social and ecological value of paper, our industry will continue to be vulnerable to more and increasingly damaging environmental attacks" (Clark, 1994).

3.4 How is influence exerted?

Where enforcement mechanisms are weak, such as in many developing countries, it may be relatively easy to simply ignore instruments of policy. As Contreras has pointed out "Corporations, foreign or domestic, will not always attach importance to the development and resource management priorities of the host country if their satisfaction does not lead to a financial profit or if compulsory measures are not effectively enforced by the government. In the absence of restrictive policies, they will tend to put private gain before social benefit" (Contreras, 1987). The inability of administrations to enforce the statutory requirements may create conditions whereby the 'custom and practice' of the private sector may become the de facto forest 'policy'. Even under more strictly regulated regimes, the penalties for compliance failures are often sufficiently low as to allow fines and other sanctions to effectively be costed-in to operations rather than regarded as a deterrent. In the UK, for example, whilst the conditions of the Woodland Grant Scheme proscribe the clearance of natural broad-leaved woodlands above a certain area, the financial penalties for doing so sufficiently low as to allow for such woodland to be cleared profitably.

Members of the private sector can also adopt tactics to keep broadly within the law but nevertheless are counter to its spirit. For example, exporters to Europe of Philippines' timber have long circumvented a prohibition on exports of rough-sawn lumber by planing and/or mitre-cutting one edge of boards such that they qualify for the status of 'further processed' wood. These are then re-worked according to the desired specification in the importing country.

Where the option of ignoring or circumventing policy is not available, attempts are made to change it. This includes the use of informal and illegitimate mechanisms as well as formal and legitimate channels. The most direct form of such influence is the use of private forestry sector funds to support political parties that are expected to favour the desired policy environments. This appears to be an almost universal practice. For example, in the United States in 1990, there were 40 registered forest products and paper industry Political Action Committees, which served to collect funds to be distributed to presidential and congressional election candidates whose views coincide with those of the Committee (Associated Press, 1990). Through PACs, forest product firms contributed nearly $5 million to candidates from 1983 to 1990, 73% of which went to Republicans. Of the total, "$775,000 went to members of the House and Senate from the five north-western states, presumably to influence decisions about public lands policies" (Cubbage, 1993).

Informal contacts between the private sector and policy-makers are highly important in achieving policy goals, and can be particularly effective as they are often one of the mechanisms open to members of the private sector and not to other ‘stakeholders’. As Cubbage notes, "Interest groups may try to influence policymakers through acquaintances or friends...In states with large forest products industries, many company officials are social friends of local or national legislators. These contacts are used by interest groups wherever possible" (Cubbage, 1993). Contact with decision makers is sought not only to influence current decisions, but as a hedge against future developments; "many companies encourage members to be active on local boards and commissions so that they are represented when issues arise" (Cubbage, 1993).

The use of ‘contacts’ as means of influence has been seen in its most highly developed form in south-east Asian countries, where the entire forest sector economy and policy structure may rest upon clientelist relationships. Such relationships are clearly an underlying cause of poor forest management: "Southeast Asian State leaders build patron client networks that siphon state funds, distort policies, and undermine supervision of state implementors. In this setting, the state is often unable to enforce timber management rules as implementors - in exchange for gifts, money or security - ignore or assist destructive and illegal loggers, smugglers and tax evaders" (Dauverne, 1995).

The use of ‘informal contacts’ and clientelist relations blends into corruption and entirely illegal forms of exerting influence. These range from the provision of 'logistical support' to forest department staff in the execution of their duties (such as concession inspection) to the making of direct payments or other inducements to decision-makers. Some of these forms of corruption have been well illustrated and documented in the case of PNG where the 1989 report of Justice Barnett’s inquiry into malpractices in the timber industry found that "it would be fair to say, of some of the companies, that they are now roaming the countryside with the self-assurance of robber barons, bribing politicians and leaders, creating social disharmony and ignoring the laws in order to gain access to, rip out, and export the last remnants of the province’s valuable timber" (Marshall, 1990).There is a growing body of information detailing such malpractices throughout the tropics (see for example, FoE, 1992; FoEI 1997, EIA 1996).

