Oceania and Pacific

Paths in the Jungle: Landowners, Deforestation and Forest Degradation in Solomon Islands*
Tarcisius Tara Kabutaulaka.
Department of Political and Social Change, Division of Politics and International Relations, Research School of Pacific and Asian Studies, Australian National University

1. Introduction

This paper discusses the role of landowners in Solomon Island's logging industry. In particular, it explores how landowners influence deforestation and forest degradation. Whilst the literature on tropical forest management elsewhere in the world often concentrates on the impact of corporate powers, state policies and international nongovernment and intergovernmental organisations (see Humphreys 1996; Poore 1989; Johnson and Cabarle 1993; Dauvergne 1996) this paper seeks to explore local level factors such as the role of landowners. It examines landowners' interactions with other stakeholders in the logging industry, and how that influences outcomes such as deforestation and forest degradation. The focus on landowners is salient in a country such as Solomon Islands where about 87 percent of land is customary owned. This is not to suggest that the impact of state policies, regulations and laws, corporate powers and international institutions are insignificant. Rather, it is to say that their influences could be best understood by looking at how landowners react, manipulate and use them to produce particular outcomes.

Unlike common assumptions that landowners are passive victims of logging, it is argued here that they are active participants who influence forestry outcomes. Furthermore, the concept of landowner is not homogenous. Rather, it is one which embodies diverse views and interests that are often manifested in local level politics, land disputes and the inequitable and unequal distribution of the benefits of logging. Landowners sometimes play a multiplicity of roles that confuse and weaken the state's ability to implement policies and enforce regulations. This contributes to factors such as deforestation and forest degradation. The paper also argues that beyond the rhetoric of empowering landowners the real problem lies in improving their capacity to exercise that power. Currently landowners do not have adequate access to services such as legal representation, information about international market prices for logs, and a lack of the basic organisational structure needed to facilitate negotiations with logging companies. Consequently, changes in state policies, regulations and laws alone can not guarantee improved landowner benefits and sustainable management.

2. Logging in Solomon Islands: a background

Discussions of logging in Solomon Islands often centre around the activities of three major actors in the industry. First, logging companies - their activities, operations, and how they affect economic, environmental, political and social developments in the country - usually come under scrutiny. Significant in this discussion is the assertion that logging companies, assisted by corporate powers in consumer countries, and taking advantage of weak state capacity in Solomon Islands have been able to maximise profits from the forest industry. Proponents of this view often base their analysis on the practices of multinational companies and how the weak administrative state in Solomon Islands has been unable to respond accordingly. They claim that logging companies have evaded taxes and maximise profit through practices such as transfer pricing, informal agreements between producers and buyers, under-reporting of export volumes, misrepresentation of species and by bribing political leaders (Dauvergne 1997; Price Waterhouse 1995; Duncan 1995). Duncan, for example, states that under-reporting of export volumes "is estimated to have cost Solomon Islands SI$96 million in revenues foregone and evaded in 1993" (1995:12)

Second, the discussions usually centre around the state. It is sometimes assumed that the state is the most influential actor in the logging industry. Hence, poor management could be related to poor government policies, outdated parliamentary Acts, and a weak state administration. Such assumptions have given rise to calls for the introduction of a new Forestry Bill. Administrative and financial weakness as well as the lack of technology and trained personnel have given rise to the inability of the state to implement policies and enforce regulations. The tax collection system, for example, is ineffective. In 1995, despite increases in the value of log exports by SI$16.7 million, the amount collected as export duty to government fell by SI$12.6 million (Solomon Star, 4 April 1996). Proponents of a state-centred analysis would argue, therefore, that deforestation and forest degradation are as much a reflection of state incapacity as they are of logging company activities.

