The race to produce energy has left large scars in forests, particularly across the Global South. The companies that produce energy on a large scale, with the aim to meet the insatiable demands of corporate capitalism, raze everything in their path. Whether the energy produced comes from fossil fuels or supposedly 'clean energy' sources for the so-called 'energy transition' makes no difference to the People whose territories are sacrificed in the name of ‘energy security’. All of these forms of industrial energy production are synonymous with the destruction of forest Peoples’ ways of life. Industrial energy production leaves behind a trail of devastation and conflict. As the past 200 years have shown very clearly, energy production will always be destructive under a capitalist paradigm.
Cheap and continuously available energy is fundamental in order to power capitalism. This energy powers the factories, industrial machines, warplanes, and bulldozers that tear down forests to make way for more factories and infrastructure – which in turn need more energy. Wars continue to be fought over the control of energy sources, especially oil.
One characteristic that distinguishes capitalist societies from others with which they share the world is an insatiable greed for accumulation and 'growth'. Fossil fuels are the energy source that matches this capitalist greed almost perfectly. The abundance of fossil fuels and their combustion power has allowed capitalist societies to grow and continue to use ever more energy. As the ecological and societal consequences of this insatiable greed reach crisis levels, the fossil fuel industry has sold the idea that a transition is underway, and that this transition will lead the world to stop using fossil fuels and replace them with 'clean energy' sources. This is a dangerous illusion, and the fossil fuel industry is fully aware that the promise of said ‘transition’ is largely an empty marketing ploy; the so-called 'energy transition' – that is, the idea of gradually ceasing to burn fossil fuels – does not exist in capitalism. (1)
The data speaks for itself. Fossil fuels still account for 87 percent of the energy used worldwide, and their use continues to increase (2). The world's largest banks continue to provide massive financing to the fossil fuel industry. Since the Paris Agreement - the UN treaty in which signatory governments pledged to reduce greenhouse gas emissions - came into force in 2016, big banks have provided a staggering USD 8.7 trillion in financing to the fossil fuel sector. In 2025 alone, banks allocated USD 906 billion to companies in this sector, an increase as compared to the previous year. (3)
The so-called 'clean energy' produced under the logic of capitalism will also always be tainted by destruction. Hydroelectric dams submerge forests, alter the course and ecosystems of rivers and make it impossible for people to continue living their traditional ways of life. Countless trees are felled and forests devastated to produce the blades that move ever larger wind turbines. Mining activities to extract raw materials for solar power panels, electric car batteries, and other products associated with 'green energy' and the 'energy transition' creep further into forests.
The green facade used to justify the search for these raw materials also serves as a shield for governments and corporations to move forward with their destructive activities. The global race for strategic minerals, while presented as a race toward the 'energy transition', holds its dirty secrets. It provides cover for an arms race that has been accelerating and expanding. A large portion of the minerals used for the ‘energy transition’ are also essential for the military industry. According to World Bank estimates, between 2020 and 2050, 3 billion tons of minerals and metals would need to be extracted for the so-called 'energy transition'. This represents a 500 percent increase in demand for certain minerals (such as graphite, lithium, and cobalt) and a projected investment of USD 1.7 trillion. But what the World Bank has failed to mention is that 47 percent of these minerals would be used in activities unrelated to the 'energy transition' – and instead, for example, to develop military technologies. (4) The wake of destruction that mining of this magnitude would leave in territories is difficult to even fathom.
WRM’s Bulletin 275 debated the very idea of what 'energy' is, and it shared stories from communities with worldviews that differ from the capitalist worldview. These communities spoke of other concepts and kinds of energy that are not destructive. (5) This current Bulletin presents articles about capitalist energy projects that inflict wounds on forests and forest-dependent Peoples. The stories provide further evidence that the so-called 'energy transition' and the concept of 'clean energy' are built on lies; that ‘clean energy’ production involves large amounts of fossil fuels no matter what; and that the territories of communities in the Global South are sacrificed for this alleged ‘transition’. As long as capitalism exists, energy production will inevitably be linked to social and environmental collapse.
The first article of this bulletin provides an overview of the impacts of oil and gas production on forest areas and several communities in the Niger Delta, Nigeria. This environmentally and culturally rich region is also home to one of Africa's largest oil reserves. In recent decades, numerous accidents related to fossil fuel extraction led to strong community mobilization against industry giants such as Shell.
The second article provides an overview of the impacts of mining of (not so) rare earth elements in the Mekong region. The Mekong region is one of the areas most affected by mining exploitation – largely driven by the search for raw materials for 'clean energy' production. The destruction and contamination this mining inflicts on communities along the Mekong and its tributaries raises the poignant question: "Green transition for whom?"
A third article discusses the impacts of an energy project that is presented as 'clean,' but which represents a severe threat to the Shuar People and their territory in Ecuador. The Santiago hydroelectric dam, designed to be the largest dam in the country, is being built in the southern Ecuadorian Amazon. The project would flood 3,000 hectares of mostly native vegetation, and it would affect more than 91,000 people. The Yuquianza and La Unión communities of the Shuar People may be entirely submerged, and their ancestral territory destroyed.
The fourth article provides an overview of current energy projects in Southeast Asia. Many of these projects are promoted in the name of the 'energy transition'; yet they are extremely destructive to the forest and the People living in and with these forests. The article also points to the perversity of forest conservation programs, which systematically ignore the large-scale forest destruction caused by energy-related projects; meanwhile, such conservation programs place the blame for forest destruction on the communities that depend on forests and use them in traditional ways.