Such practices have not been limited to developing countries, and corruption appears to have played an important role in the establishment of timber industries in what are now 'developed' countries. For example, Ficken has detailed the perversion of administrative policies by the nascent timber industry in the western states of the US in the early part of the twentieth century, along with theft of state timber lands, and pressure to get rid of conscientious officials who attempted to stand in the way of illegal acts (Ficken, nd). Corruption of officials has also been a past feature of the timber industry in Tasmania and British Columbia.

Finally, whilst boycotts are usually thought of as an NGO tactic, the private sector also has the option of withdrawing altogether from policy processes, or using the threat of ceasing economic activities, if other means of influence fail. For example, in 1994, the European Tissue Symposium, representing 90% of tissue manufacturers in Europe, boycotted the European Ecolabelling scheme over the European Commission's selection of eligibility criteria (see section 4, ‘EU Ecolabelling case study’, below). The Swedish forest products corporation Assidoman shut down its pulp mill in Segezha, Russian Karelia, making 5000 workers redundant, in what has been interpreted as a move to influence the Russian authorities in negotiations concerning tax payments and compensation for heat supplied to a local town (TRN, 1997). In 1996, the major logging companies in Papua New Guinea threatened to collectively close down their operations if the government introduced new requirements for royalty payments to landowners.

4. CASE STUDY: THE EUROPEAN UNION ECO-LABELLING SCHEME

The case study of the development of the EU Ecolabelling scheme for forest products provides a detailed insight into the anatomy of private sector lobbying and its influence over policy. Because of the nature of the Ecolabelling scheme, it is possible to assess the effectiveness of private sector influence in a relatively objective manner.

4.1 Background to the Ecolabelling scheme

The European Union eco-labelling scheme was initiated in 1992, with the aim of promoting the trade in products with a reduced environmental impact, and to provide consumers with better information about such products (Erskine and Collins, 1996).

The criteria against which any given product is assessed for eligibility for an eco-labelling award is based upon an assessment of the most important environmental impacts at the various stages of manufacture, use or disposal of the product. For each of these criteria, an arbitrary scale of 'load points' is established, such that lower points' scores imply a lesser environmental impact. A maximum allowable score is then set; products for which the total score of load points across all criteria exceeds this threshold are not eligible for an eco-label award. Determination of the criteria and loading values are delegated to a 'national competent body' from one of the EU member states; in the case of ‘forest products’, this task was delegated to the Danish Competent Body (DCB).

4.2 The EU eco-label scheme and forest products

The DCB sub-divided the forest products group into smaller groups, initially 'tissue paper products', and 'fine paper'. By early 1993, the DCB had agreed the list of the main assessment criteria for forest products, which were to consist of:

• disposal of solid waste;
• emissions of sulphur dioxide;
• discharges of chlorinated organics;
• chemical oxygen demand of emissions to water;
• renewable resources ('RR' -mainly consumption of wood fibre);
• non-renewable resources ('NRR' - mostly energy);
• carbon dioxide emissions.

(CEC, 1994a; ENDS, 1993a)

The loading values proposed for all seven of the criteria proved to be highly contentious, but particular attention is given below to the criterion for renewable resources ('RR'). This, along with the criterion concerning ‘solid waste’, was of critical interest to forestry companies and producers of wood fibre, as its treatment would effectively determine whether products containing virgin wood fibre, as opposed to recycled material, could qualify for the EU’s Ecolabel. As originally proposed by the DCB, materials manufactured entirely from recycled material would score zero load points under the RR criterion, whereas those manufactured inefficiently from virgin fibre would receive a high score, probably prohibiting them from receiving an Ecolabel award.

The loading values for each of the criteria went through various drafts over a period of nearly two years. By comparing the alterations in these drafts with industry position statements and records of meetings at which the criteria were considered, it is possible to gain an indication as to why such changes were made.