Third, discussions often centre around landowners and the role they play in the logging industry, how that affects logging operations, and whether or not they benefited from the industry. This discussion is closely related to the issues of land tenure, procedures for negotiating logging licences and the distribution of benefits from logging. Frequently expressed in this discussion is the assertion, both within the state and in civil society, that landowners have not benefited as they should, and that they are victims of corporate power agendas and the inadequecies of existing state policies, regulations and procedures. Emanating from this is the suggestion that state policies and regulations need to be changed and landowners ought to participate more in discussions of forestry developments. Furthermore, some argued that landowner interests should be protected by the state. The Minister for Forests, Environment and Conservation, Hilda Kari, for example, stated in parliament that there should be an increased local participation in the forest industry and legislations should be ammended to cater for that. Kari, in making reference to Solomon Islands Forest Resources and Timber Utilisation Act stated that "it has served its purpose . . . it had been largely conducive to the interest of foreign investment and logging on government land, but little focus to accommodate or be based on our own aspirations as resource owners" (Hansards Report, 20 April 1998, pp. 16-17). Not much of the literature attempts to discuss the role of landowners in a critical way.

To better understand the above viewpoints, let us explore in a historical way the development of Solomon Islands logging industry. Large-scale commercial logging in Solomon Islands started over 30 years ago. However, it was not until the 1980s that landowners became directly involved as a consequence of logging operations shifting into customary land. Prior to the 1980s most logging was done on government land or government leased land (Bennett 1995).

Fraser (1997) in discussing the struggle for control of Solomon Islands forests identified two periods. The first was between 1963 to the early 1980s when most logging took place on government land or customary land leased by government. The forests industry at that time was monopolised by Levers Pacific Timber which made up for about 75 percent of log production. Bennett (1995) also discussed forestry in public land or state controlled land.

The second period began in the early 1980s and continues today. This period is marked by a shift from government land to customary land and an influx of multinationals (particularly from Southeast Asia) in the logging industry. The industry at this time involved Solomon Islands landowners, the state and predominantly Malaysian and Korean producers, and Japanese and Korean buyers. Between 1981 and 1983 the number of logging licences issued to foreign companies increased fourfold (Fraser 1997:50) Politically this coincided with the coming into power of the first Solomon Mamaloni-led government which had a policy that encouraged foreign investor involvement in the logging industry.

The second period was also characterised by Solomon Islands economic dependence on the logging industry. By 1990, for example, log exports made up for 34.5 percent of the country's total exports. This increased to 54.9 percent in 1993. In 1994 it contributed to 56 percent of the country's export revenue and 31 percent of all government revenues (Montgomery 1995). In 1997, despite the collapse of the Southeast Asian log markets, forestry accounted for 48 per cent of total exports (Central Bank of Solomon Islands 1998). Furthermore, the rate of logging went beyond unsustainable rates. Log exports in 1994 and 1995, for example, were 659,000 and 748,500 cubic metres respectively (Central Bank of Solomon Islands 1995). This was more than double the potential sustained yield at that time which was about 325,00 cubic metres (Forestry Review). During this period there was also an increase in the incidents of logging-related conflicts. In 1995, for example, there were conflicts in Pavuvu in the Russell Islands which led to the deployment of police officers to protect the operations of Marvingbros, a Malaysian logging company against landowner resistance to logging the islands (Solomon Star, 18 April, 1995). The late 1980s and early 1990s were also characterised by numerous allegations that logging companies bribed political leaders. Indeed, it was alleged that logging companies played a crucial role in causing the collapse of the Francis Billy Hilly-led government in 1994 after only 18 months in power. A letter to the Private View column of the Solomon Star on 12 April, 1996, for example, states that "when Mamaloni took over the government in 1994, the mess in the forest industry developed into a very controversial issue." My own researches have unearthed cases where government ministers were listed on logging company payrolls as directors of companies.

In late 1997 Solomon Islands' logging industry was severely affected by problems in the Asian economies which consequently resulted in the collapse of log prices. This affected Solomon Islands' log export. By November 1997 about 300,000 cubic metres of log were stranded in the country with nowhere to sell (Solomon Star, 15 December 1997). This affected the logging operations to extent that some companies suspended operation for a few months. This also coincided with the election of the Batholomew Ulufa'alu-led Solomon Islands Alliance for Change (SIAC) government which promised reforms in forestry policies. The SIAC government's change in policy also attracted the re-establishment of the Australian government-sponsored Timber Control Unit.