Finally, this bulletin includes a warning about the risks of large government investments in gas production and related infrastructure. Such investments, slated to occur over the coming years, would benefit private interests in the name of the so-called 'energy transition'. The article explains how the Brazilian government, in particular, is promoting this kind of fossil fuel extraction; it plans to build a gas pipeline that would impact hundreds of kilometers of Amazon rainforest and numerous communities along its path.
The Niger Delta, in Nigeria, is rich in petroleum resources with the first commercially viable oil well drilled there in 1956. The region hosts the second largest petroleum reserves in Africa, with the Nigerian economy heavily dependent on the industry. And that's exactly where one of the most ecologically diverse regions on Earth is located. It is also home to more than 30 million people from more than 40 ethnic nationalities. Most of them depend on farming and fishing for their livelihoods and food security, as well as their cultural identity and well-being. Deforestation in connection with activities of oil companies poses acute threats to both the environment and people.
For forest-dependent Peoples of the Niger Delta, oil has not only stolen their forests but their foods, lives, livelihoods, dignity and culture. This region has the most extensive mangrove forests in Africa and the fourth largest in the world. Mangroves play critical roles in shoreline protection, water purification, climate regulation and livelihood support. They provide resources for construction, food and are reservoirs of biodiversity. More than 60 per cent of commercial fish in the Gulf of Guinea breed in the Niger Delta mangroves. Unfortunately, about 40 per cent of the mangrove in the Niger Delta has been lost primarily due to oil and gas exploitation. Furthermore, 27 per cent of mangroves potentially threatened by oil spills globally are found in the Niger Delta. (1)
An aerial view of the Niger Delta shows a region criss-crossed by lines that heavily fragment the forests, making room for additional deforestation by loggers, poachers, miners and other forest resource harvesters. Generally, tropical forests in Nigeria run from the coast to between 150 and 200 kilometres inland from the Atlantic coast. The Niger Delta is a huge fan-shaped region in Nigeria fed by deposits from two major rivers, (the River Niger and the River Benue) and emptying into the Atlantic Ocean. The natural vegetation here is the tropical rainforest with thick and lush canopies.
All stages of oil and gas extraction processes directly impact the forests of the Niger Delta. At the exploratory stage, seismic lines are cut through the forests and even more deforestation occurs when pipelines are being laid. Although seismic lines are temporary and the environment could recover after the completion of the survey, mangrove forests can remain damaged for decades as the lines remain open after clearing. The oil companies are fully aware of the deforestation caused by their activities. A Shell fact book highlights the “visibility of seismic line cutting on the mangrove swamp... It is the aerial roots that are subject to most of the cutting. Recovery of the cut roots takes 2-3 years, but re-growth of mangrove trees, to make the seismic line indistinguishable from the uncut areas, may take 30 years or more”. (2)
It is estimated that there is between 5,000 to 7,000 km of pipeline networks in the region. Considering that these pipelines have at least 100 metres right of way, the extent of the deforestation associated with these pipelines is enormous. Added to these major pipelines are smaller flow lines that connect the oil wells and that equally impact the territory.
In addition to the pipelines, there are canals built by oil companies for the movement of their equipment inland. There are other canals constructed to transport process water and other wastes from oil flow stations to rivers and to the ocean. Roads built to access oil wells, flow stations and other locations further slash through the forests of the Niger Delta. These infrastructural developments are often accompanied by dredging and sometimes sand filling of swamps and other wetlands. Dumped dredging materials alter the topography and hydrology of affected areas and impeded the recovery of deforested areas.
Oil companies also use poorly constructed waste dump sites in the forests that further deepen the forest cover losses.
Forests on Fire (and Pollution Stories)
The level of pollution from oil extraction and processing is estimated to be equivalent to more than 13 million barrels of crude oil (more than 2 billion litres), causing enormous damage to the environment and posing severe health threats to the people who live in the region. Unsurprisingly, the region holds the dubious record of being one of the top ten most polluted places in the world.
Besides the oil spills, routine gas flaring equally impacts the forests of the Niger Delta through stunting of tree growth and overall poisoning of the ecosystems. The flares cause acid rain and acidification of soils and water bodies. They alter local ecological conditions including damaging the vegetation and forests, contributing to climate change, which further stresses coastal ecosystems.
Oil pollution is a major cause of mangrove forest destruction in the Niger Delta. The unregulated and destructive harvesting, conversion of mangrove covered areas into agricultural land or built-up zones, such as for housing or industrialization are also contributory factors.
The problem of oil spills in the Niger Delta has been described in several reports. (3) One of them, the United Nations Environment Programme report on the Environmental Assessment of Ogoniland of 2011, found contaminated soil and groundwater; pollution of vegetation such as mangroves; aquatic contamination resulting, among other things, in a decrease in fish; communities exposed to petroleum hydrocarbons in outdoor air and drinking water, sometimes at elevated concentrations, and also exposed through dermal contact with soil and sediments. In the community of Ejama-Ebubu, the study found heavy contamination present 40 years after an oil spill occurred, despite repeated clean-up attempts of dubious quality.
Spills happen due to a variety of reasons, for example due to corrosion of pipelines and operational and equipment failures. For example, in the Bodo Creek area, more than 1,000 hectares of mangrove forest were degraded by two major operational oil spills in 2008 and 2009 and subsequently reinforced by several spills due to pipeline breakage.
In January 1998, 40,000 barrels of crude oil (more than 6 million liters) was spilled by the oil company Mobil at their Idoho offshore production platform. Some of that oil evaporated, but the impact of the spill spread beyond the borders of Nigeria, reaching Benin Republic and causing harm to coastal communities along that stretch.