4.3 Ecolabelling of tissue paper - industry catches a cold

The DCB’s initial proposal for the criteria load points was tabled in March 1993. Revised proposals were made in March 1994, followed by a third version, which was approved by the EC’s Regulatory Committee in November 1994. The basis of these values was that the more wood used to produce a given quantity of tissue paper, the higher the loading value, and hence the more likely that the product would score in excess of the loading score ‘threshold’ and be ineligible for an Ecolabel Award. The values set in the various drafts for the Renewable Resources criterion are shown in Table 1. Whilst the load point scores at the lower end of the scale remained the same, new (lower) levels of loading were introduced at the upper end of the parameter's range, thus favouring more inefficient manufacturers. Furthermore, in the final version, the ‘threshold’ score had been increased from 6 points to 6.5, representing a relaxation of the overall requirements.

In addition to the numerical criteria shown below, the DCB’s original, March 1993, proposal included an extra requirement such that any virgin fibre should be obtained from regions where "sustainable forest management is applied". However, in the version of the criteria finally adopted, the word 'sustainable' had been dropped, and 'forest management' was redefined in relation to the ‘Helsinki General Guidelines’ (CEC, 1994b).

Although individual corporations submitted views and participated in the consultation over the tissue paper criteria, most of the lobbying was carried out by industry associations. At the first meeting, in February 1993, of an Ad Hoc Working Group (AHWG) - a group including members of national competent bodies, Commission officials, industry and other representatives set up to consider the Danish proposals - it was recorded that "the flat paper industry (CEPI - Confederation of European Paper Industries) wanted the criteria loosened" (Anon, 1993).

Table 1. Development of EU Eco-label; renewable resources criterion and load points for tissue paper products, March 1993 - November 1994

Basic load points

(Sources: CEC, 1993; CEC, 1994b; Jackson, 1994a)

Industry had clearly had some success in pressing for such a relaxation, but the private sector was nevertheless enraged by the relatively minor changes made to the criteria, which still rendered it challenging for non-recycled paper to gain an Ecolabel Award. Two weeks after the adoption of the criteria by the European Commission, the European Tissue Symposium, which represents manufacturers accounting for more than 90% of tissue paper production in Europe (Barrett, 1995), announced that it was boycotting the scheme (ETS, 1994). ETS believed that the criteria had "been deliberately massaged to favour recycled products" (Zimmer, 1995). ETS further suggested that until the problems had been resolved, "no eco-label should be awarded", and threatened to bring a legal challenge to the scheme. The Association of Brazilian Cellulose Exporters (ABECEL) stated that "sustainable forestry operations will be heavily penalised by the ...plans for the new eco-label", a position which it found particularly serious for Brazilian producers, "since nearly four in every ten tonnes of their pulp and paper exports are to the EU" (ABECEL, 1995).

In December 1995, it was reported that there had been zero take-up by manufacturers of labelled products "largely due to effective boycotting of the scheme by CEPI and the European Tissue Symposium" (Webb, 1995).

4.4 The criteria for fine paper - the private sector rules

The private sector evidently resolved to be more effective in exerting influence over the development of the Ecolabelling criteria for the second main product group, ‘fine paper’ products.

Consultants employed by the DCB proposed preliminary criteria for this product sub-group identical with those adopted for tissue paper products. However, an early decision by the DCB was to delete the criterion relating to renewable natural resources altogether (Jackson, 1994b). A new criterion, 'Commitment to safeguard forests', was introduced. In order to satisfy this criterion, "a declaration, charter, code of conduct or statement reflecting the commitment, applicable to the operators in charge of managing the forests from which the fibres originate, meant to implement principles and measures aimed at ensuring sustainable forest management, shall be presented" (CEC, 1996a). After first proposing a ‘weighting factor’ of 0.6 for all load values for solid waste (ie, reducing the stringency of the criterion by 40%), the solid waste criterion was also dropped completely (CEC, 1996b)]

Concerning the source of virgin fibre, the requirement for European-based companies remained as for tissue papers, ie based on the ‘definition’ of Sustainable Forest management set out in the Helsinki Resolution H1. However, for non-Helsinki signatory countries, all that would be required would be simply a declaration of sustainability "according to other international or national agreements on sustainable forest management" (CEC, 1996a).