But, in order to understand the logging industry in Solomon Islands, it is pertinent to have some understanding of the traditional land tenure systems and how these have changed over the years. This is significant because about 87 percent of Solomon Islands land is customary owned and that influences forestry outcomes.

3. Land, landowners and logging

Understanding the issue of landownership is vital to the development of land-based resources in Solomon Islands (as it is in other Melanesian countries). Peter Larmour (1979) explores the issues of forestry and ownership. Customary land tenure systems have often been regarding as an impediment to resource development in countries such Solomon Islands where a significant percentage of land is customary owned. Consequently, forestry development in Solomon Islands are shrouded by numerous questions such as: What is customary landownership? How is it organised? How does customary land tenure influence landowner responses to logging developments.

While it is not possible to identify a traditional land tenure system that exists throughout the Solomon Islands, there are commonalities in land tenure practices that influence landowner responses to the logging industry. One of the most important characteristics arguably found in most parts of Solomon Islands is the assumption that land is communally owned - a common property. Such an assumption implies that any dealings in the development of land-based resources such as forests will have to involve the community. This raises a related question: What is `the community'? - what constitutes it? In most instances the community is defined according to anthropological classifications such as tribe or extended family. Hence, land is often argued as the property of the tribe both in the work of outside scholars as well as Solomon Islanders. Zoloveke, for example, in discussing land tenure systems in Choiseul noted the fact that land is a common tribal property that, traditonally, is not a commodity that could be bought and sold (Zoloveke 1981). Questions not often asked are; what constitutes a tribe? does it really exist in Solomon Islands, or was it a social unit identified merely to fit anthropological discourses.

Although the specific objective of this paper is not to explore anthropological discourses on tribe and community, the above questions are significant because they illuminate discussions of the differences between ownership and rights of use to land. Because the tribe has become commonly accepted as the unit of ownership in most parts of Solomon Islands, negotiations for logging often involves the tribe. This is despite the fact that there is no standard definition of what constitutes a tribe. Consequently, in many instances difficulties in identifying the landowning unit is either because the tribe cannot be identified, or because land is not owned by the tribe. Such misunderstanding usually contribute in conflicts between landowning groups, or between landowners and companies. Furthermore, it could contribute towards the unequal distribution of logging incomes as will be demonstrated later when discussing forestry outcomes.

For the purposes of analysis, the landowners involved in Solomon Islands forestry industry could be categorised into three general categories. These are identified according to the nature of their participation in the forestry industry. First, are the royalty recipients who directly benefit financially from the royalty payments by logging companies. These are usually members of landowning groups (tribe, clan, family) and they benefit because of their membership to a defined social unit. Most of these social units, for example, the tribe, are large and because income received from royalty payments are distributed amongst members, the amount each member eventually gets is minimal and to the point of being neglegiable. The factors that motivates these people to participate in logging are promises of financial and social benefits in the form of the provision of education, health and infrastructural services.

The second group are `middlemen' who negotiate between logging companies are landowning groups. These receive financial remuneration for their services. In most cases they are either landowners or community leaders of some sort. In Choiseul Bay where Eagon Resources Development Ltd. operates, for example, the middlemen were called "co-ordinators" either landowners or chiefs and leaders of the landowning group. They company uses them to get access to the land identified for logging. The case of Rendova in the Western Solomons also demonstrates a situation where an educated member of the landowning group has manipulated the community as middleman for the company and benefited from the logging company. The middleman, therefore, often has a multiplicity of interests and identity. There are, however, some middlemen who neither landowners or community leaders. They function purely as consultants for the company in its negotiations for logging rights licence.

The third group are landowners who do often benefit either directly or indirectly from logging operations. This group often includes women and children and some elders. This often results in the disempowerment of this particular group.

The three categories of landowners as identified above often overlap. There are cases where a single landowner functions in different ways.