There was an offshore oil spill at Shell’s Bonga platform in December 2011. Shell and the Nigerian government announced that 40,000 barrels of crude oil was dumped into the Atlantic Ocean. At the Idoho platform incident the volume of oil spilled was also said to be 40,000 barrels. That appears to be a comfortable measure of ecological abuse by the oil companies. The Bonga spill affected 20 coastal communities in three states of the Niger Delta. (4)
One of the largest oil spills in Nigeria was the Funima Well 5 offshore well blowout in January 1980 with a spill of at least 200,000 barrels of oil (almost 32 million litres) into the Atlantic Ocean and causing damage to 340 hectares of mangrove forest.
In 2004, Nigerian Liquefied Natural Gas pipeline transversing through Kala-Akama, Okrika mangrove forest leaked and caught fire, and devastated and estimated 27 km² of the mangrove forest. Repeated contamination from aged pipelines and abandoned but not decommissioned wells repeatedly contaminate recovering mangrove forests.
In more recent years, massive deforestation and ecological harms have been caused by blowout of poorly maintained, abandoned or derelict oil wells. In November 2021, for example, there was a wellhead blowout at Well 1 of the Oil Mineral Lease 29 on Santa Barbara River.(5) Crude oil was spewed into the river and neighbouring mangrove forests for six weeks. The official estimate of the volume of crude oil spewed into the environment was put at 3,000 barrels, whereas experts estimate a release of at least 500,000 barrels of crude oil (more than 79 million litres). The incident left a trail of suffocated and dead mangroves besides the general devastated ecosystem. The wide disparity between official and independent figures of the volume of crude oil dumped into the environment raises questions about accountability in the handling of serious issues impacting oil field communities.
The mode of handling oil spills has also exacerbated ecological impacts of production. Forests have been incinerated by fires set on crude oil by oil company contractors who are not competent in oil spill clean-up. This happened at Aleibiri forest in Ekeremor Local Government Area in Bayelsa State in March 1998 and another in Foutorogbene Community in August of the same year that Shell’s contractors sought to cover the evidence of a major oil spill by setting the forest on fire. (6)
Another factor that contributes to widespread deforestation in the Niger Delta is oil theft. It is generally agreed that the operation is at industrial scale and includes crude stolen for export and some stolen for bush or artisanal refining. Bush refining requires clearing of large areas of forests and dumps crude oil into the environment in an uncontrolled manner. The stealing process sometimes involves clandestinely breaking of pipelines and leaving them to keep leaking crude into the environment because of poor equipment handling.
A remote-sensing study, “Mapping Impacts of Crude Oil theft and Illegal Refineries on Mangroves of the Niger Delta of Nigeria with Remote Sensing Technology”, found that distressed mangrove vegetation associated with illegal or unauthorised refining activities covered an approximately 37.6 km² area.
Assault on the Deltas
Hundreds of thousands of Niger Delta residents have suffered from the impacts in the almost seven decades since oil was discovered in the region. Two crude oil spill fire deforestation incidents deserve to be mentioned here: those in Goi and Bodo. Shell was successfully challenged in courts in The Netherlands and the United Kingdom by the impacted communities over both incidents.
One spill from a Shell facility affected Goi community in Ogoniland, Nigeria, in 2004. The community and the adjoining mangrove forest caught fire, sacking the entire community. The impacts were so extreme that the residents of Goi left their homes and evacuate the community. "We were eating, drinking, breathing the oil," said Eric Dooh to The Guardian. Nearly 20 years after the spill, he returned to visit the community, which remained deserted, with decimated biodiversity. (7)
The second community is Bodo, also in Ogoniland. A 2008 major oil spill there destroyed vast areas of mangrove forests. These oil spills destroy the lives of the impacted communities. Water contamination makes fishing impossible – the main livelihood for many of these communities –, prevents them from accessing safe drinking water, and even their lands are contaminated, often making it impossible for them to farm. (8)
In both Goi and Bodo, an official sign warns: “Public Notice, PROHIBITION! Contaminated Area, Please Keep Off” (see picture).
The deforestation of the Niger Delta has gained notoriety mostly be the accompanying oil pollution and gas flaring. The region should be a cautionary tale to other regions where the drive for petrodollars continue to sideline care for people and the planet. This is particularly disturbing in Africa where there appears to be a coordinated assault on world heritage and other protected areas. The flash points include Virunga National Park in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Okavango Delta in Namibia/Botswana, the Saloum Delta in Senegal – all of them UNESCO World Heritage Sites – and Murchison Falls National Park in Uganda.
But resistance to this destruction has been woven for a long time. In an article previously published in the WRM Bulletin, Ken Saro-Wiwa, a leader of the Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People (MOSOP) warned about the long-term impact of the destruction of Ogoniland by oil companies. He described the environment in his community of Ogoni as having been “completely devastated by three decades of reckless oil exploitation or ecological warfare by Shell.... An ecological war is highly lethal, the more so as it is unconventional. It is omnicidal in effect. Human life, flora, fauna, the air, fall at its feet, and finally, the land itself dies.” Ken Saro-Wiwa was ‘legally’ assassinated by hanging, in November 1995. His message is as strong as ever. (9)
The struggle to reforest and reclaim the forests is ongoing with community women leading the charge by raising nurseries of mangroves and replanting in degraded portions. Despite the huge harms wreaked on the Niger Delta forests, the people have not given up hope.