Learning from the earlier experience of the tissue paper criteria, industry representatives argued that the development of the criteria for fine paper should differ both the general approach taken and the specific criteria to be adopted. Indeed, cessation in April 1993 of work on the criteria for fine paper, and its resumption only in late 1994, was as a result of industry complaints about the initial proposal (ENDS, 1995). The British Paper and Board Industry Federation (BPBIF) wrote to the UK Eco-labelling Board, stating that the proposals were "deeply flawed" and that the criteria would "severely disadvantage the paper and board industry not only in the UK but across the EC as a whole" (ENDS 1993a). BPBIF claimed that the scheme would be "discriminatory against non-integrated mills...and mills using virgin fibre" (Kay, 1993). Buckling to this pressure, the DCB postponed submission of the fine paper criteria to the European Ecolabelling Consultation Forum in order to allow industry time to present evidence to support its complaints (ENDS, 1993b).

Initial private sector efforts were successfully directed at a separation of the process for defining the criteria for fine paper from that which had pertained in the setting of the criteria for tissue products. A report of the Ad Hoc Working Group meeting noted that "industry commented that proposals for criteria for Fine Papers should not automatically follow those for tissue products. The DCB acknowledged this point and replied that they had taken this into account by proposing to change the scoring for some criteria and by dropping the scoring for renewable resources" (Jackson, 1994a).

That the level of contact between private sector organisations and the DCB, as well as with members of the AHWG and the Commission, increased during 1994 and 1995 is clear from the minutes of the 2nd AHWG meeting held on April 6th 1995. Private sector representatives present at this meeting included Mr Jean-Pierre Lardillon of CEPI, Mr Alexandre Martins of Soporcel SA. (Portugal) and Mr Nils Jirvall (Swedish Forest Industries Association) (Engel, 1995a). Only one representative of an environmental NGO attended the meeting. The Chair of the meeting (Mrs Anne Nielsen of the Danish Environmental Protection Agency) noted that "there had been much interest and activity from industry organisations in USA, Canada and Brazil" (Engel, 1995a). Representatives of these associations had also held bilateral meetings with the DCB (Jackson, 1995). The representative of DGXI of the European Commission informed the meeting that there had been "heavy pressure" on the Commission (Engel, 1995b)

Concerning the specific revisions in the March 1995 proposal compared to the 1994 proposal, it was explicitly stated that "one of the intentions of the proposal is to ensure that some products based on virgin fibre are able to obtain an eco-label" (Engel, 1995b). Nevertheless, industry representatives claimed that it was still too difficult for products based on virgin fibres to qualify, and pressed for an increase in the maximum permissible load point score (Engel, 1995a).

CEPI argued against the inclusion of a parameter on the use of renewable resources, a position supported by Scandinavian and Brazilian private sector interests. A representative of the Finnish Forest Industries Federation stated that "Finland cannot accept those (parameters) for raw material use. The use of primary fibre brings more penalty points than the use of wastepaper. This puts most Finnish paper products at a disadvantage from the outset, as only a small number of products will qualify for a paper eco-label" (von Ungern-Sternberg, 1995). ABECEL wrote to the Chair of DCB supporting the exclusion of the renewable resources parameter (Hall, 1995a).

Concerning the lowering of the load points for the solid waste criterion, the consultant to the DCB responsible for drafting and revising the criteria noted that "paper industry representatives have raised the objection that the waste parameter has been given too much weight. We have investigated the relevance of this objection and found that the waste parameter is the greatest obstacle for achieving the goal given above (i.e. the inclusion of virgin fibre). Therefore we have changed the weight factor of this parameter from 1.0 to 0.6"" (Engel, 1995b). The Chair of the 2nd AHWG stated that the solid waste issue is "one of those that causes much concern in USA and Brazil" (Engel, 1995a). Aracruz International Ltd had stated to the DCB that it did not believe the issue of solid waste disposal was as relevant to Brazil as it was in densely populated areas in Europe (DEPA, 1994).

Despite the proposed lowering of the solid waste load point scale by applying a 0.6 weighting, the private sector argued that the level was still too high (Engel, 1995a). ABECEL told the chair of the DCB that the proposed change "does not go far enough" (Hall, 1995a), and proposed a further reduction of the weighting factor to 0.3. This was supported by the Finnish Forest Industries Federation (von Ungern-Sternberg, 1995). In May, 1995, ABECEL wrote to Mr Tom Burke, Special Advisor to the Secretary of State for the Environment, expressing its concern about the UK’s position (Hall, 1995b). The letter also stated opposition to the inclusion of any conditions relating to forestry practices.