4. Landowners and forest degradation

In Solomon Islands, landowners contribute significantly in influencing forestry outcomes such as deforestation and forest degradation, unsustainable logging, conflicts, and the distribution of incomes accumulated from forestry operations. The concern of this paper, however, is on forest degradation and deforestation, a concern that has consistently been raised by by NGOs (both domestic and international) (Roughan 1997) as well as by international institutions and donor governments (Price Waterhouse 1995; Duncan 1995; Montgomery 1996).

For Solomon Islands, the issue of most concern is not so much deforestation - the removal of primary forests to the extent that it results in the conversion of formerly forested land to grass land, or the complete desertification of the land (Johnson and Cabarle 1993). Rather, forest degradation is the most immediate problem. Here, the term forest degradation is employed to refer to the reduction in the forest's capacity to sustain the ecology as well as the economic and socio-cultural needs of the local population. Deforestation, however, could become a problem if the current rate of forest degradation is not addressed. Most of the discussion on logging in Solomon Islands have used the two terms interchangeably. This has often confused the discussion. However, the purpose of this paper is not to deal with the technicalities of distinguishing between the two concepts. Rather, the paper is more concerned with examinig the role landowners play in either forest degradation or deforestation.

Much of the discussion on forest degradation in Solomon Islands often refer to the practices of logging companies and the government's weak capacity to enforce its forestry and environmental regulations as the main underlying causes for forest degradation. There is a prevalant assumption that landowners are victims of logging operations because they suffer as a consequence of logging. It is important to note, however, landowners are not always victims of logging operations. Under the Standard Logging Agreement (SLA) landowners are both protected and authorised to participate activily in the negotiations and other processes leading to logging.

Because of the significance placed on landowners by the SLA, many have become active participants and cooperate with logging companies in encouraging logging operations. In these cases landowners are often motivated by the need for a source of income. For most of these landowning groups logging provided the only source of income generation. Landowners' often sign logging agreements because of desire for income and economic development that would otherwise be unavailable in rural Solomon Islands. Also, some have been lured by promises of riches that the Company is able to provide. For example, the Korean negotiator for Eagon Forest Resources Development Ltd. told a landowner on Choiseul: "sapos iu givim kampani lan blong iu, ei! bae iu ia, iu wanfala rich man" (if you give your land to the company you will become a rich man). It was such promises and anticipation for quick money that attracted many landowners into signing logging agreements.

Indeed some landowners did become wealthy as a result of logging. These were, however, few and often involved educated villagers and leaders who had taken advantage of both the Company and the ignorance of the rest of the landowners. In the case of North New Georgia, for example, the close relationship between the logging and social control by the Christian Fellowship Church (CFC) meant that those who controlled CFC were in a better position to exploit the benefits of logging. In the case of Ndai Island on North Malaita, one individual working as a middle man between the Keyukeni Company of Korea and landowners was able to create for himself a financial empire in Solomon Islands. Other landowners who benefited from the industry often mismanaged their shares and directed it towards short term leisures such as drinking and women. In other instances because of the size of the landowning unit, the money is distributed to the extent that each individual's share is so small that it could not be meaningfully invested.

In such a situation environmental considerations become secondary as financial benefits are deemed as significant. Logging operations on Choiseul Bay, Choiseul Province is an example of a case where landowners contribute to both the rate and nature of forest degradation. Here, landowning groups have formed themselves into the Poroporo Association which deals directly with Eagon Resources Development Ltd. Much of the land that was contracted to the company by the Association has been subjected to clear felling and converted into plantation after logging. The company views this as reaforestation (personal conversation with Camp Manager, Tarakukure, Choiseul Bay, 26 February 1998). Despite the fact that this is technically the development of a mono-culture forest plantation rather than reaforestation as in the regeneration of the original forest, the state has been unable to do much because of the agreement signed between Poroporo Association landowners and Eagon Resources Development Ltd. This, however, is often the result of few influential members of landowning groups who have been able to influence the rest of landowners. These are usually the middle man who benefit directly from dealing with the company.

Another example is the case of Rendova Island in the Western Province where a few individuals have become influential and accumulated much of the profit from the industry. These indivituals usually work with the logging company, either as consultants or middleman who negotiate for the Timber Rights Agreement and help the company obtain logging licences.