Nnimmo Bassey, Health of Mother Earth Foundation, Nigeria
‘Energy’ is much talked about today, but both the word and concept are relatively new inventions. The concept of ‘energy’ as we know it today was created just a few hundred years ago. Entrepreneurs realized that they could use the fossil fuels coal, oil and gas to increase the productivity of their machines, and thus better control their workforce and accumulate capital. The wealth of the richest people on earth is built on the massive use of fossil fuels. This wealth has been created at the expense of social and ecological destruction. (1)
‘Energy transition’ does not question this understanding of ´energy´. It does not question the structural exploitation of territories and people that is inseparable from this concept of ‘energy’. The social and ecological destruction that forest-dependent communities face as a result of energy-related projects continues very much the same in times of ‘energy transition’ – which has, above all, created more opportunities for capital accumulation for the beneficiaries of fossil fuelled capitalism. Nevertheless, it is sold by its promoters as the way to a cleaner future. Investors who got rich with fossil fuels now also invest their money into profitable business opportunities of the new wave of energy projects. This also helps them ´clean’ up their image (see the ´box´ about Adaro, below).
Asia has become the most industry- and energy-intensive region worldwide. A new wave of energy-related projects connected with the ‘energy transition’ are causing massive deforestation, in particular in Southeast Asia. Without pretending to present a complete picture, this article gives a glimpse of how energy-related projects impact on and threaten forests and forest-dependent peoples in Southeast Asia.
Coal extraction
Indonesia is the main coal extracting country in Southeast Asia, and coal is the main source of electricity generation in the region. Since 2020, Indonesia´s coal production has annually increased and in 2024, reached a new production record of 831 million metric tons. (2) This alone suggests that the supposed ´energy transition´ is a lie.
Main export destinations are China and India. From there, coal is embedded in manufactured goods supplying the industrialized world, just like other export-oriented energy projects mentioned below.
Coal mining is also a key driver of deforestation. The Indonesian anti-mining network JATAM reported in 2025 that in the province East Kalimantan mining – coal mining in particular - was the main driver of deforestation, responsible for 4.2 million hectares of forest destruction. (3) Provincial regulations oblige mining companies to restore mining pits; however, most companies fail to fulfil their legal obligation to reforest. Media reports suggest that about 1,700 mining pits have been abandoned before the required restoration was carried out. (4)
While Indonesia is the main coal producer in Southeast Asia, China and India are the main coal producers in the world. According to official data, in Indian states of Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand and Madhya Pradesh, forest-rich districts with coal mining have lost an 51,900 hectares more than districts without coal mines. (5)
Hydropower dams
Along the 5,000 km long Mekong River and tributaries, three decades of hydropower dam construction has destroyed large forest areas. State and private interests, in particular from China and Thailand, use ´energy transition´ to push for and justify the building of more dams. Activists are warning that a ‘final battle’ to save the Mekong River is underway, with the latest announcements for yet more mega-dams risking to devastate the Mekong River. (6)
In Indonesia, the government plans to use hydropower to increase the share of ‘renewable energy’ in its energy matrix. Two priority hydro dam projects, located in North Kalimantan province, threaten a forest region that conservationist NGOs like WWF call ‘The Heart of Borneo’: the 1.3 GW Mentarang Induk Hydropower plant is already under construction while the 9 GW Kayan Hydroelectric Power plant is still in the planning phase. (7)
The case of Adaro: ´Green transition´, ‘greenwashing’ and deforestation
The Adaro group is one of Indonesia´s major coal mining companies. However, in times of ‘energy transition’, Adaro presents itself as a ‘green’ company, even if in reality it is increasing its own deforestation track record. Adaro´s CEO and co-owner, Garibaldi “Boy” Thohir, leads a consortium that is building the Green Industrial Park KIHI in North Kalimantan. Indonesia’s ex-president Jokowi called it “the largest green industrial area in the world”, in reference to the solar panels and electric vehicle batteries to be produced there. This ignores the destruction of 30,000 hectares of lands including forests to set up the industrial Park. (8) Adaro also has stakes in one of KIHI`s industries: PT Kalimantan Aluminium Industry. The company plans to process bauxite from West Kalimantan, where bauxite mining is a driver of deforestation. (9) To ensure the massive electricity demand of aluminium smelting, Adaro became 50 percent co-owner of the Mentarang hydropower dam project, while simultaneously building a coal-fired power plant to meet the smelter´s energy needs. (10)
Nickel mining
Nickel is crucial to the ‘energy transition’. It is a key component in lithium-ion batteries used to power electric vehicles and so-called renewable energy storage units. In 2023, thousands of villagers on Halmahera Island, in North Maluca province, Indonesia, collided with security forces when they occupied the installations of the company PT IWIP (Weda Bay Industrial Park), the epicentre of Indonesia´s nickel industry. Villagers protested against the destruction of the Boki Marure Karst area, a forested area the residents have been guarding for generations. (11)
Indonesia has about half of the world´s nickel reserves. Among the many affected communities are the O’Hongana Manyawa, one of the remaining nomadic Peoples in Indonesia. O’Hongana Manyawa means ‘People of the forest’. One O’Hongana Manyawa comments that: “if it continues like this, the forests in Halmahera will be destroyed. The trees will be cut down; the animals will be driven out and die because their homes have been completely cleared. Then where will we live?” (12) According to a study, the Indonesian nickel industry destroyed at least 75,000 hectares of forests until 2024. (13)