In relation to the changes to the requirements for sourcing of virgin fibre from areas under sustainable forest management, the Chair of AHWG said at the group's 2nd meeting that a difficulty was faced in that "no guidelines for sustainable forestry have yet been developed" (Engel, 1995a). However, she also noted that the "American Forest and Paper Association had wanted that it also should be possible to use their (the AFPA's) system" of assessing forest sustainability. In fact, the US industry was arguing that "self-certification must be accepted". EuroCommerce, a Brussels-based industry lobby organisation, which represented, amongst others, Canadian forest-sector interests, had expressed the view that the concept of sustainable forest management should be "implemented in the context of the local controls in existence" (CFEE, 1995). The Canadian Pulp and Paper Association (CPPA), whose members account for nearly all Canadian pulp and paper production, similarly expressed the view that assessments of sustainability should be conducted by independent, local certifying authorities, and that "it makes absolutely no sense to exclude certain paper products solely on the basis that a fibre source was primary forest. This would certainly be challenged as an unjustified barrier to international trade" (CPPA, 1995b).

4.5 Opposition to the changes

The changes to the criteria brought about by private sector lobbying did not go unopposed. The Consultation Forum for the European Ecolabel, "expressed doubts" about the changing of the criteria for fine paper products from those adopted for tissue products. The Forum suggested that the reference to 'forest management' was too vague, that use of primary forest fibre should be forbidden, and that the criterion on the use of renewable resources should be reinstated since "forest preservation is a highly sensitive issue, and consumers would not understand a zero level of concern for this parameter" (CFEE, 1995)

The German Environment Ministry opposed reductions in the weighting of the solid waste criterion, on the grounds that this would serve as an incentive for continued dominance of the paper market by material produced from virgin fibre (Engel, 1995b). The Ministry also argued that the definition for sustainable forestry used in the later draft criteria allowed for the use of wood from primary and old growth forest. The World Wide Fund for Nature expressed the view that the dropping of the renewed resources criterion would cast doubts as to the credibility of the eco-labelling system for paper products (Sullivan 1994), concerns which were apparently shared by the UK Eco-labelling Board (Jackson, 1994c).

4.6 Conclusions to EU eco-labelling scheme case study

It is clear from available documentation that, throughout the development of the EU Ecolabelling for forest products, industry representatives argued strongly for a relaxation of the criteria, such that more (or, indeed, all) products would be eligible for an Award. From initial proposals which would have made it difficult for paper products containing ‘virgin fibre’ to have been eligible for an Award - and even then only if the fibre could be shown to come from a sustainable source - the criteria were so weakened that effectively any form of industry self-certification of sustainability would be sufficient for compliance, regardless of the source of the fibre.

Industry lobbying of relevant officials was well-organised and persistent. According to Maureen Smith, VP for International Affairs, the American Forest and Paper Association "made repeated representations to DGXI and other EU officials" (Smith, 1996a) whilst the European Tissue Symposium claimed that it had "devoted a lot of resources over the last three years to the process in the EU of developing environmental criteria to be adopted" (Zimmer, 1995). Although the criteria for tissue products were influenced "by strong industry lobbying" (ENDS, 1995), the boycott of the scheme by manufacturers, and its subsequent failure, appears to have lead to greater willingness on the part decision-makers to incorporate industry concerns in the later development of the criteria for fine paper.

The industry bodies active in pressing for changes of the specific criteria also sought to bring about change in the process through which eco-labels are awarded. AFPA invoked the provisions of world trade agreements by saying that the "fundamental character and structure of the ecolabel approach to paper products must be altered before we can consider it anything other than a technical barrier to trade" (Smith, 1996b). CEPI welcomed the replacement of specific criteria for fine paper with clauses relating to the application of good management practices in pulp and paper production (CEPI, 1996). However, CEPI stated that it was "unacceptable" to industry that such requirements remained as a pre-requisite to the eco-label.