However, also in the same area are landowning groups who have resisted against logging on their lands. These include the Chiropodoko and Sasaqaramu land cases. In these cases landowning groups demanded compensation from the logging company for trespassing into land not included in the Timber Rights Agreement for logging.

Landowners, as signatories to the Standard Logging Agreement (SLA), have the authority to either stop logging company operations if they contradict environmental regulations. However, on the ground landowners often find themselves powerless. This is also partly because landowners often are either not literate enough to interpret the agreements or they do not have access to legal representation. In other cases, landowners' ability to influence logging operations have been affected by the fact that logging companies have had close relationships with state officials. On Pavuvu, in the Russell Islands, for example, landowners ability to stop logging by Marving Brothers Company Limited was severely affected by the close relationship between the state and the company. There were also allegations that some government ministers received bribes from the company.

At the state level laws and regulations had to been amended to cater for these developments. At the time of independence the laws governing the exploitation of forest resources were contained in the Forest and Timber ACT 1969. This was a document passed by the British colonial government and tailored for that period of time and the purposes of the colonial regime. It has since been amended a number of times to include new regulations and ommit what were regarded as out dated potions of the law. In 1989 the Forest Resources and Timber Utilisation (Amendment) Act incorporated established processes and procedures for the exploitation of forest resources. This included procedures for obtaining licences. Such documents include the Standard Logging Agreement (SLA) which placed paramouncy on the rights and powers of landowners.

Discussions of landowner involvement in the forestry industry often states that there are legislations which provided landowners with more control and power over forest resources would enhance their benefit from the industry. Indeed at the outset these laws and procedures looked set to enhance landowner control over logging. The SLA, for instance, stipulates clear guidelines regulating matters concerning the environment, reforestation, preservation of tambu places, control of setlers, employment opportunities, royalty to landowners, provision of monthly statements, arbitration in any case of dispute, termination of operations, etc. There are two issues that generally concern landowners most: (i) roylaty payments, and (ii) environment. In so far as royalty is concerned the SLA stipulates that the rate of royalty payable by the Company to landowners is calculated monthly as a percentage of the average sale price. It states that the basic rate of royalty shall be 12.5 percent when average sale price amounts to S.I.$50 per cubic metre. "When the average sale price exceeds S.I. $50 per cubic metre or drops below S.I. $150 per cubic metre, the royalty shall be increased or reduced by 2 percent and a maximum of 17.5 percent".

An interesting factor is that these calculations are based on the logging company records - the volume of timber on which royalty is paid is based on the Company's production figures and so is the record of shipments. This means that both the state and landowners are depended on the company to provide truthful and reliable data. Government forest officers stationed at log points are often bribed by companies and invariably do not cross check company records. Figures supplied to the Ministry of Forest, Ministry of Finance, Customs and Excise and Inland Revenue Departments were often extracted from logging company's computer inputs. Recordings of log exports by landowning groups in Choiseul and North New Georgia have indicated that Eagon Resources Development Ltd and Alladyce Timber Company respectively have under-recorded volumes of log export (Landowner records and recorded conversation with landowners, 17 March 1998 and 24 March 1998).

Furthermore, despite the above formular, in nearly all the agreements signed in the Solomon Islands in the period between 1983 and 1996 the royalty to landowners was paid at 10 percent of the FOB price regardless of the fluctuating average sale price of logs within that period of time. Many landowners did not really understand the formula and, therefore, did not take the issue up to either the courts or the logging companies.

Another salient issue is that despite the legal apparatus that supposedly protects the interest of landowners, the changes in the state system often fail to address questions such as; do landowners have the ability and resources to enable them to take control of the forest resources? does the state have the capacity to perform its coordinating and observer role? This is not to imply that landowners are either not ready or not capable. Rather, it is to say that the institutions and services landowners might need in the process of exploiting forest resources may not be available. For instance, legal representation for landowning groups are limited and in many cases nonexistent except for the over worked public solicitors in the provinces and Honiara.