The Philippines is the other major nickel producer in SE Asia is. The Alliance to Stop Mining (Alyansa Tigil Mina) denounces how Palawan Island, with its extensive forest areas, including mangroves, has become one of the main nickel mining areas, ignoring laws that protect forests and ignoring Indigenous communities saying “No” to mining. (14) According to one community member: “It’s our culture that has been affected, because the environment is being destroyed. It is our belief that there are spirits in the mountains and the spirits are angry because of the destruction of their homes, the trees, the forest.” (15)
In Santa Cruz, in Zambales province, four large-scale nickel companies are active. One community member said: “Before nickel mining, the mountains were filled with trees. We earned a living purely through farming vegetables and root crops. Life was good back then.” Another community member adds: “The companies really dig up the mountain and the trees that protect us from flooding. Now when it rains, it floods.” (16)
The Caraga Region is the epicentre of nickel mining in the Philippines. A fisherwoman says: “Before, if there was a storm, the ocean water wouldn’t penetrate the river system, and the winds would be stopped by the trees. The forest cover was very thick, which protected us from storms. Now, big waves come in, and the flooding is more severe. Water runs down from the mines and brings mud, while stronger winds hit the village.” One fisherman adds: “The mud poisons the mangroves, and some of the mangroves have died. They try to replant them, but they won’t grow.” (17)
‘Rare earth’ mineral mining
‘Rare earth’ mineral mining is about the extraction of 17 metals. Contrary to what the name suggests, these deposits are not actually rare, but scattered which in turn makes their extraction expensive. As components of wind turbines and electric vehicles, these elements are crucial for the ‘energy transition’. Myanmar is the main country in SE Asia in terms of ‘rare earth’ mineral mining, followed by Thailand, Vietnam and Malaysia, with Vietnam having the biggest known reserves in the region. (18)
In Kachin state in northern Myanmar, the boom in ‘rare earth’ mineral mining already caused severe impacts (see article in this bulletin), including more than 30 thousand hectares of deforestation in the period 2018-2024. According to a spokesperson: “There has [also] been a noticeable rise in deforestation since around 2018, with sharp increases particularly around mining zones due to road construction, land clearing for extraction activities, and widespread tree cutting for fuelwood or to dry the rare earth sludge.” (19)
Bioenergy
In Indonesia, organisations warned in 2021 that 10 million hectares of forests were at risk due to the demand for woody biomass energy from Japan and South Korea as well as Indonesia. All three countries, were planning to increase the use of wood pellets to co-fire coal power plants. (20) A report from 2024 on deforestation for woody biomass and the setting up of ‘energy’ tree plantations in Kalimantan, Sulawesi and Papua points to a staggering increase in wood biomass export volumes. (21)
Industrial oil palm plantations produce Indonesia´s main commodity, palm oil. It has been responsible for millions of hectares of deforestation. The latest pretext for expansion has become the domestic use of biodiesel. A 66 per cent increase in deforestation in 2025, if compared with 2024, might be related to the government’s policy to expand biodiesel use, blending it 50 per cent with conventional diesel oil. West Papua is the new frontier of oil palm expansion in Indonesia. (22)
Papua: The new deforestation frontier
As a result of colonization, the island of Papua is divided in a western part controlled by Indonesia and the country Papua New Guinea, on the eastern side of the island. Papua holds the biggest and most diversified forest area that still remains in SE Asia and is home to numerous Indigenous Peoples. But it is also heavily under threat by energy-related projects.
In West Papua, one tactic used by the Indonesian government to destroy huge forest areas without the destruction appearing as ´deforestation´ in monitoring statistics, is to reclassify areas as ´non-forest´. This is a common practise in particular where it benefits industrial oil palm companies. (23) Another tactic is attempting to label monoculture oil palm plantations as forests. For example, the President has argued that oil palm plantations are forest because “oil palms are trees (..) they´ve got leaves (..) We don´t need to be afraid of endangering – what´s it called – deforestation, right?” (24)
The biggest deforestation project in West Papua, and probably worldwide, is the Merauke National Strategic Project. (25) 560,000 hectares of the more than 2 million hectares which the government of Indonesia has allocated to the Merauke Project, would be turned into sugar cane plantations, among others, to produce bio-ethanol. The government plans a mandatory 10 percent ethanol mix for petrol. (26) Another dangerous threat for forests in Papua is the decades-old plan by the Indonesia government to build the Mamberano River hydropower dam complex. If built, it could become the world´s largest hydropower complex, with potential to provide electricity for numerous mega-industries in special economic zones. It would be a ´death certificate´ for the future of Papua´s forests and Indigenous Peoples.
In the Gulf province in Papua New Guinea, French oil company TotalEnergies plans a mega-liquified fossil gas project with production wells, a pipeline and processing plants. (27) The government also plans to expand industrial oil palm plantations by up to 1.5 million hectares by 2030, combined with factories for biodiesel production. (28)
Geothermal mining
In Indonesia, legally protected unfragmented forests have been opened for geothermal mining. A law approved in 2014 considers geothermal mining not a 'mining activity’. Many forest-dependent communities in the archipelago are now struggling against the mining companies drilling for potential mining sites insides primary forest areas, for example on the island of Flores. (29)
Forest conservation that triggers more deforestation
Governments’ forest conservation plans in SE Asia are increasingly based on carbon trading and offsetting, turning the protection of forests into one more business opportunity. Whenever such plans are put in practice, those behind the plans tend to blame forest-dependent communities for deforestation. The drivers of large-scale deforestation such as those described in this article, by contrast often go without mention; where they are mentioned, they are described as an unfortunate occurrence. Restrictions do not target this large-scale destruction for energy but traditional farming and livelihood activities of peasant farmers and forest-dependent communities.