Despite the apparently fundamental changes arising from industry lobbying, industry representatives still felt that they had had insufficient opportunities for influencing the process. Following adoption of the criteria for fine paper, CPPA stated that "there was a crucial lack of transparency and opportunity for interested parties to participate in the development of the relevant criteria" (Neuheimer, 1996) (7). According to AFPA, "US industry feels very strongly that its concerns were not satisfactorily taken into account" in the development of the fine paper criteria (Smith, 1996a).

There is evidence that industry associations collaborated in opposition to the scheme, developing joint lobbying positions. Information was shared between the associations of Canada, the US and Brazil. European and US paper manufacturers met through the forum of the TransAtlantic Business Dialogue and jointly proposed cessation of further work on the paper criteria and review of the entire scheme (TABD, n.d.).

Diplomatic pressure was also brought to bear on the Commission and EU member governments. The Brazilian Embassy took up ABECEL's concerns with the Director General of DGXI in 1993 and 1994 (ABECEL, 1994). According to the AFPA, over the course of two years, "the US government engaged in extensive discussions with the EU on the subject of paper product ecolabelling....urging the Commission not to go forward with the fine paper ecolabel until there could be more consideration of the serious issues raised" (Smith, 1996a). The office of the US Trade Representative noted that "Following consultations, the EU delayed final votes on criteria" for fine paper, and that "the US Government had seen some responsiveness to US industry concerns with respect to the substantive criteria" (USTR, 1996).

5. OVERALL CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The evidence presented in this paper suggests that private sector influence within the forest sector is pervasive and highly significant in the formulation and implementation of public policy. The area of forest under direct control of the private sector is very large, probably growing, and increasingly in the hands of large, politically influential, corporations.

Whilst previous studies have suggested that strong private sector influence is largely a phenomenon of developing countries, decision-makers in developed countries appear to be no less susceptible to the demands of corporations and trade associations. There are very few examples whereby private sector influence has been used to promote long-term, multi-purpose sustainable forestry, but a great deal of evidence that private sector-influenced policy has been self-seeking and inimical to the long-term management of forests. This has profound implications for the resolution of the growing world forestry crisis, and for any attempt, especially at the international or global level, to address forest policy failures.

It is clear that the process of policy reform - including the establishment of global norms or standards - cannot be seen in terms of simply grafting new policy instruments or institutions onto existing policy or institutional structures, as these may rest heavily on the involvement, and influence, of the private sector. Instead, policy reform first seek to reform the mechanisms through which private sector influence is exerted. Some specific ways in which this can be achieved are as follows:

• Prescriptions for reform of forest policies, whether at the local national, regional or international level, must identify, recognise and address the role played by the provide sector in establishing or maintaining the existing policy framework, as well as the mechanisms through which such influence is exerted.

• International and national forest policy-making bodies need to greatly increase the transparency of their processes, particularly concerning the participation and involvement of the private sector. This can be achieved through the establishment of publicly accessible ‘registers of contact’ between officials and members of the private sector in which all forms of contact would be recorded. Documentation about the processes and decisions involved in the formulation of forest policy should routinely be made available to the public.

• Private sector representatives should be excluded from formal participation in international fora and decision-making bodies, or balanced with interests from other sectors, such as NGOs and local communities.

• Nationally and internationally agreed Codes of Conduct for forestry officials need to be developed, stipulating the procedures and safeguards to be adopted when entering into dialogue with the private sector. This would cover the acceptance of inducements and favours etc.

• Official development assistance to the forestry sector through bilateral and multilateral agencies should specifically promote greater transparency in forest policy-making. Aid should be redirected away from support to private interests, and all forestry sector aid should be conditional upon the existence of acceptable levels of transparency and ‘good governance’ within the forestry sector.

• There should be a de-linking of official development assistance to corporations in donor countries such as through ‘Aid-Trade Provisions’.

• Complementary legislation needs to be developed in timber importing countries to make it illegal to import timber which has been exported or felled illegally.

• Legislation aimed at promoting sustainable forest management should not disadvantage smaller interests or strengthen the control over forest resources of large corporations.

• State subsidisation of private sector forestry activities should be reduced or terminated.

• Greater public support should be given to basic forestry research, and greater public participation encouraged in the setting of research agendas.

• Public education programmes are needed to provide information about the environmental and social impacts of forest product use, particularly in countries with high levels of consumption.

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