The complications of the above issues are often exacerbated by socio-cultural factors relating to land, in particular the question: Who is the landowner? Answers to this question are made complex by confusions over notions of ownership and rights and conflicts emanating from these.. The next section attempts to answer this question and examine how these affect forest outcomes and landowners role in it.

6. Conclusion

The logging industry in Solomon Islands demonstrates that landowners have significant authority to determine forestry outcomes. They could influence the fate of forest degradation and deforestation. However, they have been unable to do so because of a lack of power. This lack of power emanates from the fact that they do not have access to appropriate and much needed legal councelling, they do not have access to government forestry advice.

Furthermore, many landowners have been motivated by the desire for income generation. They will continue to accept logging and, therefore, contribute to deforestation unless alternative means of income generation opportunities are provided. Landowner acceptance of logging is merely a pragmatic response to their changing needs and increasing influence of a cash economy.

One could conclude, therefore, that landowners currently contribute to the rate of deforestation. Furthermore, the concept of landowner is and should not be treated as homogenous.

Bibliography

Bennett, Judith, A., 1995. "Forestry, Public Land, and the Colonial Legacy in Solomon Islands", The Contemporary Pacific, vol.7, no.2, pp.243-275.

Dauvergne, Peter, 1997. Shadows in the Forest: Japan and the Politics of Timber in Southeast Asia, Cambridge MA: MIT Press.

___________, 1993. "The Politics of Deforestation in Indonesia", Pacific Affairs, vol.66, no.4, pp. 497-518.

Duncan, Ron, 1994. Melanesian Forestry Sector Study, Australian International Development Assistance Bureau, International Development Issues, no. 36, Canberra.

Fraser, Ian, 1997. "The Struggle for Control of Solomon Island Forests", The Contemporary Pacific, vol.9, no.1, pp.39-72.

Humphreys, David, 1996. Forest Politics: The Evaluation of International Cooperation, London: Earthscan Publications Ltd.

Larmour, Peter, 1979. "Forestry and ownership", in Peter Larmour (ed), Land in Solomon Islands, Suva: Institute of Pacific Studies, pp. 105-118.

__________, 1981. "The North New Georgia Corporation", in Peter Larmour, Ron Crocombe, and A. Taungenga (eds), Land, People and Government: public lands policy in the South Pacific, Suva:Institute of Pacific Studies, pp. 133-146.

May, Ron J. and Stephen Hennigham (eds), 1992. Resources, Development and Politics in the Pacific Islands. Barthurst, NSW: Crawford House Press.

Price Waterhouse, Economic Studies and Strategies Unit, 1995 (December). Forestry Taxation and Domestic Processing Study. Final Draft Report. Report for the Solomon Islands Government, Ministry of Finance, and the Ministry of Forests, Environment and Conservation.

Roughan, John, 1997. "Solomon Islands Nongovernment Organisations: major environmental actors", The Contemporary Pacific, vol.9, no.1, pp. 157-66.

Tausinga, Job, Duddley, 1989. "Logging in North New Georgia Timber Corporation (NNGTC)", in Ron Crocombe, Esau Tuza et al. (eds), Independence, Dependence, Interdependence: the first 10 years of Solomon Islands independence. Suva and Honiara: Institute of Pacific Studies in association with the USP Honiara Centre and the Solomon Islands College of Higher Education.

Questions for Discussion.

1. What are the main factors that cause deforestation in Solomon Islands?

2. The major actors in Solomon Islands forest industry are; (i) the state, (ii) logging companies, (iii) foreign governments and international institutions, (iv) landowners. What is the nature of their interactions, and how does that affect forestry outcomes?

3. Define the concept of `landowner'. Is it a homogenous unit? How does landowner politics influence forestry outcomes?

4. How do landowners react to state policies and Acts?

5. How do landowners react to the activities of corporate powers?

6. How will forest degradation and deforestation affect landowners?

7. What are the main trends of landowner reactions to logging in Solomon Islands?

8. What are the implications of plantation development for Solomon Islander landowners?

9. How can landowner benefits from the logging industry be developed?

10. What can be done to slow down the rate of logging in Solomon Islands?

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