In Indonesia, one of the first jurisdictional REDD programs was implemented between 2019 and 2024 in the province of East Kalimantan. On the one hand, the program, supported by the World Bank, did not restrict the operations of industrial oil palm plantations, or the logging and mining sectors. (30) On the other hand, Indigenous communities that have taken care of the forest they depend on, have faced severe restrictions. The indigenous Dayak Bahau community of Long Sun, for example, has been struggling for recognition of their ancestral rights over the lands and forest they depend on. They reported restrictions imposed on them as part of the jurisdictional REDD program, due to which they lost access to forests which women in particular depend on. Using fire to prepare fields for planting in the forest and tree felling for building material were also prohibited. One of the village women explains that her community has processes and practises in place that were developed over hundreds of years and do not destroy the forest. When land is burnt, special rituals are performed so that the fire does not spread. She says “I think the best forest caretakers are Indigenous communities”. (31)
Final remarks
This article describes the connection between energy-related projects and deforestation in Southeast Asia. While incomplete, it shows the extent of the destruction caused by massive deforestation that results from such energy-related projects, whether related to fossil or ‘clean’ energy. It shows how ´energy transition´ builds anything but a ´cleaner´ future.
Increasingly intertwined with this ‘energy transition’ trend, is an expansion of militarized conservation in Southeast Asia through government policies and plans; the UN Convention of Biodiversity (CBD) targets like the 30x30 conservation target to protect 30 percent of land by 2030 in protected areas; and private sector so-called ‘nature-based solutions’ initiatives. Discussing what energy and energy transition are really about is therefore fundamental and urgent.
With the increasing pressure over people´s territories, strengthening the support to communities facing all these projects and threats is equally urgent. Not only to strengthen the struggles to defend their territories and forests but also to build stronger alliances and movements in the region to resist.
Of the actions undertaken by the Brazilian government to advance the so-called 'energy transition', one seems particularly ironic, but it's not: increasing the use of 'natural' gas, a fossil fuel. As a strategic pillar of the 'transition', the Energy Research Company (EPE), linked to the federal government, proposes to double gas production in the country by 2034 and to invest up to 140 billion reais (USD 27.6 billion) in infrastructure projects for the sector. (1) Among these projects are 27 transport pipelines that connect different states of the country. One of them stands out for its size and for being located mostly within the Amazon forest. The proposed gas pipeline would connect the municipality of Santo Antônio dos Lopes, in the state of Maranhão, to Barcarena, in the state of Pará; it is expected to be 677 kilometres long and could transform hundreds of kilometers of closed Amazon forest into a large construction site, impacting several communities that live along the proposed pipeline.
Globally, Brazil is a small player in the gas sector: in 2024, it ranked 29th among countries producing this fossil fuel. (2) But why would a country boasting that renewable sources represent 50 percent of its energy mix invest in fossil fuels – and at the same time claim that this will help the country’s energy transition? (3)
Unsurprisingly, the lobbying power of the oil and gas sector is strong, and many companies stand to profit from this boom. In Brazil, part of the exploration, processing and transportation of gas have been privatized in recent years and private companies already dominate a significant part of the entire gas chain - most notably Eneva, the largest private gas operator in the country. (4) Although it is a scenario marked by disputes between different economic groups, there is something that unites them all and the government itself: the discourse of the key role of 'natural' gas as a 'transition fuel'.
The 'natural' in the name helps in creating this false impression; it disguises that what is called ‘natural gas’ is also a fossil fuel and no more or less natural than oil or coal. Moreover, in most cases, oil and gas are in the same deposits and are extracted together. (5) The burning of fossil gas is among the main causes of global warming. The idea of 'energy transition' may be in the discourse of representatives of the fossil fuel sector, but they know it doesn't exist. (6) Eneva's own CEO stated in an interview: "The world has never had a real energy transition; it has had energy additions". (7) Subsequently, however, he reinforces the importance of gas for this supposed transition which, as he himself suggests, will never happen.
As always, those who will pay the price for the expansion of this fossil fuel energy source will be the communities that would be impacted by the construction of gas pipelines, the increase in gas extraction areas, and the boost that this fuel will give to industrialization in the region. An overview of the plans for the gas pipeline that could be built in the Amazon forest provides clues about some of the main private players interested in the booming gas market in Brazil and the impacts it could cause.
The Santo Antônio dos Lopes-Barcarena gas pipeline: there was a forest and many villages along the way
The proposal for the planned gas pipeline to connect the municipality of Santo Antônio dos Lopes, in the state of Maranhão, to Barcarena, in the state of Pará, is not new and has already been proposed along several routes. The most recent proposal is part of the Indicative Plan for Transport Pipelines (PIG), published by the Energy Research Company. (8) This document is an important piece for attracting and guiding the billions of dollars in investments planned for the sector's infrastructure.
According to the document, the gas pipeline would be 677 km long and its installation requires a 20-meter-wide right-of-way. In Maranhão, the route passes through a transition zone between the Amazon forest, Cerrado, and Caatinga biomes. As the route moves towards Pará, the vegetation takes on characteristics of the Amazon forest, which is the predominant biome along the proposed route. The gas pipeline was planned in a region containing conservation units, native vegetation, wetlands, and Indigenous Territories, such as the Alto Rio Guamá, Alto Turiaçu, Awá, and Caru Indigenous Territories.
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Most recent proposed route for the gas pipeline, submitted by EPE in 2020
Ninety-eight percent of this route would require opening forest areas currently without any pipeline infrastructure, and approximately 264 km of this new strip would be in an area of intact Amazon forest. The only gas pipeline of similar scale ever built in the Amazon connects the municipalities of Urucu and Coari with the capital of the state of Amazonas, Manaus. Its construction highlights some of the impacts that could be repeated. Dozens of representatives from affected communities denounced the lack of transparency in the process prior to the work, as well as the trail of destruction it left behind. (9) Opening of at least 32 clearings and parallel roads to enable the work in the dense forest; movement of heavy machinery that blocked sources of drinking water used by the communities; clogged tributaries with a drastic reduction in the fish population, among others. This is without even mentioning the population boom in the region's cities driven by the construction and the leaks that have already occurred along this gas pipeline. The local population inherited nothing from the project except its impacts. For many communities, these socio-environmental impacts represent a disruption of their traditional ways of life, resulting in collective and individual traumas that are difficult to overcome.
As for the remaining 2 percent of the route, equivalent to 13 km, it would share the right-of-way with an already existing Norsk Hydro mining pipeline in the state of Pará. In a manifesto against this mining pipeline, published in 2024, Indigenous, Riverside, and Quilombola communities from the Acará Valley denounced the consequences of this type of project. Hundreds of trees uprooted; at least 20 streams devastated by Hydro's "gigantic backhoe" bulldozers to protect and guarantee the project; the installation of power transmission lines to supply the pipeline structures; water contamination and water scarcity and criminalization of leaders who oppose the project. Communities affected by this mining pipeline ask: “Why do we have to pay with our lives, with our culture and with our biodiversity for something that only serves to enrich foreigners and the partners of a company on the other side of the world?” (10)
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Construction of Hydro's slurry pipeline for transporting bauxite in the Brazilian Amazon (Photo: IRQ Movement)
In the municipality of Moju, in Pará, the gas pipeline passes less than 3 km from four Quilombola territories. (11) Several Quilombola communities were recognized after the project was drawn up, so this number may be even higher; it is possible that the route will pass straight through some of these territories.
The proposed pipeline route would also cross at least 11 rural settlement projects. (12) The impacts of this are not few. Farmers who lost land to the Urucu-Coari-Manaus gas pipeline, for example, had to give up a 50-meter-wide strip of land on their property. For this, they received a paltry compensation (some received less than 10 thousand reais - USD 2,000 - in 2006) and were prohibited, among others, from carrying out their traditional agricultural practices that involve the use of fire, given that this would pose a risk of explosion. (13) “Nowadays, for us, it is a very big risk because we are surrounded [by the pipelines]. If something happens, no one will escape. No one can use fire to farm there anymore. This hurt us a lot. We used to plant corn, we used to plant mallow, but nobody can do that anymore. Nobody can use fires, the farmer has to clear the land and use fires for that,” laments one of these farmers for whom living with fear has become part of everyday life. (14)
So, what stage is this project at?
The Santo Antônio dos Lopes-Barcarena gas pipeline appears in the Transport Pipeline Indicative Plan (PIG) as “under licensing”. (15) According to this document, it is considered to have this status because the proposed route is similar to the Pará Gas Pipeline, an older project which had already started the regularization process previously. The Pará Gas Pipeline, proposed by a company that is part of the Termogás holding company, even obtained construction authorization from the responsible federal agency. In 2007, it was in the process of environmental licensing, but this process did not move forward. (16) At the time, lobbying for the gas pipeline project was not strong enough to get it off the ground.
The Termogás holding company belongs to Carlos Suarez, known as the “Gas King”. Suarez is one of the main lobbyists for the construction of gas pipelines in the country. (17) Also part of his holding company are Gasmar and Gás do Pará, gas distribution companies in the states of Maranhão and Pará, respectively, which would be connected by the gas pipeline. Over the past two years, both states have enacted controversial laws concentrating the monopoly on gas distribution in the hands of companies connected to the "Gas King" – and of which the states are also shareholders.
Since the impacts of a project of this magnitude extend beyond the mere construction of the pipelines, it is important to consider these broader impacts, too.
The Santo Antônio dos Lopes end, state of Maranhão
The municipality of Santo Antônio dos Lopes is located in the Parnaíba Basin, the second largest onshore basin of 'natural' gas in Brazil, which has been a burden for many surrounding communities. Since 2013, with the first installations of Eneva's thermoelectric plants, for example, the traditional community of Demanda was removed from its territory; 6,000 babaçu palm trees were felled; coconut breakers from traditional communities were unable to maintain their way of life. They lost access the babaçu groves and streams in areas that were privatized, and several farmers were no longer allowed to work in their territories due to the risk of causing explosions. (18)
Impacts such as these could intensify with the construction of the planned gas pipeline, as this would imply more gas extraction. In addition to the gas pipeline to Barcarena, the Indicative Plan for Transport Gas Pipelines includes three other gas pipelines that would end or start in Santo Antônio dos Lopes. (19)
The company that dominates gas exploration and production in the Parnaíba Basin is Eneva, whose main shareholder is the BTG bank. It holds the concession rights for 15 blocks in the Basin, which together total an area of over 3 million hectares.
Currently, most of the gas extracted from the Parnaíba Basin is used to supply the Parnaíba Thermoelectric Complex, owned by Eneva itself. The surplus is sent by truck mainly to Suzano's pulp mill in the city of Imperatriz, (20) and to the mining company Vale's Pelletizing Plant in the capital of the state of Maranhão, São Luís. Eneva is also investing in what it calls a "green corridor" to supply gas to agribusiness trucks in the Matopiba region (a region encompassing the states of Maranhão, Tocantins, Piauí, and Bahia).
The boost that gas gives to companies like these is one of the pipeline’s impacts that are usually not considered. In addition to providing (cheap) energy for these companies, gas allows them to present themselves as 'environmentally responsible' companies that are so demanded by the consumer market. Suzano, one of the world’s largest pulp companies, has faced many allegations of deforestation and violation of the rights of communities whose territories it occupies to plant eucalyptus. In fossil gas, the Suzano has yet another ally to present itself as ‘positive for the climate’. (21) Vale, whose mines open up giant clearings in the middle of forest areas and whose tailings dam collapses in Mariana and Brumadinho caused an unprecedented death toll and continue to leave a trail of socio-environmental damage, claims that the use of gas moves the company closer to its ‘zero carbon’ goal. For the agribusiness sector in the Matopiba region, which is characterized by concentration of forested lands, deforestation of the Cerrado and land conflicts, gas opens the possibility to sell its commodities abroad claiming a 'reduction in carbon footprint,' simply because the trucks that transport its grains are fueled by fossil gas. Eneva's largest shareholder, the BTG bank, is providing yet another form of greenwashing. The company operates one of the world's largest carbon offsetting projects through 'reforestation'. Planting trees - often eucalyptus - on lands the company has declared ‘degraded’, BTG’s subsidiary BTG Pactual - sells carbon credits to large multinationals so they can continue polluting and presenting themselves as 'carbon-neutral'. (22)
Almost all the gas currently extracted from the Parnaíba Basin is used up by the industrial activities mentioned above. The construction of the gas pipeline that would connect Santo Antônio dos Lopes to Barcarena would thus depend, in part, on proving that there is more gas to transport, in other words, that the ‘probable’ gas reserve is indeed there. To that end, by 2028, Eneva intends to drill for gas in 11 blocks; exploration in5 of them as early as 2026. (23) These exploration has already caused impacts. Some of these blocks for which Eneva has already obtained authorization to drill, overlap with at least five Quilombola territories and, in one case, more than 75 percent of the Krenyê Indigenous territory. (24) Recently, after action by the Federal Public Prosecutor's Office, Eneva gave up exploration in part of these blocks. (25)
the lack of confirmation that the gas reserve indeed exists and with no significant surplus of gas to transport, the initial idea of a gas pipeline from the Parnaíba Basin to Barcarena was almost shelved by the government. However, the opening of a liquefied natural gas (LNG) import terminal in Barcarena changed that perspective. The gas pipeline was redesigned to be bidirectional, and the gas, which could also be sent from Barcarena to the region of Eneva's thermoelectric plants, could serve as a safety measure to guarantee their operation. This kept the pipeline proposal alive, and the proposal remains in the most recent Indicative Plan for Transportation Pipelines, published in 2025.
The Barcarena end, Pará state
The municipality of Barcarena, located in the heart of the Amazon forest, has become a central industrial hub for the expansion of gas production in the northern region of the country. The opening, in 2024, of the region’s first LNG Regasification Terminal was greeted with fanfare by local and federal governments who announced a “new energy era”, “cleaner and more sustainable”. (26)
The terminal belongs to the US company New Fortress Energy (NFE) and receives ships carrying imported liquefied gas for regasification. Currently, this gas has two main destinations: the Novo Tempo Thermoelectric Power Plant and the aluminum factory of Alunorte.
The thermoelectric power plant belongs to NFE itself, but will be operated by its subsidiary Celba. It was installed in Barcarena and is scheduled to be inaugurated sometime in 2026.
As for Alunorte, the largest alumina refinery in the world outside of China, it is a subsidiary of the Norwegian multinational Hydro and uses the same pipeline denounced by the people of the Acará Valley. Refining alumina, the raw material for aluminum, is an energy-intensive industrial activity. By replacing some of the l used by Alunorte with gas, (27) Hydro can charge more on the international market for its 'low carbon alumina and aluminum' and advertise its supposed 'green aluminum'. (28) This, despite Alunorte being involved in conflicts with traditional communities due to the serious socio-environmental impacts caused by its activities. Examples of this include the numerous spills of “red mud,” an extremely toxic residue dumped by the company – not to mention the impacts caused by other Hydro subsidiaries in the region. (29)
In addition to the gas pipeline that would connect Barcarena to Santo Antônio dos Lopes, yet another proposed gas pipeline would connect the municipality in Pará state to the state capital, Belém. Injecting more gas into this scenario is to give this predatory industrial hub the breathing room to advance under the guise of greenwashing financed by the use of this fossil fuel.
Communities beware!
The Santo Antônio dos Lopes-Barcarena gas pipeline is still just a preliminary plan, but the interests driving the 'natural' gas sector in Brazil could revive it at any moment under the banner of 'energy transition'. It is important to keep in mind that many of the large 'development' projects planned for the Amazon remained dormant for decades before finally being implemented. This was the case, for example, with the Belo Monte Hydroelectric Plant, (30) with the BR-319 highway and with the Urucu-Coari-Manaus gas pipeline. (31)
Given the expanding gas sector, it's crucial to pay close attention to the next steps the fossil fuel lobby will take, because those most impacted by such projects are usually the last to know. After all, as the people of the Acará Valley said in their manifesto against Hydro's mining pipeline: "Like any invasion, we don't know for sure what they came to do or what damage they will cause. No one even told us how many trees would be uprooted to allow pipes to violate our ancestral land."
